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Introduction: rationale and
synopsis of the thesis
The ten-year growth strategy "Europe 2020" set for European countries
the policy objective of achieving a "smarter, greener and more inclusive
economy" by the year 2020. This policy has been articulated into ﬁve
objectives, which combine employment, innovation, environmental, edu-
cation and social inclusion goals in a broad and comprehensive strategy.
In this broad policy framework, a more sustainable economic growth
is deemed to depend upon improvements towards a greener production
that may lead to a "decoupling" between environmental pressure and
economic growth and allow to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions re-
duction target without giving up to economic growth.
These improvements towards greener production techniques depend
upon the ﬁrms' adoption or generation of environmental innovations
(from now on EI). EI are crucial to improve the sustainability of the pro-
duction processes, either when innovations are integrated in the produc-
tion process (in the literature deﬁned as "Cleaner Production" measures),
or when innovations are add-on measures which allow to reduce the neg-
ative externalities of the production in the last stage of the production
process, for example by including speciﬁc ﬁlters to reduce pollution (in
the literature this typology is deﬁned as "End of Pipe technologies").
As it will emerge in this work, EI show some peculiarities with respect
to standard technological innovations that motivate their investigation,
either in the drivers and in the eﬀects. Looking at their eﬀects, not only
EI allow to move towards a more sustainable production of goods and
services, but can also be central for generating new growth and job op-
portunities, as the new products or production processes can have the
side-eﬀect of boosting productivity, growth and reducing production's
costs (Montresor et al., 2013). Consequently, their potential for policies
aimed at reaching a smart and more sustainable Europe is big. More-
over, EI are considered a special typologies of innovations (Rennings,
1998; 2000), whose investigation brought to the rise of a strand of liter-
ature speciﬁcally aimed at understanding their nature and drivers. As
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it will emerge in the following section and in the ﬁrst Chapter, EI are
indeed inﬂuenced by a more systemic interplay of the traditional drivers
that have been identiﬁed for standard technological innovations and the
knowledge required to their adoption goes beyond their existing indus-
trial knowledge base, thus requiring the need to explore new knowledge
sources.
Furthermore an important distinction has to be made between (green)
invention and EI, mostly because for EI to play their joint economic and
environmental eﬀect, those have to be actually adopted by ﬁrms. Their
invention, when it is not translated into an adoption, is indeed not enough
to allow them to play their potential. This consideration has important
implications also on the appropriate choice of the indicators and vari-
ables that are selected to properly frame an empirical investigation on
the topic. A discussion of this choice will be provided in the following
Chapters.
Before starting a proper analysis on this research ﬁeld, given the
complexity of the framework of analysis that has been anticipated so far,
it is useful to ﬁrst make clear what exactly we are going to talk about,
i.e. how EI are deﬁned and how they can be measured. After having
provided the reader with the main deﬁnitions which are at stake, the
structure of the thesis will be presented.
Deﬁnitions of environmental innovations
Starting from James' deﬁnition of EI as "new products or processes which
provide customer and business value but signiﬁcantly decrease environ-
mental impacts" (James, 1997:53), many attempts have been made to
enrich such a deﬁnition in order to account for the complexity and spe-
cialty of EI (Rennings, 1998; 2000) that will be soon described.
One of the broadest and more comprehensive one came from the
"Measuring Eco Innovation" (MEI) project, which deﬁnes EI as "the
production, assimilation or exploitation of a product, production pro-
cess, service or management or business method that is novel to the
organization (developing or adopting it) and which results, throughout
its life cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other
negative impacts of resources use (including energy use) compared to
relevant alternatives" (Kemp and Pearson, 2007:7).
This deﬁnition is inclusive of all those EI which are not necessarily
new to the world but are at least new to the organization adopting them,
as the Oslo Manual on innovation suggests to (OECD, 2005).
Moreover this deﬁnition allows to consider as an EI not only new
environmental technologies, but also any new/improved product or pro-
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cess or service (Kemp and Pearson, 2007). From this it follows that "all
new processes that are more eco-eﬃcient are eco-innovations" and that
"the term eco-innovation crucially depends on an overall assessment of
environmental eﬀects and risks" (Kemp and Pearson, 2007: 7).
A feature of this deﬁnition that needs to be underlined is the focus
on the environmental performance of innovation itself, rather than on
the mere environmental aim. This suggests how in the deﬁnition the
eﬀective achievement of environmental improvements after the adoption
of an innovation is more important than the motivations underlying it.
Accordingly, an "unintended" EI that has environmental eﬀects should
be considered as an innovation towards sustainability, while the inten-
tion of a ﬁrm to introduce an EI should not be accounted for until it is
adopted.
Like in the case of standard technological innovations, several mea-
sures are available to measure EI empirically. Although the diﬀerences
between EI and standard technological innovations (that are described
in the next section), the indicators proposed by Kemp (2010) to mea-
sure EI are nothing new with respect to those already available for the
measurement of standard technological innovations, with the exception
of the last one. Those are the following:
1. Input measures: Research and development (R&D) expenditures,
R&D personnel, or innovation expenditures;
2. Intermediate output measures: i.e. those indicator that do not mea-
sure directly the output "innovation" but can approximate it for
instance through the number of patents or scientiﬁc publications;
3. Direct output measures: the number of innovations, descriptions of
individual innovations, data on sales of new products;
4. Indirect impact measures derived from aggregate data: i.e. those
indicators that indirectly measure the impacts of the adoption of
EI extrapolating them from aggregate data. An example of such an
extrapolation is the measurement of changes in resource eﬃciency
or in productivity measures that can be applied through decompo-
sition analysis techniques.
According to Kemp (2010), the most used indicator for measuring
empirically EI is the number of patent, mainly because it is a widespread
indicator, easy to be collected, and allows for international comparisons.
Using patents as a proxy for innovation have some drawbacks that
require to be accounted for. The main one is that patents measure in-
ventions rather than innovations. In other words, patents provide an
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indication of new knowledge that is generated, but it cannot be taken for
granted that these inventions will enter the market. Moreover, not all the
patents have a commercial value and strong sectoral, country and tem-
poral heterogeneities emerge when one looks at the propensity to patent.
Lastly, only technological invention can be patented, thus excluding orga-
nizational and marketing innovation. A broader discussion on the limits
of using patents to approximate innovations is provided into Chapter 2.
Given on the one side the availability of data and on the other side
the drawbacks that the choice of one indicator instead of its alterna-
tives entails, in the current work two alternative but at the same time
complementary measures to capture EI are going to be exploited.
In the ﬁrst and the third Chapter, a direct output measure of the
adoption of EI will be used. In these Chapters EI are deﬁned, similarly
to the deﬁnition provided above, as "a new or signiﬁcantly improved
product (good or service), process, organizational method or marketing
method that creates environmental beneﬁts compared to alternatives"
(Community Innovation Survey 2006-2008: Section 10). Furthermore,
"the environmental beneﬁts can be the primary objective of the innova-
tion or the result of other innovation objectives" or "can occur during the
production of a good or service, or during the after sales use of a good
or service by the end user" (Community Innovation Survey 2006-2008:
Section 10).
Data on EI come from two diﬀerent but interrelated survey sources,
the COMMUNITY INNOVATION SURVEY 2006-2008 provided by EU-
ROSTAT, exploited into the ﬁrst Chapter and the MANNHEIM INNO-
VATION PANEL 2009 and 2011 provided by the Center for European
Economic Research-ZEW, exploited into the last Chapter.
In the second Chapter an intermediate output measure will be instead
used to proxy EI. In particular a patent-based analysis has been imple-
mented and, according to a methodology that will be discussed in the
Chapter, an assignment to each patent to the "Environmental Realm"
has been conducted according to the technology ﬁeld of each patent.
What spurs the adoption of environmental in-
novations?
A necessary step for any analysis dealing with EI is to understand their
determinants, i.e. those elements which spur their adoption or generation
by ﬁrms. This is a crucial element as it can help policymakers and
managers to properly promote the adoption and diﬀusion of EI.
On the one side the "standard" innovation studies literature has out-
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lined a set of determinants that aﬀect ﬁrms' adoption of technological
innovations. Although the understanding of what drives innovations is
still a debated issue, a general framework can be drawn. Innovations
could mainly be "science-pushed" or "technology-pushed" , i.e. can be
driven by advancements in science and by R&D, they can be "demand-
pulled", i.e. can be driven by market conditions, they could be "regu-
latory pushed", i.e. driven by policies that for instance might set new
standards, or also by a combination of the previous elements (Carter and
Williams, 1959; Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 1990; Schmookler, 1966;
Walsh, 1984).
On the other side, the relationship between EI and technological in-
novations is not straightforward, since, from the seminal contribution
by Rennings (1998), the literature stressed that EI are "special" innova-
tions for at least three reasons. The main one is the "double externality
problem", determined by the the nature of EI as innovations that on
the one side act to reduce negative environmental externalities and, on
the other one, are themselves subject to externalities, which are driven
by knowledge spillovers, that could potentially lead to sub-optimal in-
vestments towards their adoption. Furthermore EI are characterized by
the "regulatory push/pull eﬀect", as they are strongly regulation driven
and regulation might act both on the supply (push) and on the demand
side (pull). Lastly EI are strongly depending on social and institutional
innovations, as many issues in the sustainable use of resources and in
the reduction of negative environmental externalities are not primarily
technological (Rennings, 1998).
As a consequence of these "specialties", an ad hoc literature on the
speciﬁc determinants of EI has emerged, which is connecting the above
mentioned "standard" studies on innovations' determinants and the new
research eﬀorts in the realm of EI determinants. As we will see, results in
their determinants are not fully comparable, suggesting that the choice
of treating EI as "special" innovations is appropriate.
My original contribution to this literature on the determinants of EI
is given mainly by the ﬁrst Chapter of this thesis. In Chapter 1 the focus
is on the role of external knowledge sourcing strategies in facilitating,
among the other determinants, the adoption of EI by ﬁrms. This analysis
will be implemented on survey data from the Community Innovation
Survey 2006-2008 for manufacturing ﬁrms in eleven European countries.
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What induces climate change technologies and
which is the role for regulation?
What emerges from the literature on EI is that they are usually more reg-
ulation driven than "standard" technological innovations (e.g. Rennings,
1998), as in the absence of a policy aimed at fostering EI, through for
instance the imposition of environmental standards to be reached, these
innovations are less likely to be adopted than standard technological in-
novations. An exception to this evidence comes for EI aimed at reducing
not only the environmental impacts but also the costs of production. In-
novations leading to a reduction in the use of energy or materials per
unit of output have indeed appeared to be less regulation driven than
other EI (Rennings and Rammer, 2009).
A wide strand of literature has emerged trying to understand the re-
lationship between regulation and the generation of greener technologies,
or the adoption of EI.
These studies are either based on patent data (e.g. Brunnermeier and
Cohen, 2003), or on survey data (e.g. Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2011).
Empirical evidence of a positive correlation between EI and regulatory
stringency has been depicted, pointing to the conclusion that regulation
is a key driver of EI.
It is also clear from previous literature that innovation in climate
change might be induced by strict and properly designed environmental
regulation.
However, countries diﬀer in the enforcement and characteristics of en-
vironmental regulation, so that in some cases a weaker regulatory frame-
work is depicted.
In such cases it might worth analyzing which mechanisms facilitate
the adoption or generation of EI.
This is the scope and at the same time the originality of Chapter 2, in
which a regional and sectoral analysis on patent data in "Environmentally
Sound" technology ﬁeld on Italian Regions will be performed.
Which are the economic implications of envi-
ronmental innovations?
Very debated is the so called "Porter hypothesis" (Porter and Van Der
Linde, 1995), according to which environmental regulation is not nec-
essarily a cost burden for the ﬁrm, but, when properly designed and
ﬂexible, might engender positive eﬀects on ﬁrms performances, as it can
signal opportunities that ﬁrms might not be aware of. There is no uni-
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versally accepted position regarding this hypothesis, and the literature
tried to test it in heterogeneous ways by decomposing it into a strong, a
weak and a narrow version (for a review see Ambec et al., 2013).
Understanding the economic implications that the adoption of EI has
on ﬁrm's competitiveness is in this last respect an interesting contribute
to the debate. This is the objective of the last Chapter, in which an
analysis on the eﬀects of the adoption of EI on ﬁrms' competitiveness will
be performed on the "Mannheim Innovation Panel" dataset. As it will
emerge in the Chapter, economic competitiveness is a broad concept that
encompasses shorter and longer term implications. These include, for
instance, eﬀects on proﬁtability, employment eﬀects, productivity gains
and increases or losses in exports or Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).
The analysis performed in the Chapter is meant to understand whether
the adoption of EI engenders gains or, on the contrary, losses not for the
whole economy rather for the ﬁrms adopting EI. Consequently a short
term measure of competitiveness centered on ﬁrms has been exploited
and the indicator chosen provides a measure of ﬁrms' proﬁtability.
EI will be disentangled into multiple categories of innovations: such as
those innovations leading to a reduction in the use of materials or energy
per output and those reducing production externalities such as harmful
materials and air, water, noise and soil pollutions. This diﬀerentiation is
coherent with the ﬁndings and suggestions of previous literature in the
ﬁeld (Rennings and Rammer, 2009; Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2013).
The competitive gains or losses of diﬀerent typologies of EI are go-
ing to be tested for these two categories. Energy and resource eﬃcient
innovations may lead to "win win" situations, in which reducing the en-
vironmental impact of production is contextually improving ﬁrms' eco-
nomic performances. The same expectation does not hold for externality
reducing innovations, for which the cost burden of the adoption of the
innovation might overcome the potential gains.
Furthermore we test whether the motivation behind ﬁrm's decision to
engage in an environmental-innovative activity can moderate the com-
petitive gains of EI adoption.
The originality of this essay lies in the decision to disentangle the prof-
itability eﬀects of an innovation by typology of EI and by the motivation
that drove ﬁrms' decision to adopt EI.
Structure of the thesis
The present work is a collection of three essays that shed light on EI
adopting diﬀerent but strictly related schumpeterian perspectives. Each
of the essays is an empirical analysis that will investigate one of the broad
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research questions outlined in the previous section and will be presented
into separate Chapters from Chapter 1 to Chapter 3.
The ﬁrst Chapter is devoted to understand the determinants of EI by
focusing on external knowledge sources; the second Chapter answers the
question on what induces climate change technologies adopting regional
and sectoral lens while Chapter 3 analyzes the economic implications of
the adoption of EI for ﬁrms.
Each Chapter draws on a diﬀerent dataset. The exploitation of several
data sources is an element of richness of the thesis, as it allows a better
extension of the results that emerged and it is also a way to overcome
the limits that the choice of one dataset with respect to its alternatives
engenders.
Microdata (i.e. ﬁrm level data) from the Community Innovation
Survey 2006-2008 for eleven European countries is exploited in the ﬁrst
Chapter.
The empirical analysis of the second Chapter is based on patent ap-
plications at the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) extracted by PATSTAT
and REGPAT, on ﬁrm level data available in ORBIS, a Bureau van Dijk
data-source and on a set of economic and environmental indicators pub-
lished by the Italian statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT): mainly the regional Ac-
counting Matrix including Environmental Accounts (Regional NAMEA),
Input Output Tables and Economic accounts.
Chapter 3 is instead centered on the exploitation of two waves of the
Mannheim innovation Panel, the 2011 and the 2009 one.
The three essays diﬀer not only in the research hypothesis and in
the dataset used to their tests, but also on the methodology. Given the
structure of the dataset and the nature of the dependent variables, the
ﬁrst Chapter performs logistic regressions, the second one performs zero
inﬂated negative binomial regressions and a principal component analy-
sis, while the last one performs interval regressions techniques. Together
with the choice of multiple datasets, the heterogeneity in the methodolo-
gies applied certainly enriches the current research thesis.
A general conclusive Chapter will follow the three essays and will
outline a set of policy implications that have been derived from the whole
thesis.
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Chapter 1
The interactive drivers of
environmental innovations.
European evidence on eleven
countries
Claudia Ghisetti
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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to investigate the impact that knowl-
edge sources external to the ﬁrm have on its environmental in-
novations. Using the CIS 2006-2008, it is estimated the impact
that sourcing strategies of external knowledge have on the prob-
ability of introducing environmental innovations by the ﬁrms of
eleven European countries. Both the depth and the breadth of
knowledge sourcing impact positively on environmental innova-
tions, signaling their positive role among the determinants of en-
vironmental innovations. Interesting non linearities are however
depicted: knowledge heterogeneity entailed by the breadth knowl-
edge sourcing could become an obstacle to ﬁrm's environmental
innovativeness, after a certain threshold, as it is the case for tech-
nological innovations.
JEL codes: Q55; O31; O32.
Keywords: Environmental innovations, Open innovation
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1.1 Introduction
Environmental innovations (EI) are nowadays key policy targets, in the
perspective of achieving a "decoupling" between environmental pressure
and economic growth and to foster a "smarter, greener and more inclusive
economy" ("Europe 2020 Strategy"). The importance of EI has stimu-
lated an intensive research eﬀort, which has rapidly highlighted their
manifold nature.
EI are, at the same time, technological, organizational, social, and
institutional innovations (Horbach, 2008). Their study thus needs to go
beyond the focus that environmental studies initially reserved to policies
and regulations issues (Kemp, 2010).
The analysis of EI has actually become truly multidisciplinary. In
particular, it has beneﬁted from a cross-fertilization of ideas between
disciplines which share a "system" kind of approach to innovation. The
bridging between ecological economics and innovation studies, for exam-
ple, has revealed extremely fruitful to address those "special" elements
which characterize EI: the so-called "double-externality problem", the
"regulatory push/pull eﬀect" 1 and the need to take into consideration
the ecological, social and institutional co-evolving context (Rennings,
1998).
The extension of systemic approaches to the realm of EI, has stressed
the role that both external knowledge sources and cooperation have in
spurring the adoption of EI. More precisely, an important general result
has been extended to the EI realm: external knowledge sources and co-
operation are at least as important as those within the ﬁrm (e.g. R&D).
Although with a number of speciﬁcations - for example, about the kind
(e.g. private business vs. public research) of external source - this result
supports the system approach to the analysis of EI. On the one hand,
the literature on the so-called "open innovation" mode is proliferating
(Chesbrough, 2003, 2006) and oﬀering interesting insights about the role
of external knowledge for "standard" technological innovations (Laursen
and Salter, 2006; Henkel, 2006).
On the other one, little attempt has been done so far to extend such
literature also to include environmental innovations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as it follows. In section 1.2
the relevant literature is provided, together with the research questions.
Section 1.3 presents the empirical strategy, in Section 1.4 results are
outlined and Section 1.5 concludes.
1Regulation may indeed act both on the supply and on the demand side (Cleﬀ and
Rennings, 1999; Rennings and Rammer, 2009).
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1.2 Literature Review
After an intense deﬁnitory eﬀort (e.g. Kemp and Pearson 2007; Kemp,
2010; Rennings, 2000), a consensus has emerged on the notion of EI
as: "the production, assimilation or exploitation of a product, production
process, service or management or business methods that is novel to the
ﬁrm [or organization] and which results, throughout its life cycle, in a
reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of
resources use (including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives"
(Kemp and Pontoglio, 2007, p. 10).
The literature on EI determinants acknowledges they are stimulated
both by "market-pull" and by "technology-push" factors, coherently with
the evidences outlined for technological innovations (Pavitt, 1984). Be-
yond them, a regulatory push/pull eﬀect is a key driver for EI (Cleﬀ and
Rennings, 1999), mainly due to the public good nature of EI. This regu-
latory push/pull eﬀect, together with the double externality problem and
their need for a co-evolution with the ecological, social and institutional
setting, give EI a "special" connotation (Rennings, 1998).
This "specialty" is the reason why a speciﬁc strand of literature has
emerged, aiming at outlining their determinants.
Extant literature has mainly focused on four clusters of determinants:
"Market-pull", "Technology-push", "Firm speciﬁc factors" and "Regula-
tion" (Horbach et al., 2012).
As for the ﬁrst, turnover expectations, new demand for eco-products
(Rehfeld et al., 2007), past economic performances (Horbach, 2008) and
customer beneﬁts (Kammarer, 2009) have been mainly assessed.
As far as the "Technology-push" determinants are concerned, ﬁrms'
technological and organizational capabilities have been investigated, such
as their engagement in R&D, knowledge capital endowment (Horbach,
2008), organizational innovations and speciﬁc management schemes like
EMS (Rehfeld et al., 2007; Wagner, 2008; Rennings et al., 2006; Ziegler
and Nogareda, 2009; Ziegler and Rennings, 2004).
"Firm Speciﬁc factors" such as ﬁrms' size, location, sector and age
are also co-aﬀecting ﬁrms' environmental innovativeness, and have been
accounted for by the majority of the previous investigations (e.g. Maz-
zanti and Zoboli, 2009; Horbach, 2008; Rehfeld et al., 2007; Wagner,
2008; Rennings et al., 2006; Ziegler and Rennings, 2004).
Lastly, "Regulation" has been recognized as key determinant for EI
in several empirical studies (Del Rio Gonzales, 2009) based either on
survey data (e.g. Frondel et al, 2008; Hemmelskamp, 1999; Horbach et
al., 2012, Rennings and Rammer, 2010; Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2010)
or on patent data (e.g. Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003; Costantini and
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Mazzanti, 2013 in press; Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997; Johnstone et al., 2010,
2012; Lanjouw and Mody, 1996, Popp, 2006). A number of elements - e.g.
strictness, enforcement, predictability, sectoral diﬀerences, credibility of
the commitment to standards, and combination with other policies - have
however made this regulatory push diﬃcult to be measured and estimated
(Kemp and Pontoglio, 2010).
Relatively less attention has been instead paid, up to now, to the EI
drivers of interactive nature, such as those processes depicted for techno-
logical innovations of knowledge-exchange and sharing, knowledge sourc-
ing and transfer, and innovation cooperation which involve innovative
ﬁrms along with other actors of their innovation systems (Arora and
Gambardella, 1994; Veugelers, 1997; Tödling and Kaufmann, 2009). In
a nutshell, for their technological innovations, ﬁrms beneﬁt extensively
from learning-by-interacting with external actors, which provide them
with additional knowledge and intangible assets (e.g. human capital) to
be complemented with the internal ones.
As they are not easily contracted through market-based transactions
(Sinha and Cusumano, 1991), by cooperating with other ﬁrms and/or
research organizations (e.g. through R&D partnerships), innovators can
more easily tap into the competence and experience of the external
providers. Furthermore, they can share the risks and costs of their R&D
projects and try to beneﬁt from economies of scale (Hagedoorn, 1993;
Tether, 2002)2. In contrast to this richness of results, the analysis of the
interactive drivers of EI is still quite scanty.
Among the few recent contributions, it has been found that inno-
vative oriented industrial linkages and inter-ﬁrm networking could trig-
ger EI in a similar way to other innovations: for example, by providing
ﬁrms (SMEs, in particular) with a way to compensate for their lack of
economies of scale (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009). On the other hand, in-
novation cooperation (e.g. in R&D) has been shown to work more eﬀec-
tively for EI than for non-EI (De Marchi, 2012), but also more selectively.
For example, business suppliers (Horbach et al., 2012) and universities
(Cainelli et al., 2012) appear to be the only partners for which it has a
signiﬁcant impact. Furthermore, information from partners which are ex-
ternal to the supply chain (e.g. KIBS, research institutions, Universities
and competitors) result more important for EI than for other innovations
(De Marchi and Grandinetti, 2013).
2These and other results have been reﬁned and extended by regional and eco-
nomic geography studies. In particular, the innovation outcome of the interac-
tion/cooperation has been shown to depend on the diversity between the objectives
and incentives of the partners (e.g. Mora-Valentin et al., 2004; Belderbos et al., 2004;
Arranz and Fdez de Arroyabe, 2008) and of the manifold proximity which separate
them (Boschma, 2005).
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The systemic nature of EI has appeared to require information and
skills which are distant from the traditional industrial knowledge base (De
Marchi, 2012). Similarly, agglomeration economies impact positively on
EI only in those industrial districts in which the subsidiaries of multi-
national corporations inject global environmental pressures at the local
level (Cainelli et al., 2012).
All in all, evidence begins to emerge that eco-innovators could also
beneﬁt from an "open innovation mode" (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006), in
which the knowledge boundaries between the innovative ﬁrm and the en-
vironment become permeable, the outcome of its internal research eﬀort
gets combined with that of other companies and/or research organiza-
tions (e.g. through licensing, joint ventures, and cooperation), and the
risks and the rewards of the resulting innovations are shared. As a fur-
ther step forward towards the substantiation of this hypothesis, it is
interesting to investigate whether some other pillars of the open innova-
tion mode are at work also with respect to EI, and eventually with which
characterisations.
At the core of "Open Innovation" mode (OIM) external information
sourcing is an EI driver of interactive nature which is currently under-
investigated by the EI literature. Contrarily, a rich strand of literature
on technological innovations has investigated the potential of external
knowledge strategies, showing that investing in broader and deeper search
can increase ﬁrm's ability to adapt, change, innovate and boost business
performance (e.g Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006).
Following Laursen and Salter (2006), it can be argued that, also with
respect to EI, two characteristics could aﬀect its outcome. The ﬁrst one
is the breadth of the ﬁrms' knowledge search, accounted by number of
sources they search for in order to innovate. The manifold nature of an
EI, and the diﬀerent capabilities which it requires (e.g. technological,
organization and institutional), makes the eco-innovator possibly more
reliant than the standard one on numerous, external knowledge sources:
the number of sources the ﬁrm search for is expected to be a signiﬁcant
predictor of its capacity to deal with its systemic nature and thus to
actually eco-innovate.
The second feature of the knowledge search strategy which deserves
consideration for EI is its depth, meant as the extent to which ﬁrms draw
deeply from their external sources. The complexity entailed by EI, and
the diversity of the knowledge base that it requires with respect to the
industrial one in which the ﬁrms operates (De Marchi, 2002), makes it
helpful to have a pattern of interaction with the external sources which
is sustained over time. Through a deep interaction with each of the
diﬀerent sources, eco-innovators are able to share feed-backs with them,
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mutually adapt their understanding and reach an actual assimilation of
external knowledge. As an illustration, one could just think about the
need of having repeated interactions with both suppliers and customers
for the ﬁrm to understand whether they could provide it with an actually
green value chain for its EI. For these reasons, the extent to which ﬁrms
draw deeply from their external sources should also positively impact on
their EI.
If both the breadth and the depth of external search could be relevant
for EI, the possibility that their exploitation could become at a certain
stage counteracting should be also considered. With respect to techno-
logical innovations, this has actually been found (Laursen and Salter,
2006) and motivated by drawing on the attention-based theories of the
ﬁrm (Simon, 1947; Ocasio, 1997; Koput, 1997). In brief, becoming too
widely and/or too deeply reliant on external sources might entail for the
ﬁrm a subtraction of organizational energies and cognitive attention from
its ultimate innovative eﬀort. In principle, this could equally happen for
EI. However, two aspects require an empirical investigation in order to
ascertain it. On the one hand, the balance between internal and external
knowledge sources could be, in the case of EI, relatively more in favor
of the latter, and thus exclude the possibility of an inverted U-shape
pattern between breadth/depth and EI. On the one hand, given its inner
systemic nature, in the case of EI, dealing with an increasing number of
diverse knowledge sources could become more demanding, and thus more
problematic, than drawing increasingly more from one of them
1.3 Empirical application
1.3.1 Econometric Strategy
The theoretical arguments presented in Section 1.2 will be tested through
a set of econometric estimates. At ﬁrst, the impact of the BREADTH
and DEPTH of external sourcing on the ﬁrm's EI can be estimated
through the following model, which includes a proper set of controls for
each ﬁrm i (CONTROLS):
EIi = α+ β1BREADTHi + β2DEPTHi + γCONTROLSi + i (1.1)
In a second moment, a variable which accounts for the role of coop-
eration in R&D, COOP , is included into equation (1.1) 3:
3COOP is added from the second model in order to avoid possible multicollinear-
ity problem that might arise in including COOP together with BREADTH and
DEPTH from the ﬁrst model. To be clear, this is just a scrupulous to cope with a
correlation that might only in principle arise. If we look at the correlation matrix in
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EIi = α+ β1BREADTHi + β2DEPTHi + β3COOPi + γCONTROLSi + i (1.2)
In order to account for the potential non-linearity in the relationship
between external knowledge sourcing and EI, the second model (1.2):
will be augmented by including squared terms for both BREADTH and
DEPTH:
EIi = α+ β1BREADTHi + β2DEPTHi + β3COOPi + β4BREADTH
2
i
+β5DEPTH
2
i + γCONTROLSi + i
(1.3)
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, which will be de-
scribed into the next section, the adequate model selected is a LOGIT
one, which allows scrutinizing the relationship between external knowl-
edge sourcing and the ﬁrm's probability to introduce an EI. As a robust-
ness check, a PROBIT regression model will be also performed.
1.3.2 Dataset and variables
The empirical application is based on the Community Innovation Survey
(CIS) for the period 2006-2008 and focus on manufacturing ﬁrms.4 This
CIS wave is the ﬁrst one which collects systematically, into an ad hoc
section, harmonized information on EI with a wide European coverage
and has two main strengths. First, it directly provides data on the ﬁrms'
EI output, without the need of resorting to indirect proxies like patent
data (e.g. Griliches, 1998). Second, it allows for large scale analyses, such
as the one we will carry out in the following for 11 countries: Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia,
Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia 5.
The CIS 2006-2008 deﬁnes EI in a way which substantially over-
laps with the standard one provided by the "Measuring Eco Innovation"
(MEI) project (see Section 1.2)6.
Table 1.3 and at the VIF tests in Table 1.7, we can see that this problem is statistically
not relevant.
4Data comes from the CIS 2006-2008 anonymized microdata dataset provided by
Eurostat.
5Descriptive statistics by country of the dependent variable and the two main
variable (BREADTH and DEPTH) are available in the Appendix in Table 1.5 and
Table 1.6.
6EI is deﬁned as "a new or signiﬁcantly improved product (good or service), pro-
cess, organizational method or marketing method that creates environmental beneﬁts
compared to alternatives" where "the environmental beneﬁts can be the primary ob-
jective of the innovation or the result of other innovation objectives" or "can occur
during the production of a good or service, or during the after sales use of a good or
service by the end user".
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Furthermore, it distinguishes nine types of EI: six related to environ-
mental beneﬁts emerging from the production of goods or services7, and
three concerned with the beneﬁts emerging from the after-sales use of a
good or service 8.
From this information I built the dependent variable ENV INNO,
which is equal to one if at least one environmental innovation has been
introduced by the ﬁrm and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Table 1.2: Variables descriptive statistics
Variable N mean min sd max
BREADTH 15911 5,34 0 2,76 9
COOP 15911 0,30 0 0,46 1
DEPTH 15911 0,98 0 1,34 9
ENVINNO 15911 0,64 0 0,48 1
EXPORT 15911 0,70 0 0,46 1
INNOPOL 15911 0,23 0 0,42 1
lnTURNOVER 15911 13,53 -6,91 3,98 24,39
MNC 15911 0,15 0 0,36 1
POLSTR 15911 -0,85 -4,99 1,51 2,16
RD 15911 0,45 0 0,50 1
As for the independent variables in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, I ﬁrst
draw on Laursen and Salter (2006) to capture the BREADTH and
DEPTH of ﬁrm's external knowledge sourcing strategy.
The former counts the number of external information sources the
ﬁrm relies upon for its innovation activities, out of the list of the nine indi-
cated potential knowledge providers (i.e. suppliers; customers; competi-
tors; consultants and private R&D institutes; universities; government
or public research institutes; conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions; scien-
tiﬁc journals and trade/technical publications; professional and industry
associations). The latter instead counts the number of these external
information sources to which the ﬁrm attributes a "high" degree of im-
portance among the four listed options (i.e. not used, low, medium, high
importance). From Equation(1.2) it is captured the extent to which the
ﬁrm is engaged in formalized cooperation agreement with external part-
ners with the use of a dummy variable, COOP , taking value 1 when the
7The following dimensions belong to this category: reduced material use per unit
of output; reduced energy use per unit of output; reduced CO2 'footprint' (total CO2
production); replaced materials with less polluting or hazardous substitutes; reduced
soil, water, noise, or air pollution and recycled waste, water, or materials.
8The following dimensions belong to this category: reduced energy us; reduced air,
water, soil or noise pollution and improved recycling of product after use.
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ﬁrm is formally engaged in cooperation agreement, either with business
partners or with Universities or Research Organizations, and 0 otherwise.
It was then needed to control for those elements, which have been
stressed to be EI determinants in previous literature, and that has been
called CONTROLS in Equation (1.1) to (1.3).
At ﬁrst a dummy, RD, which captures whether the ﬁrm is engaged
in internal R&D investment has been used9.
The economic performance of the past is also accounted for, by in-
cluding the logarithm of the turnover (lnTURNOV ER) in the ﬁrst year
of the reference period, i.e. 2006. COUNTRY - and SECTOR- speci-
ﬁcities in terms of market and technological opportunities and institu-
tional settings are controlled for with the inclusion of a series of dummies
10. Two characteristics related to the internationalization of the ﬁrm,
which extant literature has considered to be important determinant of
the EI performance (e.g. Cainelli et al., 2011, 2012) have been included:
EXPORT , a dummy which reﬂects whether the company is engaged in
international markets, and MNC which denotes whether the ﬁrm is an
aﬃliate of a multi-national corporation.
Finally, given the relevance that policy and regulation aspects have
been found in the empirical literature of the ﬁeld, at ﬁrst, I try to con-
trol for the role of policy intervention for innovation in general, with a
dummy that captures whether the ﬁrm has received a public support
for its innovation activities (INNOPOL). As for more speciﬁc regula-
tory aspects, unfortunately CIS data do not allow to directly control for
those related to environmental policies at the ﬁrm level 11. This issue
has been overcome by exploiting EUROSTAT data on "Air emissions
accounts by industry and households". In particular, as in some recent
contributions (e.g. Costantini and Crespi, 2008), the logarithm of the
CO2 emission/Value Added ratio in each country/sector combination re-
ferred to the year 2006 has been adopted as a proxy for environmental
policy stringency (POLSTR) 12.
9Although available, I do not use the continuous variables for R&D expenditures.
As they refer to the last year of the period (i.e. 2008), they could create endogeneity
problems as the dependent variable refer to the entire period (i.e. 2006-2008).
10In order to control in a more punctual way for these speciﬁcities, as a robustness
check COUNTRY*SECTOR interactions have been included.
Results of this robustness checks conﬁrm the solidity of the models, and are pre-
sented in Table 1.8.
11To be clear, in the Section of the CIS on "Innovations with Environmental Ben-
eﬁts", a question on the role of regulation (either existing or expected) is included.
The formulation of the question, however, does not allow me to include this variable
in our regressions, as it covers only those ﬁrms who introduced an environmental
innovation, and it could generate endogeneity problems in the regressions.
12Robustness checks on diﬀerent years for emissions and value added (2006-2008
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As a robustness check, a dummy variable (EAST ) capturing those
Countries belonging to the Eastern Europe has been added to the full
speciﬁed model. This inclusion has not altered the results and the vari-
able was found to be negative and signiﬁcant. At the sake of parsimony
it has been excluded from my analysis, because it was not improving the
explanatory power of the model, as the Pseudo Squared R after its in-
clusion remained unaltered. The correlation matrix (see Table 1.3) and
the Variance inﬂation factor (see Table 1.7) do not reveal collinearity
problems in the regressors selected.
1.4 Results
The main research hypothesis about the importance of knowledge sourc-
ing is strongly conﬁrmed.
Once the role of the ﬁrm's internal and external predictors of EI is
controlled for (Equation (1.1)), knowledge sourcing appears as a ﬁrmly
signiﬁcant EI driver. On the one hand, the wider the array of knowledge
sources the ﬁrm draws on (BREADTH), the greater is the ﬁrm's cov-
erage of the multiple need of knowledge that EI requires, and the more
probable is its introduction. On the other hand, although with a lower
impact, the chance to be an eco-innovator also increases with the com-
petences that the ﬁrm acquires from a deep interaction with its external
knowledge sources (DEPTH).
The inclusion of cooperation in R&D (Equation (1.2)) is relevant,
as COOP is positive and signiﬁcant, and, moreover, is not altering the
results of the previous Model.
The test for non-linear eﬀects (Equation (1.3)) of external knowledge
also shows that its impact on EI is not unbounded, at least as far as
the breadth of knowledge sourcing is concerned. More speciﬁcally, the
beneﬁt of a diﬀuse sourcing strategy stops increasing after a certain level
(BREADHT 2 is signiﬁcantly negative). As it happens with technologi-
cal innovations, an excessive and not profound resort to multiple knowl-
edge sources can create redundancy and/or inconsistent signals, which
could make the ﬁrm hesitant to step into EI.
The negative sign of BREADTH2 required to implement a further
analysis, to assess whether the negative coeﬃcient of the quadratic term
(BREADHT 2) oﬀsets, after a certain threshold, the positive eﬀects of
BREADTH. Should it be the case, it would lead not generally to di-
minishing returns but speciﬁcally to negative returns.
emissions and 2006 value added; 2003-2005 emissions and 2003-2005 value added)
have been performed.
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Table 1.4: Estimation results
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III)
BREADTH 0.116*** 0.107*** 0.273***
(0.00778) (0.00784) (0.0271)
DEPTH 0.0883*** 0.0735*** 0.0938***
(0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0339)
BREADTH2 -0.0173***
(0.00267)
DEPTH2 -0.00467
(0.00708)
COOP 0.469*** 0.478***
(0.0494) (0.0496)
RD 0.402*** 0.347*** 0.322***
(0.0443) (0.0446) (0.0451)
lnTURNOVER 0.0200*** 0.0193*** 0.0206***
(0.00671) (0.00669) (0.00673)
POLSTR 0.0127 0.0113 0.0125
(0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226)
MNC 0.302*** 0.233*** 0.241***
(0.0591) (0.0598) (0.0599)
EXPORT 0.251*** 0.238*** 0.234***
(0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0455)
INNOPOL 0.195*** 0.119** 0.125**
(0.0494) (0.0503) (0.0504)
Constant -0.539*** -0.483*** -0.790***
(0.13) (0.131) (0.141)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1627 0.1675 0.1697
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -8703.3982 -8649.0873 -8626.4246
Prob> Chi2 0 0 0
Observations 15.919 15.911 15.911
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
From Figure 1.1, it can be identiﬁed a maximum point in the function
(graphically for values ofBREADTH above 8), below whichBREADTH
seems to negatively aﬀect EI, as the function starts decreasing. By test-
ing for that, on the contrary, the conclusion that no negative returns are
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at stake can be derived 13.
On the other hand, going back to the interpretation of the estimation
results, whatever increase in DEPTH turns into an increase in the prob-
ability of introducing an EI (DEPTH2 is not signiﬁcant), suggesting the
pervasive (although lower) beneﬁts of a sustained pattern of interaction
with the outer environment for a ﬁrm which aims at entering the green
realm 14. Coming to the controls, all the variables are behaving as I
expected.
The "technology push" played by ﬁrmÂ´s engagement in R&D activ-
ities is a good and signiﬁcant predictor of EI. Also "market pull" kind
of determinants have resulted as being important: past economic per-
formance (lnTURNOV ER) is positive and signiﬁcant. "Firm speciﬁc
characteristics" such as sector, country, exporting activities (EXPORT )
and being a multinational aﬃliate (MNC) are also key determinants for
EI.
Lastly, the "regulatory push" is conﬁrmed in the case of the existence
of an innovation policy (INNOPOL positive and signiﬁcant), while the
proxy for the stringency of the policy is not signiﬁcant. This last element
is not surprising, as having included in all the models both Country and
Sector dummies, should have cleaned the data from country and sector
speciﬁc policy stringencies. This is however not implying at all that
policy does not play a role in spurring EI.
13This result has been derived by calculating algebraically the turning point by
equaling to zero the ﬁrst derivative of the function. This function is constructed by
implementing the margins of the logit model in equation (1.2), having as a dependent
variable ENV INNO, and for the explanatory variables, all the values are taken
at their means, a part from BREADTH, which takes continuous values. The ﬁrst
derivative of this function has been computed to calculate the condition under which
it equals 0, i.e. when the ratio between β1 BREADTH and β2 BREADTH
2 is equal
to zero. Accordingly, what emerges is that the maximum point of the function lays at
value 8.32 of the independent variable, with a conﬁdence interval which varies from
7.14 to 9.45. If we consider that the BREADTH ranges from 0 to 9, I can conclude
that the function does not show actually negative returns, as in the conﬁdence interval
the function is not signiﬁcatively diﬀerent from 0. This means that the negative value
of the quadratic term has to be interpreted as a sign of only decreasing returns, but no
negative eﬀect are depicted. I stress this result, as it is diﬀerent from what emerged
in previous study on technological innovations (Lauren and Salter, 2006).
As further test for the presence of decreasing returns,BREADTH has been split
into 4 groups, according to the number of external sources the ﬁrm is relying upon,
and, taking as a benchmark the class NOBREADTH (in which 0 external sources
are exploited), a Logit regression for the Model (1.3) has been performed. Once again,
the decreasing returns of BREADTH are conﬁrmed, see Table 1.9 in the Appendix.
14As no curvilinearity in DEPTH is depicted in the estimation results, no further
test is needed to disentangle it.
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1.5 Conclusions
In spite of several common elements, EI are substantially diﬀerent from
"standard" technological and non-technological innovations. The possi-
bly more systemic nature has been conﬁrmed by the recent studies that
extend the analytical tool-box of innovation studies to the investigation
of EI (e.g. De Marchi, 2012). This result is supported by the evidence
on the importance of external knowledge for the ﬁrm's EI performance.
Apart from these works, the extent to which ﬁrms can actually organize
in order to beneﬁt from external knowledge has not been investigated
yet.
Although in a not very integrated way, the adoption of speciﬁc strate-
gies of knowledge sourcing, have been found to impact on the ﬁrms' in-
novativeness.
In trying to ﬁll this gap, the extant literature on the search patterns
for external knowledge of innovative ﬁrms has been exploited (Laursen
and Salter, 2006) and, as a value added, the standard innovation liter-
ature has been applied to the realm of EI. The econometric strategy of
the empirical application has been chosen consistently with the nature
of the dependent variable, and makes use of the systematic evidence,
which has been collected through the CIS 2006-2008 wave with respect
to eleven countries. Drawing on external knowledge, by devising (implic-
itly or explicitly) patterns of knowledge search which are broad and deep
increases the ﬁrm's chance to become an innovator. At ﬁrst sight, open
entrepreneurial strategies and open-innovation friendly policy should ﬁnd
scope to increase the EI performance of the ﬁrms and their externalities
on the economic system.
Furthermore, as in the case of non-EI, knowledge sourcing is not
completely unbounded: an excessive breadth of external sources become
problematic to handle and shows decreasing returns, but it does not be-
come detrimental, contrarily to technological innovation. Cooperation in
R&D is also conﬁrming my expectation of playing a key role in spurring
EI, and this is coherent with previous literature in the ﬁeld (e.g. De
Marchi, 2012). Lastly, the analysis of the set of determinants I built co-
herently with previous literature can conﬁrm my research expectations.
All in all, some of the building blocks of the open innovation mode
seem to work also in the case of EI, and this make of the "open eco-
innovation mode" an important source of inspiration for further analysis
and policy eﬀorts towards more sustainable patterns of development. A
further and interesting step, would be to look at the elements which work
in-between the absorption of external knowledge within ﬁrms 15.
15I am currently working on this further step in a paper jointly co-authored with
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Appendix
Figure 1.1: Plot of the predicted probability of EIs on BREADTH
Table 1.5: Distribution of the EI, BREADTH and DEPTH by Country
EI
COUNTRY 0 1 Total Perc. values >0
BG 1935 727 2662 27%
CZ 278 1179 1457 81%
DE 648 1683 2331 72%
EE 500 804 1304 62%
HU 194 582 776 75%
IT 1200 1900 3100 61%
LT 100 224 324 69%
LV 64 91 155 59%
PT 340 1741 2081 84%
RO 377 1020 1397 73%
SK 80 244 324 75%
Sandro Montresor and Alberto Marzucchi.
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Table 1.7: Variance inﬂation factor of the regressors
Variable VIF 1/VIF
BREADTH 1,37 0,727353
RD 1,33 0,752681
COOP 1,25 0,801662
DEPTH 1,21 0,825091
EXPORT 1,2 0,834456
INNOPOL 1,16 0,861648
lnTURNOVER 1,14 0,879183
MNC 1,12 0,896318
POLSTR 1,03 0,972957
Mean VIF 1,2
Table 1.8: Logit regression with Country*Sector interaction matrix
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
BREADTH 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.280***
(0.00786) (0.00791) (0.0275)
DEPTH 0.0888*** 0.0739*** 0.0972***
(0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0338)
BREADTH2 -0.0177***
(0.0027)
DEPTH2 -0.00531
(0.00699)
COOP 0.478*** 0.487***
(0.0498) (0.05)
RD 0.413*** 0.357*** 0.331***
(0.0448) (0.0451) (0.0456)
lnTURNOVER 0.0208*** 0.0201*** 0.0215***
(0.0067) (0.00667) (0.00671)
POLSTR -0.0922 -0.0398 0.0337
(0.96) (0.966) (0.956)
MNC 0.298*** 0.228*** 0.234***
(0.0594) (0.0602) (0.0603)
EXPORT 0.261*** 0.248*** 0.244***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.0461)
INNOPOL 0.189*** 0.112** 0.118**
(0.0498) (0.0508) (0.0509)
Constant -0.87 -0.773 -1.029
(0.89) (0.896) (0.887)
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector*Country Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 1.675 1.724 1.747
Observations 15,919 15,911 15,911
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Robustness check on curvilinearity in BREADTH through
classes
VARIABLES LOGIT
BREADTH1_3 0.654***
(0.0923)
BREADTH4_6 1.005***
(0.0899)
BREADTH7_9 1.181***
(0.0922)
DEPTH 0.1000***
(0.0339)
DEPTH2 -0.00533
(0.00709)
COOP 0.477***
(0.0495)
RD 0.329***
(0.0449)
lnTURNOVER 0.0207***
(0.00677)
POLSTR 0.0131
(0.0226)
MNC 0.243***
(0.0599)
EXPORT 0.234***
(0.0454)
INNOPOL 0.123**
(0.0503)
Constant -0.893***
(0.152)
Sector Dummies Yes
Country Dummies Yes
Observations 15.911
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
39

Chapter 2
Beyond inducement in climate
change: does environmental
performance spur environmental
technologies?
A regional analysis of
cross-sectoral diﬀerences
Claudia Ghisetti and Francesco Quatraro 1
1This paper has been accepted for publication in Ecological Economics. It has
been written during a Research Visiting period at GREDEG-CNRS Sophia Antipolis
(France).
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Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate on the inducement of
environmental innovations by analysing the extent to which en-
dogenous inducement mechanisms spur the generation of greener
technologies in contexts characterized by weak exogenous induce-
ment pressures. In the presence of a fragile environmental regula-
tory framework, inducement can indeed be endogenous and envi-
ronmental innovations may be spurred by ﬁrms' reactions to their
direct or related environmental performance. Cross-sector analysis
focuses on a panel of Italian regions, over the time span 2003-2007,
and is conducted by implementing zero-inﬂated regression models
for count data variables. The empirical results suggest that in a
context characterized by a weak regulatory framework, such as the
Italian one, environmental performance has signiﬁcant and com-
plementary within- and between-sector eﬀects on the generation
of green technologies.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: O33,
Q53, Q55, Q56, R11
Keywords:Green technologies, Environmental Performance,
Regional NAMEA, Technological innovation, Knowledge produc-
tion function
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2.1 Introduction
The economic analysis of environmental issues has received increasing
attention over the last decades. Within the wide body of literature on
the subject, the dynamics of the creation of environmental innovations
has recently become a key topic, due also to the identiﬁcation of these
new technologies as a means of restoring the competitiveness of advanced
countries which has been harmed by the economic crisis. Their emergence
is indeed supposed to bring about new jobs and new perspectives for
economic growth.
In this respect, an investigation of the determinants of green innova-
tions may provide useful input to policymakers when designing targeted
measures aiming, on the one hand, at reducing the environmental impact
of production activities and, on the other, at fostering technology-based
competitiveness.
Most of the literature analysing determinants of environmental inno-
vation has been grounded on the induced innovation approach accord-
ing to which stringent environmental regulation may exert an incentive
to ﬁrms to introduce innovations, for instance, allowing the polluting
standards exogenously set up by policymakers to be met (Brunnermeier
and Cohen, 2003; Rennings and Rammer, 2011; Rennings and Rexhuser,
2011).
This paper aims at contributing to this strand of literature by adopt-
ing a diﬀerent and yet complementary perspective on the inducement
mechanism. We investigate the extent to which, in a context with a
weak environmental regulatory framework, an inducement of environ-
mental technologies can still be at stake. In such a framework, induce-
ment could indeed be endogenous rather than exogenous. Instead of
investigating the direct relationship between an inducing factor (mainly
an environmental policy) and the generation of green technologies, as
previous literature has done, we posit that it is important to understand
if and to which extent such endogenous mechanisms are set in motion as
a response to environmental performance. In articulating this hypothe-
sis, we provide an interpretation of how those endogenous mechanisms
work by appreciating the distinction between direct inducement and that
exerted by related sectors.
To understand the latter, we need to stress the diﬀerences and com-
plementarities between the adoption of greener technologies and their
generation processes. For the latter, we argue that inducement mecha-
nisms are likely to work through user-producer dynamics based on the
derived demand of polluting agents for cleaner technologies rather than
through their direct innovating eﬀorts. We put particular emphasis on
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the importance of vertical linkages and the role of derived demand in
stimulating the generation of green technologies since environmental in-
novations may be endogenously pulled by the derived demand of verti-
cally related sectors featuring bad environmental performance. To test
for this, we implement a synthetic measure of vertical relatedness across
sectors based on input-output tables.
Cross-sectoral analysis is carried out on a panel of Italian regions
observed over the time span 2003-2007, and is based on matching of
the regional National Accounting Matrix with Environmental Accounts
(henceforth NAMEA) data, patent data and regional economic accounts.
The econometric results, obtained by implementing a zero-inﬂated bino-
mial model for count data variables, identify interesting and persistent
patterns of inducement for diﬀerent classes of emissions. Environmental
performance of vertically related sectors, proxied by emission intensities
in terms of value added, exerts a positive impact on the generation of
green technologies. This would support the hypothesis that sectors with
higher levels of green innovativeness are stimulated to generate green
knowledge by the demand coming from vertically related sectors with
bad environmental performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 articulates
an induced innovation framework to the analysis of the determinants of
the creation of green knowledge at the sectoral and regional level and
constructs the working hypothesis. Section 3 outlines the empirical con-
text of the analysis while Section 4 presents the data, methodology and
variables. In section 5, we show the results of the econometric analyses
and the main robustness checks we implemented. We provide conclusions
and points for discussion in Section 6.
2.2 Induced technological change and derived
demand for environmental innovations
The inducement hypothesis in climate change has been largely investi-
gated in the domain of environmental economics. This hypothesis iden-
tiﬁes environmental regulation as a driver for environmental innovations,
resting upon the traditional Hicksian argument that "A change in the
relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to invention, and
to invention of particular kind - directed to economizing the use of the
factor which has become relatively expensive" (Hicks, 1932: 124-125) 2.
2Habbakuk (1962) provided support to this hypothesis showing how, in American
and British historic evidence through the nineteenth century, labour scarcity pushed
ﬁrms to generate and introduce labour-saving technologies. The formal analysis pro-
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This strand of literature points to the moderating role played by reg-
ulation on the generation of green technologies. A stringent policy is
treated as an additional cost that increases total production costs by
changing the relative factor prices. This induces ﬁrms to engage in inno-
vation activities aimed at reducing the increased cost, e.g. by developing
emission-saving technologies 3. The incentives are engendered outside
the production system, i.e. in the institutional system and will for this
reason be labelled as exogenous in this paper. The correlation between
environmental regulation and technological change has been empirically
investigated either by using patent data to test whether regulation af-
fected knowledge generation 4 (e.g. Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunner-
meier and Cohen 2003; Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997; Popp, 2006) or by using
survey data to test whether regulation pushes and/or pulls environmental
innovations (e.g. Frondel et al, 2008; Horbach et al., 2012, Rennings and
Rammer, 2011; Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2011; for a review see Del Rio,
2009). In both cases, evidence conﬁrms that regulation exerts a positive
eﬀect on innovation.
The outcome of such inducement mechanisms cannot however be
taken for granted. The public nature of innovation and the appropriabil-
vided by Kennedy (1964) and Samuelson (1965) consists in the construction of an
innovation possibility frontier, with the typical shape of a production possibility fron-
tier, along which the trade-oﬀ between labour-saving and capital-saving innovations
can be traced. The relative costs of capital and labour shape the isorevenue that
enables identiﬁcation of an optimum direction of technological change (Binswanger
andRuttan, 1978). The approach has been criticized for the lack of microeconomic
foundations by Salter (1966), but remains one of the cornerstones of the economics of
innovation. Ruttan (1997 and 2001) has shown that technological change is charac-
terized by a strong directionality that can be represented in terms of changes in the
output elasticity of production factors.
3Pindyck (1979), and Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), shed light on the question as to
what extent energy and capital are complementary or substitutes by concluding that
in the short run these are complements while in the long run they are substitutes.
Accordingly, an increase in the price of energy (factor of production) in the long
run induces technological change (Jaﬀe and Stavins, 1995).
4In this perspective, an increase in pollution abatement expenditures, taken as
a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation, exerts a positive eﬀect on
granted patents in environmental ﬁelds (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996) and on patent
applications in environmental technologies (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003). Con-
versely, by using the same proxy for environmental regulation, Jaﬀe and Palmer (1997)
found a positive eﬀect only on innovation inputs, measured by R&D expenditure,
while no signiﬁcant eﬀect was found on overall patents.
The literature has also focused on speciﬁc environmental patents, e.g. on the eﬀect
of climate change policies on renewable energy patents (Johnstone, 2010a), on some
speciﬁc regulations, e.g. the Clean Air Regulation on NOx and SOx (Popp, 2006)
and on the role of the perception of stringent environmental policies (Johnstone et al.,
2012). In all these cases, conﬁrmation of the inducement hypothesis has been found.
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ity regime does indeed create a positive externality, which is translated
into innovation eﬀorts that are lower than the social optimum. Con-
versely, pollution is a case of negative externality, the social costs of
which are spread over the entire society, so that ﬁrms pollute more than
the social optimum level. Without policy intervention "ﬁrms pollute too
much and innovate too little compared with the social optimum" and in-
vestments in green technologies are in the end too low as "the two market
failures are mutually reinforcing" (Johnstone et al., 2010b: 9).
The need for environmental regulation is also supported by the Porter
hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) in its diﬀerent versions 5,
and empirical evidences underline the positive eﬀect of regulation over
ﬁrms' competitiveness, e.g. in terms of increased trade for environmental
technologies (Costantini and Mazzanti, 2012).
Moreover, the regulatory push/pull framework may have diﬀerent ef-
fects across diﬀerent typologies of environmental innovations (Rennings
and Rammer, 2009; Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2013) and diﬀerent pol-
icy frameworks 6 What is more, the stringency, predictability, ﬂexibility,
incidence and depth of the policy instruments impact on the eﬀort and
direction of the innovations (Johnstone et al., 2010b) although the mea-
surement of these elements is not an easy task (Kemp and Pontoglio,
2011).
In contexts characterized by weak environmental regulatory frame-
works and/or barriers to policy enforcement, the inducement may come
from within the economic system (endogenous) rather than from the in-
stitutions (exogenous).
A step forward in the identiﬁcation of the endogenous incentive for
ﬁrms to generate green technologies is represented by the literature on
corporate social responsibility (CSR)7. As remarked by Orlitzky et al.
5This hypothesis suggests that stringent environmental regulations, under certain
circumstances, may trigger innovations which lead to innovation oﬀsets that are go-
ing to improve ﬁrm competitiveness. According to the assumptions on the eﬀect of
regulations, the Porter hypothesis can be split into a "narrow" a "weak" and into a
"strong" version (Jaﬀe and Palmer, 1997). This hypothesis remains controversial in
its empirical investigation (see, for instance,Lanoie et al., 2011). Without going into
the details of this literature, it is important for us to highlight its content and the
fact that this idea challenges the one that regulation may be detrimental on ﬁrms'
and countries' competitiveness, thus encouraging production to be moved to countries
with lower environmental standards. This is known as pollution haven hypothesis.
6Market-based instruments such as taxes on the emissions or tradable permits have
indeed stronger impacts on innovations than direct regulation (e.g. Popp et al., 2009)
may generate diﬀerent innovative outcomes (Popp et al., 2009).
7The origins of this approach date back to the 1950s and it has been developed to
accommodate the traditional ﬁrms' maximization objectives and the idea that corpo-
rations play a role in society (see Lee (2008) for an exhaustive review). In the last
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(2011), although the CSR concept appears to be a multifaceted one, the
assumption that environmental responsibility is a key part of it is less
controversial (Hart, 1997).
Accordingly, factors such as moral appeal, sustainability and repu-
tation are particularly relevant in shaping the choice of ﬁrms to adopt
environment-friendly behaviour. The generation of green technologies
may allow ﬁrms to align the target of lowering the environmental impact
of the production process with the target of increasing technology-based
competitiveness. The reduction of production costs becomes a potential
side eﬀect stemming from the generation of green technologies whereas
the main inducing factor relates to the likelihood of improving ﬁrms'
performance through market evaluation.
These positive business performance eﬀects of ﬁrms' environmental
innovation strategies have been systematically assessed by Ambec and
Lanoie (2008) who explicitly analysed the channels through which envi-
ronmental practices are improving ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance. On the
one hand, environmental performance can increase revenues via a better
access to "green" markets, via a product diﬀerentiation strategy and via
entering a market for their pollution control technologies. On the other
hand, it can reduce costs in the following categories: "a) risk manage-
ment and relations with external stakeholders; b) cost of material, energy
and services; c) cost of capital and d) cost of labour" (Ambec and Lanoie,
2008: 46).
To sum up, consistently with the broader CSR approach, environ-
mental responsibility may aﬀect ﬁrms' ﬁnancial returns by allowing the
development of new markets, the increase of the market value of publicly
traded ﬁrms, the reduction of consumer boycotts and the attraction of
active consumers 8. Moreover, a proactive environmental management
may also reduce the risks associated with potential regulatory and legal
decades, this approach has successfully elaborated a framework that articulates the
link between CSR and corporate ﬁnancial performance (CFP) (Margolis and Walsh,
2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002 and 2006, Kotler and Lee,
2005).The recent developments of strategic management theories draw upon the ex-
tension of the stakeholder theory, as proposed by Freeman (1984). Unlike traditional
approaches, in this one, ﬁrms' objectives should not only take into account sharehold-
ers, but also stakeholders, thus involving employees, local communities, governments
and customers.
Consequently, the social and economic goals of a corporation are strictly inter-
twined. The grafting of the CSR onto the stakeholder theory has allowed the scope of
the concept of CSR to be widened to include environmental responsibility, diversity,
aﬃrmative action, transparent accounting, etc. (Jones, 1995; Clarkson, 1995; Berman
et al., 1999).
8This makes CSR closely related to the concept of sustainable consumption (Sanne,
2002; Gilg et al., 2005).
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actions (Lee, 2008).
The inducement hypothesis in climate change, by stressing the im-
pact of changes in the regulatory framework on ﬁrms' costs, can thus be
read as an application of a price-inducement argument to the price of
polluting production technologies (Lichtenberg, 1986; Antonelli, 1998).
The mechanisms through which the adoption of an environmental reg-
ulation is translated into an increase in environmental innovations are
to our knowledge still not fully explored. Indeed, it is worth stressing
that patent statistics are a reliable proxy of inventive activity, but not
of adoption, since polluting ﬁrms under a stringent regulation may be
willing to adopt green technologies, but they do not always have the nec-
essary competences to generate them. In such cases, the pressure from
regulation can engender a derived demand of green technologies.
The interplay between the classical inducement mechanism and the
derived demand pull dynamics (Schmookler, 1957) allows the relevance
of vertical linkages to be stressed (as in Cainelli and Mazzanti, 2013)
and gives rise to an extended inducement hypothesis. Downstream ﬁrms
confronted with stringent regulatory frameworks resort to upstream ﬁrms
for the supply of new and more environment-friendly technologies in the
production process. A stringent regulatory framework thus alters the
relative prices of production processes, inducing ﬁrms to redeﬁne the
characteristics of the intermediate goods they buy on factors' markets 9.
The interactions between users and producers therefore matter in shap-
ing the ultimate eﬀects of the inducement mechanism, in a way that the
generation and the adoption of new technologies become strictly com-
plementary (von Hipple, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Antonelli,
2006; Castellacci, 2008).
In view of the arguments articulated so far, we are now able to spell
out our working hypothesis. Inducement mechanisms play a crucial role
in the generation of new technological knowledge, especially in the do-
main of green technologies. The interplay between price-inducement and
derived demand-pull mechanisms brings vertical linkages to the centre
of our analysis, where the generation of new technologies is likely to be
triggered by the derived demand of polluting ﬁrms for technologies that
improve their environmental performance.
However, the relevance of these inducement mechanisms is context-
speciﬁc. In contexts characterized by weak regulations and ineﬀective
policy interventions, the inducement mechanism is more likely to be set
in motion by endogenous mechanisms, i.e. internal to the economic sys-
9Alternatively, one can look at the inducement mechanisms as the result of the
movement of ﬁrms across the Lancastrian space representing the features of the in-
termediate goods they employ in the production process (Lancaster, 1966).
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tem, rather than by the exogenous ones, i.e. lying in the policy realm.
In particular we hereby mainly consider as endogenous mechanisms the
following co-occurring mechanism: the social responsibility of ﬁrms that
are responsible for the emissions of pollutants and the opportunistic be-
haviour of pre-emptive response to a future regulation.
The paper raises the basic question as to what extent an induce-
ment of environment-related inventing activities may also be depicted in
those contexts characterized by weak (exogenous) policy inducements.
We further draw on this intuition and test on the one hand whether, in
the presence of weak policy inducement, some endogenous inducement
mechanisms are at stake. In particular, we analyse on the one hand
whether the generation of green technologies is directly aﬀected by re-
gional and sectoral environmental performance. On the other hand, we
test whether vertical relationships are important in that environment-
related inventing activities may beneﬁt from an endogenous inducement
from downstream ﬁrms operating in vertically related sectors To the best
of our knowledge, no previous attempts have been made to investigate
the inducement environmental region/sector composition plays on the
generation on knowledge.
In line with the local dimension of stakeholder theory, the hypoth-
esis we are testing is that ﬁrms located in highly polluting regions and
belonging to strong polluter sectors will be more prone to inducing the
generation of green technologies in upstream sectors, as compared with
others, either as a side-eﬀect of their expectation of future stringent reg-
ulations or as an eﬀect of increasing environmental responsibility. In
other terms, we test whether sectoral environmental performance in the
sampled regions is likely to aﬀect sectoral generation of green technolo-
gies. More precisely, we hypothesize that environmental performance
generated by closely (vertically) related sectors aﬀects green innovative
activities whereas the sectors in which the generation of green technolo-
gies occurs are also likely to be characterized by better environmental
performance.
2.3 Empirical context
As outlined in the previous section, the strand of literature on the induced
innovation hypothesis in climate change basically tests the existence of
a link between environmental regulation and green technological change.
We have argued that in an environmental policy weak context, it may not
be appropriate to focus on the regulatory framework since it is more likely
that only endogenous inducement mechanisms will be set in motion.
Although Italy presents one of the higher levels in the amount of
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environmental taxes10, we have chosen this country as an environmental
policy weak context for the reasons we are now going to discuss.
Although Italy is part of a broader European environmental policy
framework, country heterogeneities are still at stake and depend on the
way policies are implemented. Any policy framework may vary according
to its characteristics such as its stringency, certainty, incidence, depth and
ﬂexibility (for a discussion, see Ha²£i£ et al, 2009) and what makes the
diﬀerence in terms of inducement is not the existence of an environmental
policy per se, but relative policy stringency. In this respect, Italy is one of
the countries reporting lower levels in the indicator of policy stringency11
(Ha²£i£ et al, 2009).
Furthermore, higher levels of corruption reduce the stringency of an
environmental policy (Damania et al., 2003), and Italy is one of the Euro-
pean countries performing worst in terms of controls of corruption 12. The
country also presents lower levels in stability and transparency 13 of the
environmental policy compared with other OECD countries (Johnstone
10Italy is the third country, after Germany and United Kingdom, in the level (in
absolute terms) of environmental taxes in ranking Eurostat data on Environmental
tax revenue for European countries in the last available year (2011) and its position
in terms of GDP lies in the middle of the rank. These data include all environmental
taxes in the following ﬁelds: Energy, Transport, Pollution and Resources (Eurostat:
Environmental tax revenue). Since high energy prices can induce green innovations
(e.g. Popp, 2001), and the presence of high energy taxes (as is the case of Italy) raises
the costs of energy consumption, we will control for the role of energy consumption as
a robustness check in our empirical analysis, to be sure that our assumption of weak
policy is not engendering a bias in our estimation deriving from omission of the role
of energy consumption. See estimation results in Table 2.7.
11The study by Ha²£i£ et al. (2009) uses data from the World Economic Forum's
Executive Opinion Survey to assess both the level of ﬂexibility and stringency across a
set of selected countries in the period 2001-2006. For both indicators, which are highly
correlated, Italy is performing averagely worse than the other European Countries,
with an index of 4.95 for stringency and 3.77 for ﬂexibility in a Likert scale ranging
from 1 to 7 (with 7 being the most stringent regime). If we think of the well known
case of the Ilva steel production plant in Taranto (Italy), we can ﬁnd an example
which corroborates our assumption of weaknesses (to be fair) in the enforcement of
an Italian environmental policy.
12In ranking data of the World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators- we see
that Italy reports for 2011 (the last year available) a value in the indicator on the
control of Corruption of -0.007, which is greater only than those reported by Romania
and Greece (for European Union countries). This index ranges from -2.5 and + 2.5 and
captures the "perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the
state by elites and private interests". For details on the construction of this index,
refer to Kaufmann et al. (2010).
13In a subsequent study, Johnstone et al. (2010b) in using the same WEF data,
presented a rank of countries according to an index on the policy stability and trans-
parency and Italy performs badly also in this last respect.
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et al., 2010b). Lastly, it does not report many environmental instru-
ments, with the exception of the EU ETS ("European Trading Scheme")
sectors which fall under the EU ETS Directive, and the relatively high
level of environmental taxes we outlined before.
When assessing the role of the policy framework in the Italian con-
text on emission performance, a further conﬁrmation of the weakness of
the Italian regulation has emerged in the literature. The insight is that
manufacturing "has also not adapted to the new climate change policy
scenario, and even the environmental Italian policy as a whole has some-
what lagged behind other leading countries in terms of policy eﬀorts".
(Marin and Mazzanti, 2013: 22).
For these reasons, it is more likely that, in such a context, pressures - if
any - to improve the environmental performance emerge within corporate
boundaries rather than from external policy constraints.
The Italian policy weak empirical context justiﬁes our decision to
select this country, in order to test our hypothesis on whether the envi-
ronmental performance, rather than direct policy measure, induces green
technological change, or, in other terms, whether environmental perfor-
mance (both direct and related) is correlated with the generation of green
knowledge. The focus on Italy is even more relevant if we look at its over-
all trends in air emissions. In terms of total Greenhouse Gases (GHG),
emission is indeed still far from reaching the 2012 Kyoto target, with
its overall GHG emissions reduced by only 3.5% 14(UNFCCC). Most im-
portantly, it is the European country in the G8 group that is performing
worst 15, and it has reached a reduction in GHG which is even lower than
the European Union average16.
The choice of an appropriate country-case is however not enough since
an appropriate level of analysis has to be chosen. Intuitively, the best
level of analysis would be the ﬁrm level one, but the lack of data avail-
ability at this level calls for an alternative solution.
If we look at the regional composition of air emissions in Italy (Figure2.1),
we ﬁnd evidence of strong and persistent regional diﬀerences which sug-
14The target for Italy was to reach by 2012 a total Gg of CO2 equivalent in GHG
equal to 92% of the emissions recorded in 1990. The 3.5% reduction refers to the year
2010, with 1990 as a reference year.
15Indeed, France has achieved a 6% reduction, United Kingdom, 22.5%
and Germany 24.8%. These GHG emission reductions refer to the year
2010 compared with the emission levels in 1990. For an overview on
the changes in the emissions of other countries refer to UNFCCC, 2012
(http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/sbi/eng/31.pdf). GHG emissions are calcu-
lated excluding emissions/removals from land use, land-use change and forestry.
When including them, the overall picture remains similar in the sense that Italy
still shows reduction performances that are worse than other European countries.
16Whose average reduction in 2010 compared with 2012 was equal to 15.4%.
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Figure 2.1: Regional distribution of air emissions (weighted by regional
value added at 2005)
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gest the need to perform analysis at regional level.
Furthermore, the economic literature on sectoral emission patterns
and "delinking" with income growth, provides support for the need for a
sector-based analysis since strong sectoral patterns have emerged (Marin
and Mazzanti, 2013; Marin et al., 2012; Mazzanti et al., 2008; Mazzanti
and Zoboli, 2009).
This literature highlights that the degree of technological development
is "highly diﬀerentiated by sector and geographical entity" (Mazzanti et
al., 2008: 296) 17.
Final conﬁrmation of the appropriateness of this focus lies in the
consideration that heterogeneities are also expected in the way regions
and sectors respond to environmental pressures since those diﬀerences
outlined in the social capital endowments (see e.g. Helliwell and Putnam,
1995) may engender diﬀerent sector-regional innovative reactions.
2.4 Data, Methodology and Variables
2.4.1 Description of data
A limited amount of studies has exploited air emission data at sectoral
and regional level of disaggregation. Most of these studies draw upon a
rich and unique dataset, which is only available at the Nuts II level -to our
knowledge- for Italian Regions: the regional NAMEA18, developed by the
Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT). Among them, Mazzanti and Montini
(2010) have focused on the drivers of emission eﬃciency, adopting struc-
tural decomposition analysis to disentangle the determinants of changes
in the emission eﬃciency of selected pollutants in Lazio (an Italian re-
gion). Costantini et al. (2013a) have focused on the economic drivers
behind the geographical distribution of environmental performance for
all the Italian regions. Sansoni et al. (2010) have provided a method-
ological and conceptual framework on the use of a regional NAMEA for
international comparisons.
17In the Italian service sectors, the previous literature on the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC) outlined the existence of an inverted N-shape relationship
between environmental pressure and income per capita (Marin and Mazzanti, 2013;
Mazzanti et al., 2008). Unlike the service sectors, Italian manufacturing industry
shows strong intra-branches heterogeneities with ceramics, paper, food and fuel man-
ufacturing facing the worst environmental performance dynamics (Marin and Maz-
zanti, 2013). Furthermore, an "N shaped" or "U shaped" EKC mostly depends on the
emission considered in the manufacturing sectors (Mazzanti et al., 2008).These con-
siderations on the Italian sector and regional heterogeneities were behind our decision
to ground our empirical analysis on a sector-region level of analysis.
18A description of the NAMEA dataset can be found in the next section.
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In line with this empirical literature, we employ the Italian regional
NAMEA to investigate the impact of environmental performance on the
generation of green technologies.
For the empirical analysis, we merged the regional NAMEA with
diﬀerent data sources concerning the economic and technological per-
formance of Italian Regions. We started exploiting patent applications,
drawn from the PATSTAT database 19, to build the proxy for knowledge
generation in the domain of green technologies20. It should be stressed
that the main limitation associated with patent data in measuring tech-
nological innovation, i.e. that of measuring inventions instead of innova-
tions, is in our case less relevant, since we are willing to understand the
eﬀect of air emission on the generation on green knowledge, irrespective
of whether these inventions then enter the market or not. Such dataset
covers patent applications of ﬁrms over 20 Italian Regions and all sectors
(NACE Rev. 1.1, at 2-character alphabetical codes, as in Table 2.10).
After extracting patent applications generated by Italian inventors,
we assigned these patents to each Italian Region, on the basis of the in-
ventor's address, and to each sector, on the basis of ﬁrms' data. In par-
ticular, the sectoral assignment required a merge with ﬁrm data, which
were drawn from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis dataset, and merged with
patents on the basis of the OECD HAN correspondence tables. Over
the considered time-span, the matching between ORBIS and PATSTAT
through the OECD-HAN dataset allowed approximately 37% of Italian
patents to be assigned to sectors21.
Patents were then deﬁned as being environmental on the basis of the
19PATSTAT Version: April 2011.
20The limits of patent statistics as indicators of technological activities are well
known. The main drawbacks can be summarized in their sector-speciﬁcity, the exis-
tence of non-patentable innovations and the fact that they are not the only protecting
tool.
Moreover, the propensity to patent tends to vary over time according to the cost of
patenting, and it is more likely to feature large ﬁrms (Pavitt, 1985; Griliches, 1990).
Nevertheless, previous studies highlighted the usefulness of patents as measures of
production of new knowledge. Such studies show that patents represent very reliable
proxies for knowledge and innovation, as compared with analyses drawing upon sur-
veys directly investigating the dynamics of process and product innovation (Acs et
al., 2002). In addition to the debate on patents as an output rather than an input of
innovation activities, empirical analyses showed that patents and R&D are dominated
by a contemporaneous relationship, providing further support for the use of patents
as a good proxy of technological activities (Hall et al., 1986).
21We also considered alternative ways to assign patents to industrial sectors such
as the application of the correspondence table implemented by Schmoch et al. (2003).
However, the latter is undesirably exclusively focused on manufacturing sectors.
Moreover, the correspondence is therein based on a statistical exercise while the use
of the ORBIS dataset allows an oﬃcial classiﬁcation to be obtained.
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World Intellectual Property Organization "WIPO IPC green inventory",
an International Patent Classiﬁcation that identiﬁes patents related to
the so-called "Environmentally Sound Technologies" and scatters them
into their technology ﬁelds (Table2.12), with the caveat that it is not
the only possible classiﬁcation of green technologies and, as with other
available classiﬁcations, it presents some drawbacks (Costantini et al.,
2013b)22.
The hybrid environmental-economic accounting matrix based on NAMEA
applied to Italian NUTS II Regions has been used to assign the level of
air emissions at a sectoral level to each Region23.The Italian NAMEA
has indeed the great advantage of allowing a coherent assignment of en-
vironmental pressure to economic branches. Ten greenhouse gases and
air pollutants and three aggregated emissions by environmental impact
are available in this dataset24.
To avoid overlap between variables, we found it more appropriate to
ground our analysis on aggregated emissions by environmental impacts,
i.e. Greenhouse Gases (GHG), Acidifying Gases (AC) and Ozone Tropo-
22Although interesting, it is out of the scope of the current work to systematically
test for the diﬀerences that may arise from the choice of classiﬁcation. We selected the
WIPO IPC green inventory since it is currently a wide and well established classiﬁca-
tion of green technologies. The OECD has indeed also developed the OECD Indica-
tor of Environmental Technologies (OECD, 2011), based on the International Patent
Classiﬁcation (IPC), which features seven environmental areas, i.e. (a) general envi-
ronmental management, (b) energy generation from renewable and non-fossil sources,
(c) combustion technologies with mitigation potential, (d) technologies speciﬁc to cli-
mate change mitigation, (e) technologies with potential or indirect contribution to
emission mitigation, (f) emission abatement and fuel eﬃciency in transportation, and
(g) energy eﬃciency in buildings and lighting. At the same time, the European Patent
Oﬃce (EPO) is working on completing its own system of classiﬁcation (ECLA) to as-
sign each patent a green tag, depending on the environmental aim of each patent. So
far, EPO allows tagging technologies for adaptation or mitigation to climate change
(Y02), in terms of buildings (Y02B), energy (Y02E), transportation (Y02T) and cap-
ture, storage sequestration or disposal of GHG (Y02C). More recently, Costantini et
al. (2013b) have pointed to the shortcomings of classiﬁcation methods based on eﬀorts
to collect IPCs potentially related to green technologies in one place. Focusing on the
biofuels sector, they show that the WIPO Green Inventory is likely to overestimate
the number of patents to be assigned due to the fact that IPCs are not speciﬁcally
designed to identify this narrow and very speciﬁc domain. Clinical analysis based on
keyword search and validations from experts are likely to yield ﬁner grained classiﬁ-
cations. Nonetheless, due to the wide scope of our analysis which encompasses many
kinds of green technologies, we will rely on the WIPO Green Inventory.
23For a detailed description of the NAMEA tables, see ISTAT (2009) and Tudini
and Vetrella (2012).
24The following pollutants are available in the dataset but have not been included in
our analysis: carbon dioxide (CO2 ), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), nitrogen
oxides (NOx), sulphur oxides (SOx), ammonia (NH3), non-methane volatile organic
compounds (NMVOC), carbon moNOxide (CO) and lead (Pb).
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spheric precursors (OZ) 25 and on Particulate matter (PM10)26.
Input-Output (Supply and Use) tables provided by ISTAT have con-
sequently been used to build indexes of relatedness among sectors which
have been adopted to generate related emissions variables, by weight-
ing direct emissions through a weighting matrix built according to the
methodology described in the next section. Unfortunately, a panel for
the regionalized NAMEA is not yet available since only observations for
the year 2005 have been developed (while at national level, a wide panel
for Italy already exists).
Consequently, the analysis we are implementing will be a cross-sectional
one since the core environmental variables are only available as a cross-
section 27. Despite this limitation, the regional NAMEA has the consid-
erable advantage of being, to our knowledge, the only NAMEA at EU
level now available at the Nuts II level. NAMEA and patent data were
then merged with regional sectoral economic accounts, regional environ-
mental expenditures and regional data on exporting activities provided
by ISTAT. Lastly, regional energy consumption at sectoral level were ac-
counted for through the deployment of TERNA data 28 to test for the
robustness of our estimation results. Our sample consists of 24 NACE
Rev 1.1 sectors in 20 Regions, which amounts to a pool of 480 potential
observations, reduced due to some missing variables to a sample of 456
for our estimations29.
25GHG, ACID and OZ are built in the NAMEA tables according to a methodology
requiring the conversion of the pollutants responsible for each phenomenon in "equiv-
alent tons". In the case of GHG, the conversion is based on their "Global Warming
Potential" (GWP), i.e. the potential of global warming associated with each emission
when compared with CO2. To compute GHG equivalent emissions, CO2, CH4 and
N20 (in tons) are multiplied by their coeﬃcients, 1 (CO2 ) ; 310 (N20) and 21 (CH4)
respectively.
To aggregate emissions responsible for the acidifying process (ACID), the "Potential
Acid Equivalent" (PAE) of each emission measured in tons has been computed and is
based on the following coeﬃcients: 0.22 (NOx); 0.31 (SOx) and 0.059 (NH3). Ozone
precursor emissions (OZ) take into consideration "tons of potential tropospheric ozone
generation", and are computed through the following coeﬃcients multiplied by the
related emission: 0.014 (CH4); 1.22 (NOx); 1 (NMVOC) and 0.11 (CO).
26PM10 has been included although it is not an aggregation of other emissions,
since on the one hand, it was not included in GHG or in ACID or OZ and, on the
other, it is strictly connected to production.
27We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting a cross-section analysis rather
than a panel one which was our ﬁrst choice.
28The company TERNA S.p.A. annually publishes "Statistical Data on Electricity
in Italy" in which it collects data on the principal aspects of the national electricity
sector, among which we extracted data on energy consumption by Sector and Region.
29Sector P (Activities of households) is not covered by NAMEA data and Sector B
(Fishing) presents some missing data for six nuts2 Regions :ITC1; ITC2; ITC4; ITI2;
ITF5 and ITH1-ITH2 (Trentino Alto Adige).
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2.4.2 Methodology
Drawing on the literature highlighted in Section 2, we have hypothesized
that, besides the traditional exogenous inducement from policy regula-
tion, the generation of green technologies may be the outcome of an
endogenous inducement mechanism. Regional polluting agents in each
sector are likely to demand technologies enabling the improvement of
their environmental performance so as to attract new customers, meet
the preferences of sustainable customers, improve their reputation and
increase their market value. At the aggregate level, this calls for investi-
gating the extent to which in each sector-region the generation of green
technologies is triggered by the environmental performance of vertically
related sectors.
We also control for the impact of environmental performance within
the same sector.
The literature dealing with empirical analysis of regional innova-
tion performance is mostly based on the implementation of the so-called
knowledge production (KPF) approach. The knowledge production func-
tion is one of the pillars of the applied economics of innovation (Griliches
1979, 1990, 1992; Romer, 1990; Link and Siegel, 2007) and it has been
widely applied in a variety of contexts including ﬁrms, regions, industries
and countries30.
In order to investigate the impact of pollutant emissions on the re-
gional generation of green technologies across diﬀerent sectors, we there-
fore propose an extended knowledge generation function in which the
number of green technologies (GT) is the dependent variable.
The discrete nature and non-negative nature of the dependent vari-
able suggests the adoption of estimation techniques for count data mod-
els.
Out of these models, the equality between conditional variance and
conditional mean in the distribution of the dependent variable was vio-
lated, suggesting the need for a Negative Binomial class of models instead
of a Poisson.
Analysis of the determinants of the generation of GTs in our case
poses an additional problem which is due to the excess sector-region
30In this approach, innovations, usually measured by proxies such as R&D expenses,
patents and innovation counts enter the production function either directly, next to
capital and labour, or indirectly, through a two-step procedure in a model that es-
timates its eﬀects on the general eﬃciency of the same production function. In this
context, the KPF is indeed what Griliches (1979) used to label "extended produc-
tion function" (Kraﬀt and Quatraro, 2011). In order to mark the diﬀerence with
this approach, we will follow Antonelli and Colombelli (2013) and use the expression
"knowledge generation function" which studies the direct relations between inputs
that make generation of knowledge as an output possible.
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combination for which we observe no GTs. This leads to a situation in
which we observe an "excess of zeros" in the dependent variable, and
investigation is needed to establish whether the observed zeros are due
to the overall absence of patenting activity or to a speciﬁc lack of green
patents in sector-region nonetheless featuring some degree of technolog-
ical activity. For this speciﬁcity, we ﬁnd the zero-inﬂated negative bi-
nomial (ZINB) model is more appropriate to ﬁt our data since it allows
empirical frameworks to be modelled in which the excess of zeros in the
dependent variable is generated by a diﬀerent process than count values.
This model simultaneously runs two equations: a binary logistical
equation to model the zeros in the dependent variable and a proper count
data estimation (negative binomial or Poisson) to model the count data
dependent variable. In our speciﬁcation, the LOGIT equation allows us
to discriminate between the zeros due to Regions and sectors generating
some patents, but no green patents, and those due to Regions that are
not creating any kind of knowledge, green or otherwise. In other words,
we based our inﬂation equation (LOGIT part of the model) on a variable
(patid) that captures the count of the overall patents (irrespective of
whether these patents were Environmental Technologies or not) in each
region-sector combination.
The Voung test conﬁrmed the appropriateness of our choice, as re-
ported in the estimation results tables.
To test our hypothesis, the following basic model is speciﬁed:
GTij = α+ β1EMij + β2(Wj,l 6=j ∗ EMi,l 6=j) + β3PURDi + β4POLi + β5V Aij+
β6DENSITYi + β7EXPORT_UEi + β8DIRTYi +
n∑
i=1
ρi + ij
(2.1)
where i = 1, . . . , 20 indicates the Region j =1, . . . , α to β7 24 stands
for the Sector and the coeﬃcients to be estimated. The error term is
decomposed so as to account for region (ρi), ﬁxed eﬀects. The region (ρi),
ﬁxed eﬀect is accounted for with the inclusion of 4 locational dichotomous
variables: NORTHEAST , NORTHWEST , SOUTH and CENTER
(benchmark). In a second step (2.2), we add a variable to the model to
account for the presence of metropolitan areas in the Region (METRO):
GTij = α+ β1EMij + β2(Wj,l 6=j ∗ EMi,l 6=j) + β3PURDi + β4POLi + β5V Aij+
β6DENSITYi + β7EXPORT_UEi + β8DIRTYi + β9METROi +
n∑
i=1
ρi + ij
(2.2)
The variables included in Equation (2.1) to (2.2) are described in the
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following section.
2.4.3 Variables
The dependent variable, green technologies (GT ), is measured by the
count of patent applications in 'Environmentally Sound' technology ﬁelds
in the years 2005, 2006 and 2007.
The explanatory variables are all lagged to previous year to overcome
endogeneity problems that may arise. The key variables to assess our
hypotheses are the environmental ones which consist of a ﬁrst group of
direct emission eﬃciency (EMij) and of a second one of related emission
eﬃciency (Wj,l 6=j ∗ EMi,l 6=j). EMij measures the emission eﬃciency of
the Region i and Sector j in terms of the value added of i and j. It is
built according to the following speciﬁcation:
EMij = log
(
EMISSIONSij2005
V Aij2005
)
(2.3)
EMISSIONS is a vector of four emission variables (GHG, AC, PM10
and OZ as in Table 2.1), each of them available at the regional and
sectoral level for the year 2005 from the ISTAT regionalized NAMEA
dataset.
It is worth stressing that previous contributes have used emission in-
tensity measures to account for the stringency of regulation when the
absence of speciﬁc data on regulation required the use of an approxi-
mation (e.g. Fredrikkson and Vollebergh, 2009; Costantini and Crespi,
2008). Fredrikkson and Vollebergh (2009), more precisely, constructed
the dependent variable ENERGY INTENSITY as the physical energy
units per unit of value added, with the aim of measuring the eﬀects of
environmental as well as energy policies. Costantini and Crespi (2008)
instead, adopted the level of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP to mea-
sure environmental stringency of the importing and exporting countries.
Such an indicator however, due to the way it is built, i.e. as a ratio
between environmental pressure and economic performance of the Re-
gion and Sector, can also capture some structural sector features (e.g.
Cainelli, Mazzanti, Zoboli, 2010).
Similarly, (Wj,l 6=j ∗ EMi,l 6=j). EMij measures the emission eﬃciency
of the vertically related sectors and follows the following speciﬁcation:
Wj,l 6=j ∗ EMij = log
(∑
Wj,l 6=j ∗ EMISSIONSi,l 6=j,2005
V Aij2005
)
(2.4)
In this case, EMISSIONS are weighted according to the sectoral re-
latedness, by using a weighting matrix which gives higher values to the
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emissions generated by strongly related sectors.
The matrix of sectoral relatedness has been built according to a
methodology that draws upon the exploitation of input-output data (Esslet-
zbichler, 2013; Fan and Lang, 2000; Feser, 2003).We used, as anticipated,
the Italian Input Output "Supply" and "Use", which contain the ﬂows
and value of commodities produced by each industry and the ﬂows and
value of commodities consumed by each industry respectively, and con-
structed a matrix for the input-output relatedness between industries
that follows this formulation:
Wjl =
1
2
(
Fjl∑n
j=1 Fjl
+
Flj∑m
l=1 Flj
)
(2.5)
whereFjl and Flj measure the ﬂows between industry l and j, and
have been built by multiplying the matrix of the share of one unit of
the commodity c produced by industry l by the value of c consumed by
industry j and vice versa.
To control for the role of economic and technology characteristics
in the generation of GTs, we included the real value added (V A), the
share of public R&D (PURD) over the total R&D and the eﬀect of
export oriented activities (EXPORT_UE) in the regression, all taken
at average values 2003-2005 and log-transformed 31.
To avoid a possible bias arising from the omission of policy variables,
the ISTAT data have been used to build the variable POL, given by
the natural logarithm of the ratio between average regional expenditure
for environmental protection (only capital expenditure) in 2004-2005 of
Region i and VA in 2004-2005 32 (as in Costantini and Crespi, 2008). To
interpret the industry eﬀect better, we included a dichotomous variable,
DIRTY , equal to 1 for the most polluting sectors and zero otherwise
in the model (see Table 2.1 for details). Lastly, we controlled for the
density of the Region, DENSITY , measured as the ratio between the
31In a way, export also accounts for the possible role that foreign countries regula-
tions exert on local production, in the case of foreign environmental standards over
imported goods, either for consumption or intermediate goods.
As a robustness check, we also tested an alternative variable which refers to all
exporting activities without restrictions on the European market. Results have proved
to be robust and are available upon request.
32We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we should build this variable
on capital expenditure only instead of using total expenditure, which also includes
current expenditure such as those for wages.
As a robustness check we alternatively constructed this variable by using the to-
tal regional expenditure for environmental protection and also the total regional ex-
penditure on environmental R&D (separately). Results remained unaltered and are
available upon request.
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Population and the Area.
In equation (2.2) we added a dichotomous variable to our model,
METRO, taking value 1 for those Regions in which a metropolitan area
is present 33 since the literature on agglomeration economies suggests
that this is where knowledge capabilities are highly concentrated 34.
Table 2.1 provides a synthesis of the deﬁnition of the variables used
in the analysis.
The descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2.2.
It is worth stressing that the statistics concerning the dependent variable
highlight a strongly over-dispersed distribution in which the variance is
far higher than the mean, suggesting the appropriateness of a Negative
Binomial class of models.
Table 2.3 shows the sectoral distribution of green technologies. In
Italy, over the observed period, the bulk of the GT generation is clus-
tered in the manufacturing sector, as could be expected. In particular,
about 41% of the GTs are produced in the sector dealing with the man-
ufacturing of equipment. This suggests that much of them are embodied
in intermediate capital goods. The real estate sector also deserves to
be mentioned since therein it produces about 15% of the observed green
patents.
In Table 2.3we also report the sectoral distribution of air emissions
related to the sectoral value added. The worst environmental impact for
GHG comes from the electricity, gas and water supply sector which is
also responsible for high levels of OZ emissions. This is the reason why
in the robustness checks we excluded this sector from the regression to
test for the stability of our results. Fishing sector and the manufacturing
of non-metallic mineral products are responsible for the highest amount
of relative pollution of OZ, while the Agriculture sector shows the worst
relative performance for AC emissions and also relative bad performance
in terms of PM10. Intuitively, the transport sector is also responsible
for high values, and if we look at the absolute value of equivalent tons
(instead of the relative ones), it is the worst performing sector in terms of
OZ and presents high values on all the other pollutants. Lastly, in Table
33In particular, we considered those developed around the 4 cities of Milan, Rome,
Turin and Neaples metropolitan areas. When applying a less restrictive deﬁnition of
metropolitan area that also includes Palermo and Florence, results remained unaltered
and are available upon request.
34We also tested whether the use of more accurate measurement of knowledge ca-
pabilities than the METRO variable would have made a diﬀerence.
We tested in particular for the role of knowledge variety, knowledge coherence and
knowledge diversity (following the methodology proposed by Quatraro, 2010). Since
these results did not provide better insights but just conﬁrmed the robustness of our
already existing ones, for the sake of parsimony, we have omitted these variables from
the analysis.
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Table 2.2: Variables descriptive statistics
VAR N mean sd min Max skewness kurtosis
GT 454 1.5 7.566 0 130 12.17 190.79
GHG 454 0.479 0.619 0.012 3.3 2.037 7.268
W*GHG 454 0.778 0.818 0.043 4.276 1.83 6.289
PM10 454 0.206 0.353 0.002 2.804 2.812 13.262
W*PM10 454 0.382 0.51 0.02 3.473 2.81 13.16
OZ 454 1.26 0.996 0.036 5.821 1.058 4.283
W*OZ 454 1.621 1.119 0.268 6.239 1.343 4.819
AC 454 0.091 0.197 0.001 1.489 3.484 16.84
W*AC 454 0.184 0.318 0.005 2.474 3.969 23.86
VA 454 6.639 1.783 -1.563 10.819 -0.739 3.917
PURD 454 -1.981 0.552 -3.135 -0.674 0.281 3.506
DENSITY 454 -1.912 0.636 -3.283 -0.857 -0.29 2.372
DIRTY 454 0.22 0.415 0 1 1.35 2.822
POL 454 0.091 0.091 0.011 0.311 1.196 3.152
EXPORT_UE 454 4.433 0.812 1.839 5.249 -1.482 5.674
NORTHWEST 454 0.196 0.397 0 1 1.531 3.345
NORTHEAST 454 0.2 0.401 0 1 1.497 3.24
SOUTH 454 0.352 0.478 0 1 0.618 1.382
CENTER 454 0.403 0.491 0 1 0.395 1.156
METRO 454 0.198 0.399 0 1 1.514 3.292
ENERGY 400 0.097 1.016 0 20.099 19.189 377.969
W*ENERGY 400 0.118 1.364 0 27.081 19.409 384.021
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Table 2.3: Sectoral distribution of green technologies and emissions (on
value added)
Sector (Nace Rev 1.1) GHG OZ AC PM10 GT Freq(GT)
A 1.643 7.391 0.883 1.538 4 1%
B 1.361 25.88 0.396 1.951 3 0%
C 0.465 2.09 0.03 0.115 37 5%
DA 0.487 2.698 0.023 0.062 0 0%
DB 0.477 0.924 0.021 0.048 9 1%
DC 0.18 7.194 0.009 0.026 2 0%
DD, DH, DN 0.201 3.25 0.011 0.032 56 8%
DE 0.522 1.992 0.009 0.026 1 0%
DF, DG 3.067 9.699 0.317 0.264 62 9%
DI 4.039 11.119 0.315 1.475 5 1%
DJ 0.611 3.613 0.039 0.509 29 4%
DK, DL, DM 0.145 0.954 0.007 0.017 282 41%
E 6.157 6.591 0.25 0.223 21 3%
F 0.064 1.408 0.007 0.08 12 2%
G 0.14 1.064 0.014 0.064 18 3%
H 0.072 0.39 0.006 0.023 0 0%
I 0.453 4.055 0.085 0.257 8 1%
J 0.019 0.109 0.002 0.007 17 2%
K 0.031 0.201 0.003 0.014 102 15%
L 0.045 0.473 0.006 0.028 3 0%
M 0.018 0.059 0.001 0.003 0 0%
N 0.047 0.125 0.002 0.006 0 0%
O 0.773 1.927 0.032 0.046 10 1%
P missing missing missing missing 0 0%
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2.4 we show the Spearman Rank correlation coeﬃcients which account
for extreme values in the considered variables.
As is clear from this table 2.4, emission intensity variables are highly
correlated. Their joint inclusion in the regressions is therefore likely to
engender biased estimations. For this reason, we will carry out separate
estimations for each of the considered emissions. In the next section, we
present and discuss the results of the econometric estimations.
2.5 Econometric results
Table 2.5 reports the results for the zero inﬂated negative binomial regres-
sions of the equation (2.1), which includes total patents in the inﬂation
part of the model. In this table we report the baseline model. As far
as the control variables are concerned, only value added and R&D are
statistically signiﬁcant and feature a positive coeﬃcient. The key vari-
ables of this study are however those concerning sectoral environmental
performance at the regional level.
The main hypothesis underlying our empirical investigation is that
environmental performance may trigger the generation of environmen-
tal technologies, working as an endogenous inducement factor. We also
stress that inducement mechanisms are likely to work through the derived
demand of downstream polluting ﬁrms for green technologies produced
in upstream vertically related sectors. It is worth recalling that the relat-
edness matrix we have used to weight the impact of emissions of sectors
lâ j on sector j is based on the input-output matrix. In other words,
we measure the eﬀects on sector j of the emissions produced by techni-
cally related sectors. Technical proximity therefore allows the eﬀects of
environmental performance of related sectors to be appreciated.
The ﬁrst column in Table 2.5 reports the results concerning green-
house gas (GHG) emissions. While the direct emissions are not signiﬁ-
cant, the emissions generated by vertically related sectors show a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. This provides initial support to the hypothe-
sis that inducement mechanisms work thorough the transmission of in-
centives along the value chain. The evidence that the environmental
performance of vertically related ﬁrms positively impacts the generation
of green knowledge represents an aggregate result which is compatible
with a microeconomic framework in which ﬁrms are increasingly aware
of their environmental responsibility or at least of the economic bene-
ﬁts that may derive from their movements towards greener production.
This holds either when those beneﬁts come for the reason outlined in the
literature on the CSR or when they are the consequence of a proactive
response to future stringent regulations. Polluting ﬁrms therefore choose
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Table 2.5: Estimation results
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
GHG -0.5715
(0.3841)
W*GHG 1.1484***
(0.4087)
PM10 -1.8422***
(0.6615)
W*PM10 1.4823*
(0.813)
OZ -0.6823**
(0.334)
W*OZ 1.1372***
(0.395)
AC -2.1572*
(1.2424)
W*AC 2.8542**
(1.4255)
VA 0.6525*** 0.4763** 0.6804*** 0.5391***
(0.1907) (0.1928) (0.2441) (0.183)
PURD 0.6547* 0.6978* 0.6061 0.7217*
(0.3898) (0.3951) (0.3818) (0.4037)
DENSITY -0.0812 0.3114 -0.106 0.178
(0.5976) (0.5952) (0.6182) (0.6153)
DIRTY 0.123 0.0658 0.1067 0.0367
(0.4672) (0.3414) (0.4179) (0.384)
POL -3.6634 -2.2849 -3.6687 -3.2615
(4.1181) (4.2125) (4.1062) (4.4774)
EXPORT_UE 0.5729 0.6247 0.548 0.5551
(0.453) (0.4526) (0.447) (0.456)
NORTHWEST 0.8026 0.5623 0.8366 0.6773
(0.534) (0.5478) (0.5278) (0.5593)
NORTHEAST -0.1791 -0.3045 -0.0918 -0.313
(0.4487) (0.447) (0.4454) (0.4524)
SOUTH -0.7283 -0.717 -0.8506 -0.6439
(0.6338) (0.6522) (0.6344) (0.6378)
Cons -5.3711** -3.1241 -5.9275** -3.5039
(2.3147) (2.1622) (2.8804) (2.1403)
Inﬂate patid -0.1138*** -0.1132*** -0.1087*** -0.1134***
(0.0438) (0.0409) (0.0384) (0.0422)
N 454 454 454 454
Log-Likelihood -359.376 -359.162 -359.069 -360.887
Pr>LR 0 0 0 0
Likelihood-ratio test α=0 (Chi2) 530.38 510.41 523.63 539.74
Pr>Chi2 0 0 0 0
Vuong Test (z) 4.73 4.93 4.47 5.03
Pr> z 0 0 0 0
Mc Fadden's R2 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.201
AIC 748.7513 748.3243 748.1389 751.7745
BIC 810.5228 810.0957 809.9104 813.5459
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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to commit resources to feed their demand for green technologies. In the
second column we show the coeﬃcients of the PM10 emissions. Here
too, emissions generated in vertically related sectors exert a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on the generation of green technologies. Conversely,
the coeﬃcient on direct emissions is negative and signiﬁcant, suggest-
ing the existence of a negative correlation between bad environmental
performance and being a producer of green technologies. The results
presented in column (3) concerning the Tropospheric Ozone precursors
(OZ) and in column (4) for acidifying gases (AC) are in line with the
previous ones. The coeﬃcient of emission intensities from related sectors
is positive and signiﬁcant whereas the one for direct emissions is negative
and signiﬁcant.
Overall,the patterns that emerge from these empirical results suggest
the existence of complementarity between direct and related eﬀects of
sectoral emission intensities. The positive sign of the emission intensities
of vertically related sectors supports the hypothesis of an endogeneous
inducement channelled by the downstream ﬁrms' derived demand for
green technologies produced in upstream sectors. The interpretation of
such a pattern is compatible with a CSR framework in which ﬁrms try
to improve their environmental performance by searching for green tech-
nologies in the markets for intermediate goods. On the contrary, ﬁrms
producing and supplying green technologies are more likely to be char-
acterized on average by better environmental performance so that the
sign of direct emission intensities is actually negative and, in most cases,
signiﬁcant.
2.5.1 Robustness checks
Several robustness checks have been implemented to support the econo-
metric results we presented above.
First of all, in Table 2.6 we include a dichotomous variable,METRO,
to account for the presence of metropolitan areas in the sampled re-
gions. In Table 2.7 we control for the role of energy consumption of
each region-sector combination, both in terms of direct (ENERGY) and
related (W*ENERGY) 35 consumption. The results are very consistent
with the estimates presented in the previous section. Emissions from
vertically related sectors are all featured by positive and signiﬁcant coef-
35We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this further check. Data are ex-
tracted from the TERNA database. ENERGY is constructed as the ratio between
average energy consumption in 2003-2005 and the average value added in 2003-2005
for each Region-Sector combination. W*ENERGY applies the weighting matrix de-
scribed in Equation (5) to ENERGY. Since not all the sectors are covered by the
TERNA database, the number of observations is reduced to 400.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results full speciﬁed model
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
GHG -0.6016
(0.3792)
W*GHG 1.2563***
(0.407)
PM10 -2.0648***
(0.6667)
W*PM10 1.7543**
(0.8023)
OZ -0.8263**
(0.3327)
W*OZ 1.3378***
(0.3986)
AC -2.3252*
(1.2269)
W*AC 3.0559**
(1.396)
METRO -0.6075 -0.68 -0.8019* -0.484
(0.4294) (0.4269) (0.4293) (0.4255)
VA 0.7315*** 0.5649*** 0.7967*** 0.5880***
(0.1946) (0.1939) (0.2468) (0.1825)
PURD 0.7164* 0.7735* 0.6663* 0.7712*
(0.3904) (0.3948) (0.3811) (0.4037)
DENSITY 0.1633 0.5727 0.1848 0.3887
(0.5967) (0.5806) (0.6045) (0.6142)
DIRTY 0.258 0.2095 0.342 0.1454
(0.4741) (0.3451) (0.4235) (0.3906)
POL -2.0263 -0.4677 -1.539 -1.9045
(4.2152) (4.2716) (4.1957) (4.546)
EXPORT_UE 0.7255 0.7932* 0.7477 0.6741
(0.4714) (0.4691) (0.4676) (0.4719)
NORTHWEST 0.8417 0.572 0.8822 0.6914
(0.5457) (0.5623) (0.5402) (0.5715)
NORTHEAST -0.5462 -0.7555 -0.5683 -0.6338
(0.5297) (0.5468) (0.5288) (0.5469)
SOUTH -0.9681 -1.0408 -1.2133* -0.8585
(0.6572) (0.6879) (0.6694) (0.6684)
Cons -5.9593** -3.7215* -6.9295** -3.7802*
(2.3484) (2.1584) (2.9147) (2.1293)
Inﬂate patid -0.1069*** -0.1070*** -0.1012*** -0.1089***
(0.0352) (0.0336) (0.0291) (0.0367)
N 454 454 454 454
Log-Likelihood -358.389 -357.911 -357.363 -360.244
Pr>LR 0 0 0 0
Likelihood-ratio test α=0 (Chi2) 521.31 489 507.92 530.32
Pr>Chi2 0 0 0 0
Vuong Test (z) 4.75 4.99 4.51 5.04
Pr> z 0 0 0 0
Mc Fadden's R2 0.207 0.208 0.209 0.203
AIC 748.7779 747.821 746.7252 752.4885
BIC 814.6675 813.7106 812.6147 818.378
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01
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ﬁcients, supporting the hypothesis of an inducement mechanism moder-
ated by the derived demand of polluting downstream ﬁrms and all direct
emission intensities but GHG emissions are featured by negative and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
Secondly, we tested the robustness of the results on the related emis-
sions by adopting a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the fully speciﬁed weighting
matrix used in Table 2.5 and shown in Equation (2.5). We worked on the
consideration that this matrix can be thought of as a proxy for technical
proximity amongst sectors. Accordingly, a cutoﬀ value can be identiﬁed
that discriminates close from far sectors. The choice of this threshold is
necessarily arbitrary and we grounded our choice on the distribution of
the weights in the matrix. Table 2.8 reports the results of the estimations
obtained by using the value of Wij at the 75th percentile as cutoﬀ.
Columns (1)-(4) show the results for the baseline estimations, whereas
in columns (5)-(8) we control for energy consumption. As is clear from
the table, results are well in line with those described so far of positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the emission intensities of vertically related
and negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for all the direct emission inten-
sities, but GHG. While the inducement mechanisms are channeled by the
vertical transmission through the value chain, the sectors responsible for
the generation of green technologies are conﬁrmed to be characterized
by virtuous environmental performance. We then found it appropriate
to group the emission variables into two factors, resulting from principal
component analysis. The ﬁrst factor represents the direct emissions while
the second factor refers to the emission intensities of vertically related
sectors.
The ﬁrst three columns in Table 2.9report the results of the estima-
tion yield by using the fully speciﬁed relatedness matrix whereas columns
(4) and (5) show the results obtained by adopting the cutoﬀ value Wlj
at the 75th percentile. This evidence is consistent with the results of
previous estimations and conﬁrms that, even when emission intensities
are grouped together in a single factor, those of vertically related sec-
tors feature a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient whereas the relationship
between the production of green technologies and environmental perfor-
mance is negative and signiﬁcant. Our results are conﬁrmed when the
Energy sector is excluded from the analysis and also once we controlled
for the regional share of manufacturing ﬁrms, either in terms of employees
or in terms of value added36. Lastly, we provide in Table reftab:apdueuno
the results obtained by running standard Poisson and Negative Binomial
estimations, which are well in line with the zero-inﬂated models presented
in Table 2.9.
36These results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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Table 2.7: Estimation results accounting for energy consumption
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
GHG -0.6721*
(0.3964)
W*GHG 1.3581***
(0.4545)
PM10 -1.8818***
(0.6748)
W*PM10 1.9819**
(1.0017)
OZ -0.7282**
(0.3519)
W*OZ 1.2293***
(0.419)
AC -2.2769*
(1.2752)
W*AC 4.2012**
(1.8355)
ENERGY -4.7427 2.2641 -5.3562 -5.398
(36.0608) (31.7458) (29.0462) (46.8024)
W*ENERGY -0.6266 -7.9814 0.9905 -2.8441
(26.9952) (24.1452) (22.6012) (33.6626)
VA 0.5910*** 0.4636** 0.6206*** 0.4949***
(0.1925) (0.189) (0.2399) (0.1761)
PURD 0.6626* 0.7798* 0.6088 0.8263*
(0.3947) (0.4042) (0.3862) (0.4226)
DENSITY -0.0242 0.2154 -0.0517 0.1185
(0.5862) (0.5861) (0.6112) (0.5961)
DIRTY 0.0544 -0.0455 0.0285 -0.1316
(0.4682) (0.3464) (0.4368) (0.386)
POL -3.278 -2.2149 -3.2237 -3.81
(4.115) (4.1616) (4.1098) (4.4197)
EXPORT_UE 0.7006 0.7143 0.6326 0.722
(0.4681) (0.4606) (0.4559) (0.4822)
NORTHWEST 0.8061 0.6609 0.8456 0.7821
(0.5331) (0.5496) (0.5314) (0.562)
NORTHEAST -0.1683 -0.2814 -0.0857 -0.2789
(0.4471) (0.4458) (0.4459) (0.4512)
SOUTH -0.8463 -0.835 -0.9495 -0.7463
(0.6337) (0.6593) (0.639) (0.6345)
Cons -5.3964** -3.485 -5.7812** -3.8392*
(2.2935) (2.1598) (2.841) (2.122)
Inﬂate patid -0.0970*** -0.1011*** -0.0962*** -0.0959***
(0.0315) (0.0346) (0.031) (0.0316)
N 400 400 400 400
Log-Likelihood -348.747 -348.578 -349.072 -349.944
Pr>LR 0 0 0 0
Likelihood-ratio test α=0 (Chi2) 518.71 493.19 513.38 527.09
Pr>Chi2 0 0 0 0
Vuong Test (z) 4.4 4.6 4.28 4.69
Pr> z 0 0 0 0
Mc Fadden's R2 0.201 0.202 0.201 0.199
AIC 731.494 731.1565 732.1431 733.8871
BIC 799.3489 799.0114 799.998 801.742
Standard errors in parentheses
* p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
71
Table 2.8: Estimation results with matrix cutoﬀ at 75th percentile
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
GHG -0.562 -0.6680*
(0.3806) (0.3862)
W*GHG 1.1276*** 1.3603***
(0.3951) (0.4462)
PM10 -2.1162*** -2.1455***
(0.6637) (0.687)
W*PM10 2.6448*** 3.0951***
(0.9782) (1.1448)
OZ -0.7417** -0.7981**
(0.3217) (0.3311)
W*OZ 1.2613*** 1.3859***
(0.3447) (0.3662)
AC -2.4729* -2.6568**
(1.2737) (1.3056)
W*AC 3.7941** 5.3625***
(1.5944) (1.9587)
ENERGY 3.1483 -15.9464 -4.186 -4.5206
(87.8513) (85.308) (66.9215) (91.7332)
W*ENERGY -7.8736 11.274 0.3342 0.6328
(96.654) (92.3098) (73.3982) (100.2348)
VA 0.5521*** 0.5162*** 0.6315*** 0.4973*** 0.4851*** 0.4627*** 0.5626*** 0.4549***
(0.1627) (0.1615) (0.2051) (0.1497) (0.1675) (0.164) (0.203) (0.1547)
PURD 0.6474* 0.7126* 0.5709 0.7290* 0.6367 0.7481* 0.5611 0.7689*
(0.392) (0.3805) (0.372) (0.3922) (0.391) (0.3876) (0.3737) (0.3929)
DENSITY -0.0733 0.1067 -0.1507 0.1228 0.0139 0.1075 -0.0592 0.1268
(0.6003) (0.5683) (0.5805) (0.5891) (0.5776) (0.5579) (0.5722) (0.5661)
DIRTY 0.0886 0.2655 0.1811 0.1867 0.0167 0.1868 0.0995 0.0899
(0.4628) (0.345) (0.4033) (0.3896) (0.4584) (0.344) (0.408) (0.3861)
POL -4.1789 -3.5561 -4.342 -3.7009 -4.0075 -3.2392 -3.9679 -4.4989
(4.1917) (4.1625) (3.9919) (4.3806) (4.1469) (4.133) (3.9889) (4.3907)
EXPORT_UE 0.5266 0.6428 0.5566 0.5928 0.6345 0.7407 0.653 0.7277
(0.4531) (0.4445) (0.4399) (0.4532) (0.4597) (0.4573) (0.4471) (0.4675)
NORTHW 0.9605* 0.7044 0.9065* 0.814 0.9566* 0.7633 0.8976* 0.8813
(0.552) (0.5339) (0.5171) (0.5578) (0.5382) (0.5338) (0.517) (0.5459)
NORTHE -0.0558 -0.1789 -0.0217 -0.1911 -0.0322 -0.15 -0.0147 -0.1313
(0.454) (0.4412) (0.4364) (0.4523) (0.4494) (0.4417) (0.4346) (0.4482)
SOUTH -0.6736 -0.8284 -0.9763 -0.7211 -0.7967 -0.9267 -1.1057* -0.8266
(0.6365) (0.6343) (0.6206) (0.6279) (0.6296) (0.6355) (0.6228) (0.6183)
Cons -4.2643** -3.9366* -5.5531** -3.4690* -4.1172** -3.9246* -5.3490** -3.6926*
(2.0516) (2.0349) (2.4937) (1.9655) (2.0226) (2.0323) (2.4469) (1.9749)
Inﬂate patid -0.1159** -0.1076*** -0.1010*** -0.1083*** -0.0963*** -0.0937*** -0.0880*** -0.0888***
(0.0493) (0.0382) (0.0321) (0.0385) (0.032) (0.0307) (0.026) (0.0276)
N 454 454 454 454 400 400 400 400
Log-Lik. -358.806 -356.874 -356.315 -359.698 -347.949 -346.58 -345.942 -348.614
Pr>LR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lik.-ratio t 526.4 486.58 508.05 532.59 511.34 481.76 497.71 518.31
Pr>Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vuong Test (z) 4.79 5.01 4.56 4.99 4.45 4.73 4.39 4.69
Pr> z 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
McFadden's R2 0.206 0.21 0.211 0.204 0.203 0.206 0.208 0.202
AIC 747.6124 743.7481 742.6296 749.3961 729.8975 727.1605 725.8846 731.228
BIC 809.3839 805.5196 804.401 811.1676 797.7524 795.0154 793.7395 799.0829
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01
The weighting matrix for Related Emissions (W*GHG, W*AC; W*PM10; W*OZ) has been built with a cutoﬀ at the 75th perc.
The weighting matrix for Related Energy (W*ENERGY) has been built with a cutoﬀ at the 75th percentile
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Table 2.9: Estimation results with principal component analysis
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
F1_DIRECT -0.3802** -0.4273** -0.4012** -0.3898** -0.4069**
(0.1679) (0.1679) (0.1743) (0.1645) (0.1664)
F2_RELATED 0.6234** 0.7083*** 0.7820*** 0.6431*** 0.7841***
(0.2446) (0.2438) (0.2892) (0.2119) (0.2402)
ENERGY -11.175 -15.5135
(46.2253) (76.7143)
W*ENERGY 2.9506 11.9643
(33.6447) (82.6422)
VA 0.5857*** 0.6746*** 0.5454*** 0.5401*** 0.4915***
(0.2076) (0.209) (0.2035) (0.1736) (0.1753)
PURD 0.6254 0.6838* 0.6851* 0.6202 0.6364*
(0.3894) (0.3883) (0.4) (0.3807) (0.3812)
DENSITY 0.0527 0.3223 0.0326 -0.0172 0.0273
(0.601) (0.5897) (0.5889) (0.5799) (0.5629)
DIRTY 0.3293 0.5253 0.2077 0.3993 0.2899
(0.4379) (0.446) (0.4468) (0.4314) (0.4303)
POL -3.1558 -1.2427 -2.8519 -3.9019 -3.8408
(4.2167) (4.3004) (4.2006) (4.1719) (4.1403)
EXPORT_UE 0.541 0.7058 0.6731 0.5493 0.6628
(0.4435) (0.4596) (0.4627) (0.4401) (0.4503)
NORTHWEST 0.6914 0.7148 0.7578 0.834 0.8609
(0.539) (0.5517) (0.5411) (0.5371) (0.529)
NORTHEAST -0.2259 -0.6621 -0.1959 -0.1042 -0.0676
(0.4423) (0.5308) (0.4414) (0.4412) (0.4383)
SOUTH -0.7888 -1.1009 -0.9013 -0.8409 -0.9653
(0.6379) (0.6698) (0.6386) (0.6257) (0.6201)
METRO -0.6906
(0.4211)
Cons -3.9349* -4.5023** -4.0007* -3.8529* -3.7731*
(2.1405) (2.1513) (2.1029) (1.9759) (1.9516)
Inﬂate patid -0.1109*** -0.1042*** -0.0953*** -0.1065*** -0.0896***
(0.0405) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.0278)
N 454 454 400 454 400
Log-Likelihood -358.869 -357.546 -348.19 -357.195 -346.398
Pr>LR 0 0 0 0 0
Likelihood-ratio test 508.03 491.65 501.1 499.74 492.56
α=0 (Chi2)
Pr>Chi2 0 0 0 0 0
Vuong Test (z) 4.8 4.85 4.47 4.84 4.55
Pr> z 0 0 0 0 0
Mc Fadden's R2 0.206 0.209 0.203 0.209 0.207
AIC 747.7379 747.0929 730.3808 744.39 726.7964
BIC 809.5094 812.9825 798.2357 806.1614 794.6513
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01
Diﬀerent Weighting Matrixes W* adopted:
cutoﬀ at the 75th perc. in col (IV) and (V) and no cutoﬀ in col.(I) to (III)
W*ENERGY uses a cutoﬀ at the 75th perc in col.(V) and no cutoﬀ in col.(IV)
F1_DIRECT is the linear combination of the 6= classes of EM yield by applying pca
F2_ Rel is the linear combination of the 6= classes of EM from vertically related sectors (pca)
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2.6 Conclusions
The investigation of the determinants of the introduction of environmen-
tal innovations has gained momentum in recent years due to the impor-
tant role that has been attributed to green technologies as a means of
coping with economic crisis and simultaneously restoring the competi-
tiveness of countries. In this debate, attention has been largely focused
on the shaping role of constraining environmental regulatory frameworks
as a mechanism for inducing the generation of green technologies.
The contribution of this paper to this stream of analysis is twofold.
First, we propose a complementary framework to the standard induce-
ment argument in climate change that acknowledges that some endoge-
nous mechanism are at stake in the presence of a weak exogenous pol-
icy framework. We focused on Italian regions because they have been
described as a context characterized by a substantial lack of stringent
regulation in terms of environmental policy. Moreover, the evolution of
the industrial structure in Italy has been marked by a large prevalence
of small and medium sized ﬁrms characterized by thick vertical linkages
in which user-producer linkages have often been the source of innova-
tion generated in upstream sectors and adopted by downstream ﬁrms
(Antonelli and Barbiellini Amidei, 2011).
We then qualify the mechanisms through which inducement mecha-
nisms may be working, stressing that polluting ﬁrms pushed to adopt
green technologies in their production processes may not possess the
necessary competences to generate them. The dynamics by which an in-
ducement on polluting ﬁrms displays its eﬀects passes through the user-
producer relationships, i.e. those established between polluting ﬁrms op-
erating downstream and those ﬁrms generating green technologies operat-
ing upstream. These vertical linkages along the value chain are conﬁrmed
as being important in this endogenous inducement framework: increases
in the derived demand engendered by the inducing factor trigger the
production of green technologies by supplier ﬁrms. The underlying ex-
planation is that regional polluting agents, when not exogenously pushed
by an environmental policy, choose or are induced to commit resources
to technologies enabling the improvement of environmental performance,
as an eﬀect of the two main co-occurring mechanisms of an increased so-
cial and environmental responsibility, and an opportunistic pre-emptive
reaction to future regulations. This translates into an increase of the de-
rived demand which triggers the production of GTs in vertically related
sectors.
These results are obtained by applying zero-inﬂated negative bino-
mial techniques and conﬁrm an interesting pattern of relationships be-
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tween environmental performance and the generation of GTs. We could
indeed discriminate between direct and related eﬀects by implementing
a relatedness matrix across sectors based on input-output matrices and
ﬁnd evidence of complementarity between direct and related eﬀects. The
generation of GTs appears to be stimulated by vertically related sectors,
providing support for the idea that user-producers interactions are shap-
ing the ultimate eﬀects of the inducement mechanisms on the generation
of new technologies. Direct sectoral emission intensities, on the other
hand, appear to be negatively related to the generation of GTs, sug-
gesting that the sectors producing environment-friendly technologies on
average feature virtuous environmental performance.
It is fair to note that our results do not imply by any means that a reg-
ulatory framework is not important. They rather suggest that stringent
regulation is not the only force behind the choice to commit resources
to the production of GTs and that the other way round an inducement
mechanism may also be depicted in a policy weak context. Analysis of
the endogenous inducement of green technologies leads to some policy
measures insights which should complement the regulatory framework
set. The importance of ﬁrms' awareness of the social and environmental
impact of their actions calls for the implementation of entrepreneurship
policies devoted to developing an entrepreneurial culture that attributes
increasing importance to the environmental performance of ﬁrms. En-
trepreneurs' awareness of the economic importance of their environmental
performance may lead them to commit resources to R&D spending tar-
geted at the generation of green technologies and identify new business
opportunities to be exploited by spinoﬀs or startups.
Entrepreneurship policies could therefore beneﬁt when traditional
measures dealing with competition, the protection of property rights and
the regulation of product and factor markets are complemented by adding
measures to shape the entrepreneurial culture (Audretsch et al., 2007).
Our results call for further analyses at micro-level, to investigate the
extent to which ﬁrms are stimulated to adopt GTs by the prospective
gains in terms of reputation, and hence increase sales, or stock market
value. Another future strand of possible research is to focus on the eﬀect
of environmental performance on the adoption - instead of the generation
- of green technologies, by using for instance survey data 37. Furthermore,
37We could not use survey data, such as the Italian Community Innovation Survey
data, to assign the level of adopted green technologies to each Region since Italian
data dissemination rules do not provide researchers with information on the Region
of ﬁrm respondents. On the other hand, Italy is the only European country to have
developed a NAMEA dataset at the regional level. This future line of research is not
feasible as long as either other countries implement a regional NAMEA or the Italian
Statistical Oﬃce releases innovation output data with regional information.
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a possible extension could be to attribute a role not only to direct en-
vironmental performance and to inter-sectoral relatedness, as we have
done, but also to regional geographical proximity since the existence of
technological and environmental spillovers has been depicted in the lit-
erature (Costantini et al. 2013a). Lastly, in future research it might be
worth assessing the relationship between regulatory frameworks and en-
vironmental performance, treating environmental performance no longer
as an explanatory variable, but, on the contrary, as a dependent variable.
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Appendix
Table 2.10: Estimation results Poisson and Negative Binomial
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
GHG -0.09 -0.4616
(0.3287) (0.4436)
W*GHG 1.3491*** 1.6826***
(0.3875) (0.4437)
PM10 -1.8214** -1.7559**
(0.7247) (0.7824)
W*PM10 1.5883*** 2.0148**
(0.5323) (0.7944)
OZ 0.0239 -0.3251
(0.2759) (0.3525)
W*OZ 1.3616*** 1.7994***
(0.4485) (0.4265)
AC -2.2413** -2.6652*
(1.1378) (1.4938)
W*AC 1.3490* 2.7192**
(0.7757) (1.325)
VA 0.9994*** 0.7663*** 1.2643*** 0.6523*** 0.9751*** 0.7123*** 1.3124*** 0.6403***
(0.1995) (0.1975) (0.2369) (0.1986) (0.217) (0.2216) (0.271) (0.2044)
PURD 0.6126 0.569 0.6798 0.54 1.0785*** 1.1375*** 1.0687*** 1.1044***
(0.4063) (0.3632) (0.4351) (0.3566) (0.4093) (0.4133) (0.4024) (0.4215)
DENSITY -0.2881 -0.029 -0.6787 0.12 0.5135 1.0725 0.0058 1.1604
(0.7474) (0.705) (0.8114) (0.7227) (0.7019) (0.6964) (0.7447) (0.7126)
DIRTY -0.3705 0.1268 -0.5882 0.0625 0.2257 0.4581 -0.1094 0.4812
(0.5095) (0.4377) (0.4724) (0.4635) (0.5591) (0.4649) (0.5094) (0.5117)
POL -5.8767 -6.6079 -6.6268 -6.5536 -0.4526 1.8802 -1.5947 1.6881
(6.0241) (5.8091) (6.2293) (5.6637) (4.4439) (4.4524) (4.4801) (4.7039)
EXPORT_UE 0.5192 0.5415 0.3889 0.5614 1.4046** 1.4321** 1.3082** 1.4142**
(0.5525) (0.5386) (0.5441) (0.5295) (0.5754) (0.5583) (0.5769) (0.5661)
NORTHWEST 1.4031* 1.3655* 1.6638** 1.3152** 1.1363** 0.9487* 1.2696** 0.9599*
(0.7667) (0.6969) (0.8432) (0.6663) (0.5475) (0.5633) (0.5418) (0.5795)
NORTHEAST 0.3398 0.3292 0.5237 0.2871 -0.1681 -0.2499 -0.1578 -0.2834
(0.6413) (0.6218) (0.662) (0.6077) (0.5431) (0.5398) (0.548) (0.5477)
SOUTH -0.9719 -0.8717 -0.9729 -0.856 -1.0881* -1.1215* -1.1919** -1.0170*
(0.6479) (0.5778) (0.7022) (0.5644) (0.5806) (0.5832) (0.5821) (0.5809)
Cons -9.6938*** -7.1787** -12.7023*** -6.0527** -11.5838*** -8.2176*** -15.6544*** -7.4037***
(3.0106) (2.9686) (3.3939) (2.8701) (2.6016) (2.4526) (3.2125) (2.3673)
lnalpha
Cons 1.9639*** 1.9932*** 1.9344*** 2.0239***
(0.1536) (0.1545) (0.1542) (0.1545)
N 454 454 454 454 454 454 454 454
Log-Likelihood -1072.175 -1080.726 -1050.894 -1105.112 -402.429 -405.393 -400.564 -407.06
Pr>LR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Likelihood-ratio test - - - - 1339.49 1350.67 1300.66 1396.11
α =0 (Chi2)
Pr>Chi2 - - - - 0 0 0 0
Mc Fadden's R2 0.422 0.418 0.434 0.404 0.11 0.104 0.114 0.1
AIC 2168.3509 2185.4519 2125.7887 2234.2246 830.8572 836.7855 827.1286 840.119
BIC 2217.768 2234.8691 2175.2059 2283.6418 884.3924 890.3208 880.6638 893.6543
Standard errors in parentheses * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01
Results in column (I) to (IV) applied a Poisson regression estimation
Results in column (V) to (VIII) applied a Negative Binomial regression estimation
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Table 2.12: WIPO IPC classiﬁcation
TOPIC IPC
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY PRODUCTION
Bio-fuels
Solid fuels C10L 5/00
C10L 5/40
C10L 5/48
Torrefaction of biomass C10B 53/02
C10L 5/40
C10L 9/00
Liquid fuels C10L 1/00
C10L 1/02
C10L 1/14
Vegetable oils C10L 1/02
C10L 1/19
Biodiesel C07C 67/00
C07C 69/00
C10G
C10L 1/02
C10L 1/19
C11C 3/10
C12P 7/64
Bioethanol C10L 1/02
C10L 1/182
C12N 9/24
C12P 7/06-7/14
Biogas C02F 3/28
C02F 11/04
C10L 3/00
C12M 1/107
C12P 5/02
From genetically engineered organisms C12N 1/13
C12N 1/15
C12N 1/21
C12N 5/10
C12N 15/00
A01H
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TOPIC IPC
Integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle (IGCC) C10L 3/00
F02C 3/28
Fuelcells H01M 4/86-4/98
H01M 8/00-8/24
H01M 12/00-12/08
Electrodes H01M 4/86-4/98
Inert electrodes with catalytic activity H01M 4/86-4/98
Non-activeparts H01M 2/00-2/04
H01M 8/00-8/24
Within hybridcells H01M 12/00-12/08
Pyrolysis or gasiﬁcation of biomass
C10B 53/00
C10J
Harnessing energy from manmade waste
Agricultural waste C10L 5/00
Fuel from animal waste and crop residues C10L 5/42
C10L 5/44
Incinerators for ﬁeld, garden or wood waste F23G 7/00
F23G 7/10
Gasiﬁcation C10J 3/02
C10J 3/46
F23B 90/00
F23G 5/027
Chemical waste B09B 3/00
F23G 7/00
Industrial waste C10L 5/48
F23G 5/00
F23G 7/00
Using top gas in blast furnaces to power pig-iron production C21B 5/06
Pulp liquors D21C 11/00
Anaerobic digestion of industrial waste A62D 3/02
C02F 11/04
C02F 11/14
Industrial wood waste F23G 7/00
F23G 7/10
Hospital waste B09B 3/00
F23G 5/00
Landﬁll gas B09B
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TOPIC IPC
Separation of components B01D 53/02
B01D 53/04
B01D 53/047
B01D 53/14
B01D 53/22
B01D 53/24
Municipal waste C10L 5/46
F23G 5/00
Hydro energy
Water-power plants E02B 9/00-9/06
Tide or wave power plants E02B 9/08
Machines or engines for liquids F03B
F03C
Using wave or tide energy F03B 13/12-13/26
Regulating, controlling or safety means of
machines or engines F03B 15/00-15/22
Propulsion of marine vessels using energy
derived from water movement B63H 19/02
B63H 19/04
Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) F03G 7/05
Wind energy F03D
Structural association of electric generator
with mechanical driving motor H02K 7/18
Structural aspects of wind turbines B63B 35/00
E04H 12/00
F03D 11/04
Propulsion of vehicles using wind power B60K 16/00
Electric propulsion of vehicles using wind power B60L 8/00
Propulsion of marine vessels by wind-powered motors B63H 13/00
Solar energy
Photovoltaics (PV)
Devices adapted for the conversion of radiation
and energy into electrical energy H01L 27/142
31/00-31/078
H01G 9/20
H02N 6/00
Using organic materials as the active part H01L 27/30
51/42-51/48
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TOPIC IPC
Assemblies of a plurality of solar cells H01L 25/00
H01L 25/03
H01L 25/16
H01L 25/18
H01L 31/042
Silicon single-crystal growth C01B 33/02
C23C 14/14
C23C 16/24
C30B 29/06
Regulating to the maximum power available
from solar cells G05F 1/67
Electric lighting devices with, or rechargeable
with, solar cells F21L 4/00
F21S 9/03
Charging batteries H02J 7/35
Dye-sensitised solar cells (DSSC) H01G 9/20
H01M 14/00
Use of solar heat F24J 2/00-2/54
For domestic hot water systems F24D 17/00
For space heating F24D 3/00
F24D 5/00
F24D 11/00
F24D 19/00
For swimming pools F24J 2/42
Solar updraft towers F03D 1/04
F03D 9/00
F03D 11/04
F03G 6/00
For treatment of water, waste water or sludge C02F 1/14
Gas turbine power plants using solar heat source F02C 1/05
Hybrid solar thermal-PV systems H01L 31/058
Propulsion of vehicles using solar power B60K 16/00
Electric propulsion of vehicles using solar power B60L 8/00
Producing mechanical power from solar energy F03G 6/00-6/06
Roof covering aspects of energy collecting devices E04D 13/00
E04D 13/18
Steam generation using solar heat F22B 1/00
F24J 1/00
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TOPIC IPC
Refrigeration or heat pump systems using solar energy F25B 27/00
Use of solar energy for drying materials or objects F26B 3/00
F26B 3/28
Solar concentrators F24J 2/06
G02B 7/183
Solar ponds F24J 2/04
Geothermal energy
Use of geothermal heat F01K
F24F 5/00
F24J 3/08
H02N 10/00
F25B 30/06
Production of mechanical power from geothermal energy F03G 4/00-4/06
F03G 7/04
Other production or use of heat, not derived
from combustion, e.g. natural heat F24J 1/00
F24J 3/00
F24J 3/06
Heat pumps in central heating systems using
heat accumulated in storage masses F24D 11/02
Heat pumps in other domestic- or space-heating systems F24D 15/04
Heat pumps in domestic hot-water supply systems F24D 17/02
Air or water heaters using heat pumps F24H 4/00
Heat pumps F25B 30/00
Using waste heat
To produce mechanical energy F01K 27/00
Of combustion engines F01K 23/06-23/10
F01N 5/00
F02G 5/00-5/04
F25B 27/02
Of steam engine plants F01K 17/00
F01K 23/04
Of gas-turbine plants F02C 6/18
As source of energy for refrigeration plants F25B 27/02
For treatment of water, waste water or sewage C02F 1/16
Recovery of waste heat in paper production D21F 5/20
For steam generation by exploitation of the
heat content of hot heat carriers F22B 1/02
83
TOPIC IPC
Recuperation of heat energy from waste incineration F23G 5/46
Energy recovery in air conditioning F24F 12/00
Arrangements for using waste heat from furnaces
kilns, ovens or retorts F27D 17/00
Regenerative heat-exchange apparatus F28D 17/00-20/00
Of gasiﬁcation plants C10J 3/86
Devices for producing mechanical power
from muscle energy F03G 5/00-5/08
TRANSPORTATION
Vehicles in general
Hybrid vehicles, e.g HEVs B60K 6/00
B60K 6/20
Control systems B60W 20/00
Gearingstherefor F16H 3/00-3/78
F16H 48/00-48/30
Brushless motors H02K 29/08
Electromagnetic clutches H02K 49/10
Regenerative braking systems B60L 7/10-7/22
Electric propulsion with power supply from force
of nature, e.g. sun, wind B60L 8/00
Electric propulsion with power supply external to vehicle B60L 9/00
With power supply from fuel cells, e.g for hydrogen vehicles B60L 11/18
Combustion engines operating on gaseous fuels, e.g hydrogen F02B 43/00
F02M 21/02
F02M 27/02
Power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, wind B60K 16/00
Charging stations for electric vehicles H02J 7/00
Vehicles other than rail vehicles
Drag reduction
B62D 35/00
B62D 35/02
B63B 1/34-1/40
Human-powered vehicle B62K
B62M 1/00
B62M 3/00
B62M 5/00
B62M 6/00
Rail vehicles B61
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TOPIC IPC
Drag reduction B61D 17/02
Marine vessel propulsion
Propulsive devices directly acted on by wind B63H 9/00
Propulsion by wind-powered motors B63H 13/00
Propulsion using energy derived from water movement B63H 19/02
B63H 19/04
Propulsion by muscle power B63H 16/00
Propulsion derived from nuclear energy B63H 21/18
Cosmonautic vehicles using solar energy B64G 1/44
ENERGY CONSERVATION
Storage of electrical energy B60K 6/28
B60W 10/26
H01M 10/44-10/46
H01G 9/155
H02J 3/28, 7/00
H02J 15/00
Power supply circuitry H02J
With power saving modes H02J 9/00
Measurement of electricity consumption B60L 3/00
G01R
Storage of thermal energy C09K 5/00
F24H 7/00
F28D 20/00,/02
Low energy lighting
Electroluminescent light sources
(e.g. LEDs, OLEDs, PLEDs) F21K 99/00
F21L 4/02
H01L 33/00-33/64
H01L 51/50
H05B 33/00
Thermal building insulation, in general E04B 1/62
E04B 1/74-1/80
E04B 1/88, 1/90
Insulating building elements E04C 1/40, 1/41
E04C 2/284-2/296
For door or window openings E06B 3/263
For walls E04B 2/00
E04F 13/08
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TOPIC IPC
For ﬂoors E04B 5/00
E04F 15/18
For roofs E04B 7/00
E04D 1/28
E04D 3/35
E04D 13/16
For ceilings E04B 9/00
E04F 13/08
Recovering mechanical energy F03G 7/08
Chargeable mechanical accumulators in vehicles B60K 6/10, 6/30
B60L 11/16
WASTE MANAGEMENT
Waste disposal B09B
B65F
Treatment of waste
Disinfection or sterilisation A61L 11/00
Treatment of hazardous or toxic waste A62D 3/00
A62D 101/00
Treating radioactively contaminated material
decontamination arrangements therefor G21F 9/00
Refuse separation B03B 9/06
Reclamation of contaminated soil B09C
Mechanical treatment of waste paper D21B 1/08
D21B 1/32
Consuming waste by combustion F23G
Reuse of waste materials
Use of rubber waste in footwear A43B 1/12
A43B 21/14
Manufacture of articles from waste metal particles B22F 8/00
Production of hydraulic cements from waste materials C04B 7/24-7/30
Use of waste materials as ﬁllers for mortars, concrete C04B 18/04-18/10
Production of fertilisers from waste or refuse C05F
Recovery or working-up of waste materials C08J 11/00-11/28
C09K 11/01
C11B 11/00
C11B 13/00-13/04
C14C 3/32
C21B 3/04
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TOPIC IPC
C25C 1/00
D01F 13/00-13/04
Pollution control
Carbon capture and storage B01D 53/14
B01D 53/22
B01D 53/62
B65G 5/00
C01B 31/20
E21B 41/00
E21B 43/16
E21F 17/16
F25J 3/02
Air quality management
Treatment of waste gases B01D 53/00-53/96
Exhaust apparatus for combustion engines with means
for treating exhaust F01N 3/00-3/38
Rendering exhaust gases innocuous B01D 53/92
F02B 75/10
Removal of waste gases or dust in steel production C21C 5/38
Combustion apparatus using recirculation of ﬂue gases C10B 21/18
F23B 80/02
F23C 9/00
Combustion of waste gases or NOxious gases F23G 7/06
Electrical control of exhaust gas treating apparatus F01N 9/00
Separating dispersed particles from gases or vapours B01D 45/00-51/00
B03C 3/00
Dust removal from furnaces C21B 7/22
C21C 5/38
F27B 1/18
F27B 15/12
Use of additives in fuels or ﬁres to reduce smoke
or facilitate soot removal C10L 10/02
C10L 10/06
F23J 7/00
Arrangements of devices for treating smoke
or fumes from combustion apparatus F23J 15/00
Dust-laying or dust-absorbing materials C09K 3/22
Pollution alarms G08B 21/12
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TOPIC IPC
Control of water pollution
Treating waste-water or sewage B63J 4/00
C02F
To produce fertilisers C05F 7/00
Materials for treating liquid pollutants C09K 3/32
Removing pollutants from open water B63B 35/32
E02B 15/04
Plumbing installations for waste water E03C 1/12
Management of sewage C02F 1/00
C02F 3/00
C02 F 9/00
E03F
Means for preventing radioactive contamination
in the event of reactor leakage G21C 13/10
AGRICULTURE / FORESTRY
Forestry techniques A01G 23/00
Alternative irrigation techniques A01G 25/00
Pesticide alternatives A01N 25/00-65/00
Soil improvement C09K 17/00
E02D 3/00
Organic fertilisers derived from waste C05F
ADMINISTRATIVE, REGULATORY
OR DESIGN ASPECTS
Commuting, e.g., HOV, teleworking, etc. G06Q
G08G
Carbon/emissions trading, e.g pollution credits G06Q
Static structure design E04H 1/00
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION
Nuclear engineering G21
Fusion reactors G21B
Nuclear (ﬁssion) reactors G21C
Nuclear power plant G21D
Gas turbine power plants using
heat source of nuclear origin F02C 1/05
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Chapter 3
Environmental innovations and
proﬁtability: how does it pay to
be green?
An empirical analysis on the
German Innovation Survey
Claudia Ghisetti and Klaus Rennings 1
1This paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Cleaner Produc-
tion. It has been written during a Research Visiting period at the Centre for European
Economic Reserach - ZEW in Mannheim (Germany).
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Abstract
Much of the empirical literature analysing the relation between
environmental innovation and competitiveness has focused on the
question whether "it pays to be green". We diﬀerentiate between
diﬀerent types of environmental innovations, which will be disen-
tangled in those aiming at reducing the negative externalities and
those allowing for eﬃciency increases and cost savings. What we
analyze is at ﬁrst the extent to which these two typologies have
impacts on ﬁrms' proﬁtability with opposite signs, and, secondly,
whether the motivations driving the adoption of those innovations
make the diﬀerence in terms of economic gains. We ﬁnd empiri-
cal evidence that both the typology of environmental innovation
and the driver of their adoption aﬀect the sign of the relationship
between competitiveness and environmental performance. Innova-
tions leading to a reduction in the use of energy or materials per
unit of output positively aﬀect ﬁrms' competitiveness. Contrarily,
externality reducing innovations hamper ﬁrms' competitiveness.
The empirical strategy is based on a sample of German ﬁrms and
makes use of a merge of two waves of the Mannheim Innovation
Panel in 2011 and 2009 that allow overcoming some endogeneity
issues which may arise in a cross-section setting.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: Q55, Q20, M10, K32
Keywords: Proﬁtability, Externality Reducing Innovations,
Energy and Material Eﬃciency Innovations, Mannheim Innovation
Panel
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3.1 Introduction
The broad 10-year growth strategy "Europe 2020" of the European Com-
mission, aiming at a smart, sustainable and more inclusive economy by
2020 (EC, 2010), is depending upon improvements towards a greener
production that may lead to a "decoupling" of environmental pressure
and economic growth.
The generation and adoption of environmental innovations (from now
on EI 2 ) by ﬁrms are consequently keys to improve the sustainability of
the production processes.
This holds either when innovations are integrated in the production
process (Cleaner Production measures) or when innovations are add-on
measures that allow to reduce the negative externalities of the produc-
tion in the last stage of the production process, for example by including
speciﬁc ﬁlters to reduce pollution (end-of-pipe technologies). Previous
literature has highlighted the peculiar nature of EI (e.g. Horbach, 2008;
Rennings, 1998, 2000) and, suggesting the need of a multidisciplinary
approach (e.g. Kemp, 2010), has recently contributed to a better un-
derstanding and identiﬁcation of the determinants that are beyond the
generation and the adoption of EI within ﬁrms.
Whereas a consensus on the determinants of EI 3 seems to be growing,
2Multiple and exhaustive deﬁnitions of EI have been provided by the literature
(e.g. Kemp and Pearson 2007; Kemp, 2010; Rennings, 1998, 2000). Among them,
the one we will be referring to is the following: "the production, assimilation or
exploitation of a product, production process, service or management or business
methods that is novel to the ﬁrm [or organization] and which results, throughout its
life cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts
of resources use (including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives" (Kemp and
Pontoglio, 2007, p. 10).
3The extant ecological economics literature has mainly agreed on the relevance
of a cluster of EI determinants (e.g. Horbach 2008; Horbach et al., 2012) mainly
Market− pull (e.g. Kammerer, 2009; Rehfeld et al., 2007), Technology − push (e.g.
Horbach, 2008), Firmspecificfactors (e.g. Horbach et al., 2012) and Regulation
(e.g. Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Costantini and Crespi, 2008; del Rio, 2009;
Ghisetti and Quatraro, 2013; Popp, 2002; Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2011; Rennings
and Rammer, 2011)with a relevant role attributed to the adoption of management
schemes to improve environmental performance (e.g. Theyel, 2000; Wagner et al.,
2002, 2008; Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009)
The access to knowledge sources coming from outside the ﬁrms' boundaries is also
found to be relevant (De Marchi, 2012; Cainelli et al., 2011; Mazzanti and Zoboli,
2005, 2009): relying on external knowledge sources is indeed positively inﬂuencing
the adoption of EI and the enlargement of an EI portfolio within ﬁrms (Ghisetti et
al., 2013). Furthermore, the investigation of what determines ﬁrms'attitude towards
cleaning behaviors has provided evidences of an important role of social pressure,
cognitive and attitudinal factors as well as of technological factors and opportunities
and organizational capabilities, all of them moderated by the perceived risks and the
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the economic implications of their adoption are still widely debated, to
understand whether ﬁrms are missing (getting) economic opportunities
in improving (not improving) their environmental performances.
We contribute to this debate on whether it pays or not to "be green"
by proposing a diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent typologies of EI.
Our main argument is that it depends on how to be green, i.e. the
"box" of EI has to be opened to disentangle the competitiveness eﬀect of
their adoption. Some neutral or even negative proﬁtability eﬀects might
be associated with EI that are only aiming at reducing negative pro-
duction externalities, while some positive economic beneﬁts are indeed
expected when EI are cost saving and/or eﬃciency improving innova-
tions.
Our corollary argument is that what drives the adoption of EI can
inﬂuence the competitive outcome of the EI itself. Section II discusses
the theoretical framework our research is based upon.
The empirical analysis is carried out on the Mannheim Innovation
Panel dataset for the years 2011 and 2009 and will be made clear in
Section III. Section IV provides a discussion of our results and highlights
a set of robustness checks we implemented to reinforce our estimates.
Section V concludes.
3.2 Theoretical framework
A deep research eﬀort has been devoted to the analysis of the economic
performance eﬀects of improvements in the environmental performances
at various levels of analysis, where economic performance has been con-
ceived through short-term measures, such as proﬁtability or even longer
term measures that capture ﬁrms' competitiveness.
While still no clear answer has been provided, the research question
whether it pays or not to be green has existed for a long time.
According to the natural-resource-based view 4 (NRBV) of the ﬁrm, it
is expected that ﬁrms' proﬁtability is positively inﬂuenced by the compet-
itive advantages generated by the accounting of the natural environment
overall attitude towards the development of clean technologies (Montalvo, 2002, 2003,
2008).
4The NRBV somehow challenges the Resource Based View of the ﬁrm as it ig-
nored how the interaction between an organisation and its natural environment helps
explaining the competitive advantages (Hart, 1995). According to this view, and
without the willingness to be exhaustive, three key strategic capabilities are at stake:
pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development, each of them
facing diﬀerent drivers, building upon diﬀerent resources and engendering heteroge-
neous competitive advantages (Hart and Dowell, 2011).
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as this pro-active behavior favors the development of strategic resources
that are engendering positive economic returns (Hart, 1995).
Ecosystem degradation and resources depletion engender a threat to
ﬁrms' resources (Hart and Dowell, 2011), and as a reaction, ﬁrms can
pro-actively adopt an environmental strategy (Hart, 1995), which can be
read as the development of a dynamic capability 5 (Aragon-Correa and
Sharma, 2003; Hart and Milstein, 2003).
To this respect, ﬁrms facing higher risks associated to climate change
are those subject to greater incentives to develop green strategies (Hoﬀ-
man, 2005). Moreover, the idea that it pays to be green became even
more attractive when it was linked to the NRBV as "it is a theory of how
an individual ﬁrm might gain a competitive advantage by going green"
(Berchicchi and King, 2007: 516). The economic beneﬁts deriving from
pollution reduction are, however, usually underestimated by managers
(e.g. Hart, 1995; Berchicchi and King, 2007 for a discussion) and this
might lead to sub-optimal levels of environmental eﬀorts if it is acknowl-
edged that innovations might more than oﬀset the cost of compliance to
stringent environmental standards (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
This underestimation can be driven by the costs associated to collect-
ing proper information about the values and returns of diﬀerent pollution
reduction factors as ﬁrms can be unwilling to bear the search costs and
thus can underexploit or abuse certain "greener" production techniques
(King and Lenox, 2002). Waste prevention processes, for instance, have
proved to be underexploited because of their not-directly-observable ben-
eﬁts (e.g. King and Lenox, 2002; Russo and Fouts, 1997).
Lastly, the literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (e.g.
Porter and Kramer, 2002 and 2006), which is centered on environmental
responsibility (e.g. Hart, 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2011), provides insights on
the potential positive gains associated to a socially responsible behaviors.
According to these studies (e.g. Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Kotler and Lee,
2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003), irrespective of whether the adoption
of cleaner technologies can be a by-product of a strategy aiming at im-
proving ﬁrms'market evaluation, or the access to new (green) markets,
or as part of a cost-reduction strategy (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008), such
an adoption might still engender positive business performance eﬀects.
Given this framework of analysis, a range of empirical studies have
been devoted to test the relationship between ﬁnancial and environmen-
tal performance in a ﬁrm-level analysis (e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 1992;
5All in all, the concept of dynamic capability, originally developed by Teece and
Pisano (1994) has been applied to the "environmental" realm. In such a framework
developing and adopting environmental strategies has been interpreted as a way itself
for the ﬁrm of developing dynamic capabilities (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003;
Hart and Milstein, 2003).
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Jaggi and Freedman 1992). Those studies provided a very mixed pic-
ture on the signs of this relation and on the empirical strategies to be
adopted. According to Horvthov (2010), 15% of them found a negative,
55% a positive, and 30% found no eﬀect of environmental performances
on economic performance.
In studying the proﬁtability eﬀects, measured as Returns on Equity
(ROE), of environmental performance ratings in the pulp and paper in-
dustry, Bragdon and Marlin (1972) found support that it pays to be
green. The same positive sign, but with diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial
performance, can also be found in Russo and Fouts (1997), adopting
Returns on Assets (ROA), in Salama (2005), assessing the Corporate Fi-
nancial Performance, and in King and Lenox (2001) and Dowell et al.
(2000), adopting the Tobins' q index.
King and Lenox (2002) provided some further insights by showing
that the positive correlation between ﬁnancial and environmental per-
formance were driven by a particular type of practice, i.e. the waste
prevention methods. A conﬁrmation that less polluting ﬁrms beneﬁt
from improved ﬁnancial performances also comes from Hart and Ahuja
(1996), who furthermore highlighted that Operating Performance (Re-
turns on Sales (ROS) and ROA) was beneﬁting from the year after the
initiation of pollution prevention strategies, while it required 2 years be-
fore ﬁnancial performance (in terms of ROE) was positively aﬀected.
To overcome the simultaneity problem that may arise in a cross sec-
tion setting, i.e. that environmental and economic performance usually
go hand in hand as they are jointly determined and jointly depending on
the unobservable ﬁrms' management strategy, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004)
adopted a Three Stages Least Squares estimation (following Ullmann,
1985) and still found support of a positive relationship between environ-
mental and economic performance.
Contrarily to those evidences, in studying the eﬀect of environmental
performance on ﬁnancial performances measured as ROS on a sample
of US ﬁrms in a cross-section setting, Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) and
Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997) found support for short-term negative eﬀects,
which were stronger for pollution prevention strategies than for end-of-
pipe measures.
A negative eﬀect on the Return on Capital Employed (RoCE) was
also found in the European context, in particular, on the European pa-
per industry using a simultaneous structural model, but when adopting
diﬀerent measurements for the ﬁnancial performance, such as ROE or
ROS, the eﬀect was no longer signiﬁcant (Wagner et al., 2002). Simi-
larly, a neutral eﬀect is also detected by Freeman and Jaggi (1992).
However, Elsayed and Paton (2005) suggested that previous mixed
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results were driven by misspeciﬁcation issues, which were due to the in-
ability of previous contributes to properly account for unobserved ﬁrms'
ﬁxed eﬀects. In confronting a static and a dynamic panel analysis on UK
data, they found that environmental performance has only a weak impact
on the ﬁnancial performance as outlined by their dynamic speciﬁcation,
while the cross-section one suggested stronger (biased) correlations. Co-
herently, Telle (2006) argued the conclusion that "it pays to be green"
is premature, as when applying a random eﬀect panel model instead of
a pooled OLS one, the positive economic gains of environmental perfor-
mances were no longer signiﬁcant.
These heterogeneous results pointed to the conclusion that the ques-
tion is no longer if it does pay to be green, but rather when or for whom
it pays (Telle, 2006; King and Lenox, 2001).
We argue that the question has to be better qualiﬁed in terms of
the typologies of environmental innovations to be considered as what
we expect is that diﬀerent EI engender heterogeneous competitiveness
eﬀects in a ﬁrm-level analysis. Thus, we formulate the research question
as "How does it pay to go green?.
EI can indeed be decomposed into at least two typologies, Energy
and Resource Eﬃciency Innovations (from now on EREI), i.e. those
innovations whose eﬀects consist in a reduction of material and energy
used per unit of output, and Externality Reducing Innovations (ER from
now on), i.e. those innovations aimed at reducing production externalities
such as air, water, noise pollution and harmful materials.
Although both EREI and ER face the "double externality problem"
typical for EI, as they still produce innovation spillover and reduce neg-
ative production externalities, empirical evidences have been provided
that the two typologies are inherently diﬀerent, either in the drivers (e.g.
EREI beneﬁt more from the use of external information sources) or in
the productivity (sales over employees) or in the role of barriers to inno-
vation, which are perceived as more intense for EREI than for other EI
(Rennings and Rammer, 2009).
Evidence is also found that the eﬀects of ﬁrm' s "green" investment
strategy improve ﬁrm' s productive eﬃciency only when the investment
in cleaner production technologies is targeted at reducing (simultane-
ously) both the externalities and the use of raw materials (Antonietti
and Marzucchi, 2013). Furthermore, ﬁrms' ability to generate proﬁts
may diﬀer, depending on their resource bases, between those that re-
spond to a policy compliance by introducing end-of-pipe innovations and
those that redesign their production processes and services (Russo and
Fouts, 1997).
The introduction of end - of - pipe technologies does not fundamen-
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tally modify production processes, thus it does not alter neither ﬁrms'
resources nor capabilities.
Consequently, it is not expected to engender any positive eﬀects on
ﬁrms' competitiveness, while it can rather be just a cost burden to the
ﬁrm and leading to negative outcomes.
Improved environmental performances are indeed expected to engen-
der positive competitive gains when a change in the resource bases and
capabilities follows the redesign of the production process (Russo and
Fouts, 1997). As EREI are actually leading to a reduction in the use
of physical resources, they can consequently be a source of competitive
advantage and thus they are expected to exert a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms'
proﬁtability. Investments in end-of pipe technologies are instead found
to be associated with lower performance (Klassen and Whybark, 1999),
thus we can expect a diﬀerent sign for ER.
Cleﬀ and Rennings (1999) analyzed the categories of end - of - pipe
technologies versus cleaner production technologies, ﬁnding evidence that
end - of - pipe technologies are more related to the motivation of compli-
ance with environmental regulation while cleaner production technologies
are more often introduced for economic reasons such as market share and
cost reduction. Many cleaner production technologies may be improv-
ing energy or material eﬃciency, and many end-of-pipe technologies may
internalize external eﬀects, however the relation of the categories to eco-
nomic theory is not as clear as in the case of EREI and ER. While the
categories of EREI and ER can be explained by investment in private
versus public goods, this is not as clear for cleaner production versus
end-of-pipe.
Coherently our main hypothesis is that proﬁtability eﬀects of EI
are heterogeneous and depend on the typology considered. EREI are
expected to positively aﬀect proﬁtability, as they can lead to a "win
win" situation in which the improvement of environmental performance
is leading to economic gains.
Furthermore, the idiosyncratic characteristics of the resources energy
and materials might lead ﬁrms to beneﬁt of a competitive advantage when
they introduce EREI. ER are instead less related to the exploitation in
the production process of scares resources that may engender competitive
advantages, in case are uniquely exploited and combined. Those are
though not expected to lead to positive proﬁtability gains, as no "win
win" situation might be related to their adoption.
Secondly, we test whether the motivations behind ﬁrms' decisions
to adopt EREI or ER may themselves impact on their proﬁtability
gains. In particular we are going to test whether EREI or ER intro-
duced in response to a current or foreseen regulation ( EREI_REG and
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ER_REG) engender diﬀerent proﬁtability gains compared to EREI or
ER introduced as a reaction to the availability of ﬁnancial incentives,
grants or subsidies speciﬁcally targeted at introducing EI ( EREI_GR
and ER_GR), and also compared to EREI or EI that were voluntarily
introduced by ﬁrms thanks to the existence of voluntary codes or agree-
ments for good environmental practices ( EREI_VOL and ER_VOL).
As far as EI introduced as a response to regulation are concerned,
a wide strand of research emerged to test the existence of a Porter-like
mechanism in assessing the competitiveness eﬀects of the adoption of a
stringent environmental regulation. On the one side, environmental reg-
ulation has been seen as a threat to ﬁrms' competitiveness (e.g. Gollop
and Roberts, 1983) or as a cause that induces ﬁrms to relocate their pro-
duction in less regulated areas as the literature on the pollution haven
hypothesis points out (e.g. Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004 for a sur-
vey).
On the other side, since the seminal contribution by Porter and van
der Linde (1995), a strand of literature aimed at testing the presence of
a possible "win-win" solution has emerged, which may arise after the in-
troduction of an environmental regulation 6 (Beise and Rennings, 2005).
6Several empirical studies provided a conﬁrmation of this hypothesis and it is not
the aim of the current work to provide an exhaustive revision of such a wide and
articulated research ﬁeld.
What we are willing to highlight is that, according to the Porter hypothesis, strict
regulation is not necessarily damaging competitiveness, but can indeed often enhance
it. A properly designed regulation may indeed trigger innovation allowing to oﬀset,
partially or fully, the cost of complying to those standards (Porter and van der Linde,
1995).
Pollution is not only a production externality that diverts the costs from the ﬁrm
to the whole society, as seen in the standard approaches, but it is often also a waste
of resources for the ﬁrm, for example in terms of energy-ineﬃcient production pro-
cesses. Consequently, a properly designed regulation might call ﬁrms' attention about
these ineﬃciencies and suggest technological improvements leading ﬁrms to a Pareto
improvement, coupling environmental protection with competitiveness enhancement
(Ambec et al., 2013). Moreover, the introduction of a speciﬁc regulation in one in-
dustry j in a speciﬁc country i, may engender a "ﬁrst mover" competitive advantage
to the ﬁrms located in i and belonging to j when compared to ﬁrms belonging to
countries that will be introducing such environmental constraints only in a further
period (e.g. Beise and Rennings, 2005).
A conﬁrmation of the hypothesis comes from several empirical studies, for instance,
Rassier and Earnhart (2010) found that the Clean Air Act regulation has improved
the ROS both in the short and in the long run in a sample of publicly owned ﬁrms
in the US chemical manufacturing industry and Lanoie et al. (2008), studying the
eﬀects of the stringency of regulation and Total Factor Productivity growth in Quebec
manufacturing sector, found that the eﬀects are stronger for industries more exposed
to international competition and positive in the long run while negative in the short
run.
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Since Porter sees resource eﬃciency as a part of ﬁrms total eﬃciency,
his hypothesis would imply that mainly EREI show positive eﬀects on
competitiveness, while the eﬀects of ER depend on the degree that envi-
ronmental external eﬀects are already internalised by regulation. Mixed
results have emerged in the empirical literature on the Porter hypothesis.
Rexhäuser and Rammer (2013) were the ﬁrst who properly distinguished
between EREI and ER in testing for the existence of a Porter-like mech-
anism and indeed found a conﬁrmation of the Porter hypothesis only for
EREI, which exert a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms' proﬁtability either when
they are or are not regulation driven, while negative eﬀects are exerted
by ER 7.
What follows is our second hypothesis that proﬁtability eﬀects of
EREI and ER vary according to the motivation that was driving their
adoption by ﬁrms as each of the three motivations may aﬀect the adop-
tion of heterogeneous innovations and this is moderating the proﬁtability
eﬀects of the innovation itself. Regulation driven EI are mainly leading
to an internalisation of negative externalities which can also be beneﬁcial
to the ﬁrm, according to the argument articulated so far and coherently
with the Porter hypothesis. On the other side, ﬁnancial incentives are
usually provided for the introduction of innovations that are not prof-
itable on their own, thus moderating the adoption of less proﬁtable EI,
which are in our case ER rather than EREI, while voluntary adopted
EI are expected to lead mainly to cost saving innovations rather than to
innovations which are perceived as a cost-burden to the ﬁrms.
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 Data
The empirical test of our research hypothesis makes use of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual survey based on a panel sample of
German ﬁrms conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW) in Mannheim.
The 2009 wave of the MIP includes a set of questions on EI that are
coherent with the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006-
2008. The advantage of the MIP with respect to the CIS lies in the fact
that it also surveys information on ﬁrm proﬁtability and market structure
that allows building our dependent and control variables. Furthermore,
as it will be outlined below, we beneﬁted from the opportunity to merge 2
7Nevertheless, the negative eﬀect disappears for ER which are driven by current or
expected regulation, while it is persistently negative for ER which are not regulation-
driven.
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waves of the survey in order to lag the explanatory variables with respect
to the dependent one. The target population are enterprises with 5 or
more employees from most economic sectors 8 and the sample is stratiﬁed
by sector (56 sectors at the 2-digit level of NACE rev. 2.), size class (8
classes according to the number of employees) and region (West Germany
and East Germany). The voluntary nature of the survey is the reason for
a response rate that is lower than in compulsory surveys 9. More impor-
tantly, a non-respondent test has been implemented to test the presence
of a selection bias in the responses and this excluded the existence of
systemic diﬀerences between respondents and non-respondents.
The operative sample used in this research consists of 1063 observa-
tions, which is equal to the 15% of the total sample surveyed in the MIP
2009. The loss of observations is due to the fact that the samples of the
two waves of the MIP that we merged, i.e. the MIP 2009 and the MIP
2011, did not include the same ﬁrms, to the high attrition rate of ﬁrms,
and to the non-responses to all our core variables. We were able to match
only 44% of ﬁrms surveyed in the MIP 2009 with the MIP 2011. Further-
more, most of the ﬁrms surveyed in both waves did not answer all the
questions asked, thus reducing the sample for which we have information
on all the variables we modeled to 1063. A set of robustness checks have
been performed to exclude the presence of a sample selection bias in our
estimates and these will be discussed in the following sections.
3.3.2 Empirical model and variables description
Our ﬁrst research hypothesis is based on the argument that it is required
to diﬀerentiate between the typologies of EI, in particular EREI and
ER, to assess the proﬁtability eﬀects of those innovations will be tested
by confronting the estimations of the model presented in equation (3.1)
and those in equation (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4).
OMi = α+ β1EIi + β2MSi + β3HHIi + β4SIZEi + γSECTi + i (3.1)
OMi = α+β1EREIi+β2ERi+β3MSi+β4HHIi+β5SIZEi+ γSECTi+ i (3.2)
8Excluding farming and forestry, hotels and restaurants, public administration,
health, education, and personal and cultural services. For further details on the MIP,
see Janz et al. (2001) and Aschhoﬀ et al. (2013).
9In 2009 the response rate was 26 percent, corresponding to more than 7.000 ﬁrms
that is not an unusual response rate for voluntary mail surveys in Germany (Grimpe
and Kaiser, 2010).
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OMi = α+ β1EREIi + β2ERi + β3MSi + β4HHIi + β5SIZEi + β6RDi
+β7LPATi + β8PCi + γSECTi + i
(3.3)
OMi = α+ β1EREIi + β2ERi + β3MSi + β4HHIi + β5SIZEi + β6RDi
+β7LPATi + β8PCi + β9EASTi + γSECTi + i
(3.4)
Our dependent variable in all the models is ﬁrms' proﬁtability (OM).
We model ﬁrms' proﬁtability empirically in terms of Returns on Sales
by adopting as a dependent variable (OM) the estimated operating mar-
gin, meant as pre - tax proﬁts over sales (as in Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010
and Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2013). In order to reduce non-responses,
OM data are collected through categorical values that are self-reported
by ﬁrms on an interval scale that follows the distribution presented in
Table 3.1. As investing in a new environmental technology is probably
leading to increasing costs in the short run, while its competitive gains in
possible terms may only be realised in a subsequent period (e.g. Hart and
Ahuja 1996, Elsayed and Paton, 2005), we found it more appropriate to
expect that the adoption of EI in 2006 - 2008 may engender proﬁtability
gains or losses after a certain time lag. For this reason, our dependent
variable is extracted from a subsequent wave of the survey, the MIP 2011,
while all the explanatory variables refer to the MIP 2009 wave.
The merge of these waves of the survey also allows overcoming those
endogeneity problems deriving from the simultaneity between OM and
the explanatory variables and the possible reverse causality issue. More
precisely, this merge allows to model the estimated operating margins in
2010 (OM) on a set of explanatory variables all referred to the time lag
2006-2008 10.
However, the choice of OM as dependent variables still brings about
a set of issues that need to be discussed.
At ﬁrst, the merge of two waves of the survey might engender a selec-
tion bias due to the (possible) attrition of ﬁrms with similar observable
and/or unobservable characteristics within the waves as we anticipated
10In this way we let environmental innovations introduced in the time lag 2006-2008
to start having proﬁtability gains from 2 to 4 years later, i.e. in 2010. An appropriate
choice regarding the time lag is needed. Our choice is supported by previous ﬁndings.
Hart and Ahuja (1996) found that operating performance (ROS and ROA) required
one or two years to be aﬀected by environmental performance, but the eﬀect starts
being no longer signiﬁcant after the third year of lag. Financial performance (ROE)
required instead a time lag of at least 2 years (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Coherently, we
need to choose a lag which is not too short (so we excluded OM measured in 2008)
or too long (so we excluded OM measured in 2012). We thus ﬁnd our choice of a 2
to 4 years lag more adequate than the available alternatives.
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when we described the operative sample. In the section on the robustness
checks this is discussed. Furthermore, the choice of using self-reported
price-cost margin data instead of more objective data might itself be a
limitation.
On the other side, it has to be remarked that in Germany the majority
of ﬁrms were not required to publish their accounting data. Consequently,
the alternative of using balance sheet data instead of the self-reported
would have engendered a clear selection bias as only data for large ﬁrms,
in particular stock corporations, would have been available.
On the contrary, the use of the Mannheim Innovation Panel vari-
able, although self-reported, guarantees the coverage on a representative
sample and this is, in our opinion, a valid motivation for our choice 11.
Table 3.1: Distribution operating margin 2010
OM Freq. Percent
< -5% 60 5.64
-5% to 2% 38 3.57
-2% to 0% 59 5.55
0% to 2% 156 14.68
2% to 4% 161 15.15
4% to 7% 216 20.32
7% to 10% 150 14.11
10% to 15% 127 11.95
>15% 96 9.03
Total 1063 100
Recalling that all the explanatory variables refer to the time lag 2006-
2008, to assess the ﬁrst research question, three key environmental di-
chotomous explanatory variables have been constructed: EI, EREI and
ER 12
11We had to test for the possible bias that may arise because of the presence of
missing values in the dependent variable. A discussion is available in the robustness
checks section.
12The CIS 2006-2008 introduced an ad-hoc section on environmental innovation
in which ﬁrms were asked to answer whether a new or signiﬁcantly improved prod-
uct, process, organisational method or marketing method that creates environmental
beneﬁts were introduced, independently on whether the beneﬁts were the primary
objective of the innovation or its by-product and independently on whether the in-
novation was new to the market or just to the ﬁrm adopting it. Firms were asked
to choose among a set of typologies of environmental innovations they might have
introduced.
The German CIS is wider than the harmonised one as it includes more typologies
of EI a ﬁrm can choose with a set of 9 indicators for process innovations, i.e. 3
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The ﬁrst takes value one when at least one process innovation with
high environmental beneﬁts has been introduced out of a scale of 9 dif-
ferent dimensions (see Table 3.2), independently on the speciﬁc nature
of the innovation, and is estimated in Equation (3.1).
From equation (3.2) to (3.4) the environmental innovation variable
will be split into EREI and ER in order to assess our ﬁrst research
question. EREI takes value one when two conditions are simultane-
ously met: a) the ﬁrm has introduced process innovations bringing to
a reduction of energy and/or material used per unit of output or to a
reduction of CO2 emissions and b) this process innovations lead to high
environmental beneﬁts13.
Similarly, ER is equal to one when externality-reducing process in-
novations leading to high environmental protection have been adopted
by the ﬁrm and zero otherwise. Process innovations that reduce air,
soil, water and noise pollution as well as those to replace dangerous
materials belong to the externality-reducing category. Coherently with
previous literature (Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2013), process innovations
that improve recycling possibilities are not assigned to any of the two
types mainly because recycling may either be a material-saving innova-
tion (thus EREI) or an externality-reducing innovation (ER), depend-
ing on whether it saves the usage of materials or water, or conversely, it
improves the recyclability of wastes 14.
As in Rexhäuser and Rammer (2013), the CO2 emission reduction di-
mension has been assigned to EREI (and not to ER) as it is not feasible
to pursue any CO2 emission reduction without energy eﬃciency improve-
ments as the major driver of CO2 emissions comes from the energy mix
more than the harmonised CIS, and 3 for product innovations. Furthermore, the
German version of the CIS allows ﬁrms to rank the environmental beneﬁts associated
to each typology of EI introduced following a 4-point Likert scale (no, small, medium,
high environmental beneﬁt). It has to be acknowledged that environmental beneﬁts
reported suﬀer of the limitation that they are subjective, i.e. depending on the re-
spondent' s perception, rather than objective, i.e. based for instance on measurable
objective indicators.
13The questionnaire asks ﬁrm to report for each environmental innovation typology
introduced its contribution to environmental protection out of a low, medium, high
scale.
As the interest of this analysis lies in the competitiveness eﬀects of environmental
innovations leading to eﬀective environmental protection, the decision was to focus
only on those with high eﬀects. In a subsequent step also those with high and medium
eﬀects will be considered.
14To be sure that this exclusion does not engender a bias in our results we controlled
whether the assignment of the recycled waste, water or materials category, ﬁrst to ER
and separately to EREI, would have changed our estimation results. We conclude
that results are stable in both the cases. A table with these results is available upon
request.
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used (for a discussion see Cainelli and Mazzanti, 2013).
We acknowledge that CO2 emission reduction innovations are inher-
ently diﬀerent from energy and material reduction ones. For this reason
we needed to test a) whether the exclusion of these innovations from the
analysis and b) whether the assignment of these innovations to the ER
category would have engendered some changes in the results we provided.
Results are stable in both the cases 15. Lastly, given the nature of the
research question, environmental product innovations will be excluded
from this analysis 16. See Table 3.2 for details in the distributions and
composition of EREI and ER and the dimensions of EI considered.
In our baseline speciﬁcations in Equation (3.1) and (3.2) we control for
some variables that have been found to be correlated with our dependent
variable in previous studies (e.g. Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010).
More precisely the Herﬁndahl concentration index (HHI),and some
ﬁrm observable heterogeneities such as size and market share (SIZE and
MS) taking lagged values from the previous wave of the survey to reduce
endogeneity problems. As the literature on ﬁrms' proﬁtability suggests,
highly concentrated markets may pose diﬀerent competitive conditions to
the ﬁrms, and this might impact on ﬁrms' own proﬁtability. More pre-
cisely, previous literature suggests that highly concentrated industries,
i.e. industries in which a small number of ﬁrms account for a great num-
ber of industrial activities, should show higher proﬁtability possibilities
(Capon, Farley and Hoenig, 1990).
Furthermore, monopolistic markets may predict higher proﬁtability.
Accordingly, the Herﬁndahl concentration index at Sector-level 3-digit
calculated by the German Monopoly Commission (HHI), as well as self-
reported (in MIP) ﬁrms market share within the top-selling line of prod-
ucts (MS) have been included in the analysis. As a further robustness
check, industry concentration measures of the 3 (C3) and 6 (C6) biggest
ﬁrms calculated by the German Monopoly Commission has substituted
HHI and as they showed very similar results, they are no longer included
in the tables 17.
The natural logarithm of employees corrected for part time workers
15A table with these results is available upon request.
16The competitiveness returns of new products or services reducing air, water, soil
or noise pollution or energy use, or with improved recycling possibilities after use
will be mainly depending on demand condition rather than on direct eﬃciency gains
(EREI) or on direct environmental compliance costs (ER). Their inclusion into
either EREI or ER variable might thus be misleading in the interpretation of their
eﬀect on competitiveness in this speciﬁc context. Nevertheless, future research might
be focused on a diﬀerent research question whose more accurate focus will allow
including environmental product innovations.
17These tables are available upon request.
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is used to control for the size of the ﬁrm (SIZE).
Description and descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in
Table 3.3.
We then add in Equation (3.3) and in Equation (3.4) to the baseline
speciﬁcation some further variables that may inﬂuence ﬁrm' heteroge-
neous proﬁtability and have been suggested to us by previous literature.
Given the pairwise correlation outlined in Table 3.4 we found it more
appropriate not to proceed with a joint inclusion of all the control vari-
ables of the full speciﬁed model in Equation (3.4) as some potentially
problematic correlations are depicted.
Coherently, in Equation (3.3) we add to previous controls two vari-
ables that capture ﬁrms' technological heterogeneities. The ﬁrst, RD, is
a dichotomous variable accounting for the existence of R&D activities,
either internal or external. We also controlled for ﬁrms' technological
heterogeneities deriving from diﬀerences in the knowledge stock through
the natural logarithm of patent stock (LPAT ), by applying the perpetual
inventory method to patent applications at the European Patent Oﬃce
between 1978 and 2008 and depreciating the stock of knowledge capital
by a 15% yearly discount rate (Griliches and Mairesse, 1984) 18.
The expectation, coherently with previous ﬁndings, is that of a posi-
tive relationship of these variables with OM .
In Equation (3.4) we add a control for the role of being a (non-
environmental) process innovator with dichotomous variable equal to one
if the ﬁrm introduced (non-environmental) process innovation (PC) in
the period 2006-2008 19 and for the East Germany transition process,
through a location variable (EAST ). In all the equations 19 sector dum-
mies are included (SECT ) (as described in Table 3.8) to control for
sectoral heterogeneities that may emerge and impact on the estimation
results.
We can now move to the empirical test of the second hypothesis. Re-
calling that it suggests that EI induced by diﬀerent determinants het-
erogeneously aﬀect ﬁrms' proﬁtability, its test is conducted by estimating
the models in Equations (3.5) to (3.7).
OMi = α+ β1EREI_REGi+ β2ER_REGi + β3EREI_NOREGi
+β4ER_NOREGi + β5MIXED_REGi + γCONTROLSi + i
(3.5)
18The presence of many non-patenting ﬁrms engenders a limit when computing the
natural logarithm of the patent stock. We then substituted 0 values with 0.001, by
adding 0.001 to patent stock before computing its natural logarithm
19As in Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) we tried to capture the presence of cartelistic
behaviors by adding an interaction variable RD ∗Herfindhal index and the presence
of collusion by an interaction variable MS* Herfindhalindex. As they were both
found not to be signiﬁcant, they are no longer included in the analysis.
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OMi = α+ β1EREI_V OLi+ β2ER_V OLi + β3EREI_V OLi
+β4ER_V OLi + β5MIXED_V OLi + γCONTROLSi + i
(3.6)
OMi = α+ β1EREI_GRi+ β2ER_GRi + β3EREI_GRi+ β4ER_GRi
+β5MIXED_GRi + γCONTROLSi + i
(3.7)
The rationale is to include in these Equations (3.5) to (3.7) all the
controls of the full speciﬁed model of the previous Equation (3.4), which
are now synthetically labeled CONTROLS, and to modify the key en-
vironmental innovation variables. Those will be included separately to
avoid multicollinearity among those environmental innovation regressors.
To test our second hypothesis, we consequently built a group of EREI
and ER variables that diﬀer according to the motivation behind their
adoption.
The MIP 2009 asks the ﬁrms to state whether an EI was introduced
as a response to a list of determinants, among which we are interested
in: a) an existing or a foreseen regulation, which allows us to create
the regulation-induced variables (EREI_REG and ER_REG) and the
non-regulation induced (EREI_NOREG and ER_NOREG); b) the
availability of government grants, subsidies, or other ﬁnancial incentives
to EI, which allowed us to build our grant induced variables (EREI_GR
and ER_GR) as well as the non-grant induced ones (EREI_NOGR
and ER_NOGR) and c) voluntary codes or agreements for environ-
mental good practices, through which we built our voluntary agreements
variables (EREI_V OL and ER_V OL) as well as the non-voluntary
agreements driven ones (EREI_NOV OL and ER_NOV OL)20.
The survey does not allow to properly distinguish between a regula-
tion that induced EREI from one that induced ER, it only gives infor-
mation on whether an EI (general) has been induced by regulation and
this applies to grants and voluntary codes as well. In the case of regula-
tion, we could not univocally assign 180 regulation-induced innovations
either to EREI or to ER.
In the case of voluntary codes, the number of ambiguous assignments
is 152, while it is 64 in the case of grant-driven innovations. For this
reason we include in each speciﬁcation in equation (3.3) to (3.5) a variable
for those situations in which an ambiguous assignment was depicted, i.e.
in the cases in which REG, GR or V OL induced both EREI and ER
(MIXED_REG; MIXED_GR and MIXED_V OL).
20The sample slightly changes when moving to the extended speciﬁcation in Equa-
tion (3.5) to (3.7) because of some missing values in the answers provided by respon-
dents on the motivations for EI. The number of observations available for testing the
second hypothesis is 1013 instead of 1063, as in Table 3.6.
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We consequently replace those EREI and ER with zero for which the
assignment was ambiguous not to double count them in the estimations.
The underlying rationale for such a structure is to have in each equation
as complement to one only the non-introduction of any EI 21 in order
to use it as the benchmark to interpret the coeﬃcients of the dummy
variables we included in the models.
Given that our dependent variable is a categorical variable with the
known thresholds as outlined in Table 3.1, we can estimate it through an
interval regression model, which allows us to model ﬁxed and known cut
points, which are in our case both left and right censored, and estimate
the coeﬃcients and Σ2 via Maximum Likelihood (Wooldridge, 2002). 22
3.4 Results, discussion and robustness checks
Estimation results of Equation (3.1) to (3.4) are provided in Table 3.5.
Recalling that column (I) reports the results when the EI variable does
not make any diﬀerentiation on the nature of the innovation itself, we
ﬁnd that in general the adoption of an EI does not play any eﬀect on
ﬁrms' proﬁtability.
If we had stopped here, we would have concluded that a neutral re-
lationship has been depicted between EI and proﬁtability and that it
does not pay to be green. But when we decompose EI by EREI and
ER, we instead ﬁnd a clear conﬁrmation of our ﬁrst research hypoth-
esis, namely that it is appropriate to diﬀerentiate between Energy and
Resource-Eﬃcient innovation and the Externality-Reducing ones as dif-
ferent proﬁtability eﬀects are expected.
More precisely, EREI are exerting a positive and strongly signiﬁcant
21For each EREI and ER we can indeed have the following situations: non− EI
(EREI or ER equal to 0), EI driven by one of the three motivations (EREI or ER
equal to one; motivation - REG, GR or V OL - equal to one, EI not driven (EREI
or ER equal to one; motivation equal to zero). Moreover for each motivation we
have a mixed category we described as MIXED above. In the case of regulation, for
instance, we have overall the following categories: EREI_REG, EREI_NOREG,
ER_REG, ER_NOREG, MIXED_REG; NO_EREI; NO_ER.
If we had included in the regressions only EREI_REG and ER_REG, we could
have not been able to disentangle the proﬁtability eﬀect among a) EREI or ER which
were not driven by REG, b)MIXEDEI driven by REG and c) non−EI ﬁrms. For
this reason we included in the regressions also EREI_NOREG, ER_NOREG and
MIXED_REG, so as to keep as benchmark (complement to one) the only category
of non− EI.
22We further checked the validity of our results by transforming the dependent
variable in a Likert scale one, which ranges from 0 to 9 and we estimated the same
models with Ordered Probit and Ordinary Least Squares. As expected results remain
unaltered. Those are available upon request.
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Table 3.5: Estimation results
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
EI 0.3976
(0.4984)
EREI 1.8502*** 1.7776*** 1.7403***
(0.6578) (0.6591) (0.6579)
ER -1.1512* -1.1915* -1.2831*
(0.6753) (0.6821) (0.6795)
SIZE -0.0408 -0.0504 -0.1114 -0.1457
(0.1305) (0.1306) (0.1383) (0.1397)
MS 0.6053 0.6266 0.6088 0.6964
(0.7713) (0.7633) (0.7627) (0.7662)
HHI -0.0041 -0.004 -0.0041 -0.0044
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.003)
RD 0.4938 0.289
(0.4558) (0.4832)
LPAT 0.047 0.0469
(0.063) (0.0629)
EAST -0.0468
(0.4208)
PC 0.5902
(0.452)
Constant 2.8375*** 2.8254*** 3.2666*** 3.3091***
(0.9344) (0.9399) (1.1847) (1.1855)
Lnsigma
Constant 1.8180*** 1.8146*** 1.8136*** 1.8126***
(0.028) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0281)
N 1063 1063 1063 1063
MLCox-Snell R2 0.055 0.061 0.063 0.065
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
19 Sector Dummies, jointly signiﬁcant (Wald Test), have been included
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eﬀect on ﬁrms' proﬁtability, while on the contrary, ER are negatively
impacting ﬁrms' operating margins (column (II)). This result is robust
to the subsequent inclusion of additional control variables (column (III)
and (IV)).
The expectation that increased resource eﬃciency engenders a posi-
tive economic eﬀect is conﬁrmed. On the one side EREI are innovations
that in reducing the use of materials and energy they reduce production
costs. On the other side diﬀerent combinations in the use of these id-
iosyncratic resources can engender a competitive advantage that a ﬁrm
can exploit in the market. The magnitude of the positive gain is so
depending on the way these two intertwined mechanisms are at work.
ER are conversely neither associated to a cost reduction in the pro-
duction nor to possible competitive advantages deriving from the ex-
ploitation of strategic resources. In general adopting an innovation is a
costly process for the ﬁrm and when those innovations are ER, the costs
actually overcome the beneﬁts in a way that the proﬁtability return of
such an adoption becomes negative.
To better appreciate the results outlined above, we now exploit the
information on what is the motivation behind the adoption of EI and
test our second research hypothesis by estimating Equation (3.5) to (3.7).
Results are reported in Table 3.6.
What emerges is that the motivation behind the adoption of an EI
makes the diﬀerence in terms of proﬁtability gains, giving a ﬁrst conﬁr-
mation of the validity of our second research hypothesis.
When an EI is introduced as a response to a current of future regula-
tion (EREI_REG and ER_REG) with respect to the case in which it
is not driven by regulation (EREI_NOREG and ER_NOREG), ER
is still hampering ﬁrms' competitiveness, coherently with our previous
results, while EREI remains positive and signiﬁcant. This last result
is coherent with the Porter hypothesis framework of analysis, according
to which regulation may help ﬁrms in seeking new production solutions
that allow them to more than oﬀset the costs of compliance and to take
advantage of competitive gains that derive from that. However, to prop-
erly account for the existence of a Porter-like mechanism, a proper and
well-designed regulation might be at stake, while we have no information
on the quality of the regulation we are accounting for in our data 23
As regulation typically induces ﬁrms to internalise their externalities,
the interpretation of our results can be the following: when regulation
works only in the direction of reducing production externalities forcing
ﬁrms to engage in ER, then it can actually hamper ﬁrms' proﬁtability.
On the other side, when regulation induces ﬁrms to improve their resource
23Furthermore, this is out of the scope of the current paper.
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eﬃciency, it results in productivity gains for the ﬁrms.
Moreover, EREI and ER introduced not as a response to environ-
mental regulation do not aﬀect ﬁrms' proﬁtability. More interestingly and
coherently with the previous result, when EI are introduced in response
to the availability of government grants, subsidies, or other ﬁnancial in-
centives, their eﬀect on competitiveness are conﬁrmed to be negative for
ER, and no longer signiﬁcant for EREI. This result can be interpreted
by considering that a ﬁnancial incentive is usually paid for innovations
that are not proﬁtable on their own.
And it is mainly paid for adopting ER innovation rather than EREI,
since EREI may not be eligible for state aids with the same frequency.
In line with this reasoning, EREI are proved to engender positive prof-
itability eﬀects only when they are not introduced as a response to a
ﬁnancial incentive (EREI_NOGR is positive and signiﬁcant).
Furthermore, the negative eﬀect of ER on proﬁtability is higher than
that reported in Table 3.5, suggesting that the negative proﬁtability eﬀect
of ER is even stronger when those innovations are motivated by the
presence of a ﬁnancial incentive. The explanation might lay in the lack
of an "additionality" eﬀect of this subsidy or grant. In other terms,
some ﬁrms may opportunistically substitute innovations undertaken as a
response to the incentive while, at the same time, abandon any further
innovation activity. This behavior might end up with stronger losses for
the ﬁrm. A proper test on the grant additionality is however not possible
in this context for the absence of speciﬁc data.
Unfortunately the survey from which we built the variables under
investigation does not allow to have precise information on the nature of
the speciﬁc grant or ﬁnancial incentive that ﬁrms are actually receiving
24.
Lastly, when the driver of the adoption is the presence of voluntary
codes or agreements, no eﬀects on competitiveness are depicted. Intu-
itively the adoption of such voluntary codes is intertwined with orga-
nizational costs, which are not necessarily making the adoption itself
24We can assume that generally ﬁnancial incentives or grants are paid for the adop-
tion of innovations that ﬁrms would not otherwise introduce, but we are conscious
that the whole spectrum of ﬁnancial incentives and grants is heterogeneous. Grants
might indeed be paid also for the development of new and cleaner technologies that
would alone lead to gains also in the absence of the ﬁnancial incentive, and here the
expectation would be of a positive proﬁtability eﬀect. However, our data do not allow
to diﬀerentiate the proﬁtability eﬀect of each and every incentive among this spec-
trum. We are only able to get information on whether ﬁrms received any ﬁnancial
incentive or not and, consequently, to interpret the net (proﬁtability) eﬀect of such
heterogeneous policy interventions when they moderated the adoption of environmen-
tal innovations. Future research using diﬀerent data might be devoted to shed light
on this issue and we thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Table 3.6: Estimation results EI disentangled by drivers
(I) (II) (III)
EREI_REG 1.7726*
(1.0424)
ER_REG -1.8817**
(0.911)
EREI_NOREG 1.3738
(1.0072)
ER_NOREG -0.7887
(1.4041)
MIXED_REG 0.9503
(0.91)
EREI_VOL 1.1825
(1.3684)
ER_VOL -1.8301
(1.4693)
EREI_NOVOL 2.0289**
(0.8007)
ER_NOVOL -1.1232
(0.8536)
MIXED_VOL 0.2572
(1.1979)
EREI_GR 0.298
(1.0669)
ER_GR -6.7765***
(1.7819)
EREI_NOGR 2.0365***
(0.7451)
ER_NOGR -1.0242
(0.7398)
MIXED_GR -0.4049
(1.6742)
SIZE -0.119 -0.1175 -0.1131
(0.1422) (0.1422) (0.1419)
RD 0.2106 0.2103 0.2054
(0.4964) (0.4962) (0.4966)
LPAT 0.0421 0.0464 0.0452
(0.0636) (0.0643) (0.0639)
MS 1.0802 1.0674 1.0048
(0.7899) (0.7912) (0.7924)
HHI -0.0057* -0.0058* -0.0056*
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
EAST -0.067 -0.0772 -0.0446
(0.4312) (0.4327) (0.4314)
PC 0.6033 0.5867 0.5716
(0.4661) (0.4675) (0.4651)
Constant 3.1272** 3.1468*** 3.0722**
(1.2163) (1.2157) (1.2092)
lnsigma
Constant 1.8085*** 1.8088*** 1.8068***
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287)
N 1013 1013 1013
MLCox-Snell R2 0.065 0.065 0.067
Std errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
19 Sector Dummies, jointly signiﬁcant (Wald Test) included
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proﬁtable. On the other side, EREI that are not introduced as a re-
sponse to voluntary codes or agreements of conduct exert a signiﬁcant
and positive role on the dependent variable (EREI_NOV OL is positive
and signiﬁcant). Lastly, sectoral heterogeneities in the adoption of these
codes of conduct have a role and might help explaining this result.
We previously built our EREI and ER variables by accounting only
for those innovations having a high environmental impact. If we instead
include also those innovations reporting medium or high environmental
beneﬁts, then we can shed more light on the nature of the relationship
between EI and proﬁtability.
In Table 3.7 we report estimation results of Equation (3.1) and (3.2)
in which we replaced respectively EI and EREI − ER by adopting a
more extensive category of EI, to include also those with medium envi-
ronmental impact. What we ﬁnd is that none of the key environmental
variables is still signiﬁcantly aﬀecting ﬁrms' proﬁtability. This suggests
not only that the question whether it pays or not to be green should be
better qualiﬁed as proﬁtability eﬀects arise not in general. More inter-
estingly, it suggests that a minimum threshold of (green) innovativeness
is required before proﬁtability gains arise. Proﬁtability eﬀects might in-
deed arise only for ﬁrms introducing highly innovative innovations, i.e.
innovation whose impact on the environment is strong, while it does not
arise for the entire spectrum of EI one might consider.
Several robustness checks have been implemented to support the va-
lidity of our estimation results.
At ﬁrst, we consider that ﬁrms may be reluctant in providing proﬁt
information data. Indeed, among the 6851 ﬁrms of the MIP2011, 1451
did not answer to the operating margin variable and 703 stated that it
was unknown. To test for the presence of a bias that may arise from
the missing values encountered in our dependent variable OM , we con-
structed a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when information on OM are
provided and 0 otherwise and we modeled the probability of providing
information on OM through a probit model and regressed it on all the
explanatory variables in equation (3.2), rejecting the null hypothesis that
the non-response to OM is random (as in Rexhäuser and Rammer 2013).
As the variable that is driving the non-randomness of the non-responses
is EAST , signiﬁcant in the probit model, it has been selected to construct
the exclusion restriction in a two-step Heckman selection model (Heck-
man, 1979). The coeﬃcient of the mills ratio in the Heckman model is
not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggested that a proper selection bias
is not depicted in our sample data and that the estimation model we
selected above was more appropriate. However, the results we presented
were conﬁrmed by this selection model, as EREI and ER were both
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Table 3.7: Estimation results EI with medium or high environmental
beneﬁts
(I) (II)
EI (med or high) -0.16
(0.4212)
EREI (med or high) -0.0735
(0.4687)
ER (med or high) 0.135
(0.4851)
SIZE -0.1314 -0.1355
(0.1399) (0.1412)
RD 0.3238 0.2972
(0.4887) (0.4868)
LPAT 0.0548 0.056
(0.0633) (0.0633)
MS 0.6691 0.6573
(0.7758) (0.7778)
HHI -0.0045 -0.0044
(0.0029) (0.0029)
EAST -0.0023 0.0088
(0.4224) (0.4212)
PC 0.6255 0.5813
(0.4609) (0.4592)
Constant 3.4456*** 3.4098***
(1.1939) (1.1902)
Lnsigma
Constant 1.8161*** 1.8161***
(0.028) (0.028)
N 1063 1063
MLCox-Snell R2 0.052 0.052
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
19 Sector Dummies, jointly signiﬁcant
(Wald Test), have been included
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reporting the expected signs and were both signiﬁcant 25.
As we have anticipated, the non-response to all the variables in the
sample restricted our operative sample to only 1063 observations. We
then controlled that the operative sample did not systematically diﬀer
from the full sample in the mean of the main variables included into
the analysis, which are reported in Table 3.9. We see that our results
are robust as the dependent variable (OM) and our main explanatory
variables (EREI, ER and EI) do not present signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the means between the sample we used in the regression and the full
sample (that is representative of the population)26.
3.5 Conclusions
Whether it pays or not to be green has been a core topic of the empirical
literature on environmental and economic performance over the past two
decades and assessing this question contributes to evaluate whether it
is possible to maintain economic growth without giving up to increasing
environmental performances. With a focus on the ﬁrm level and by an-
alyzing survey data for the German ﬁrms, we contribute to this debate
by showing that the question needs to be better qualiﬁed if we want to
empirically operationalise it. Our main ﬁnding is that it is indeed more
appropriate to open the box of the environmental realm and separately
consider the competitive gains of diﬀerent typologies of EI, those reduc-
ing externalities from those increasing energy and resources eﬃciency. It
depends on how to be green.
If we look at innovations leading to a reduction in the use of energy
and resources, we can conclude that it deﬁnitely pays to be green. If we
then turn to innovations aimed at reducing externalities, such as harmful
materials and air, water, noise and soil pollutions, we should conclude
that it does not pay to be green. Although it may be proﬁtable in the
long run due to improved environmental regulation, it does not pay oﬀ
in the short run when environmental regulation has to be faced as an
external restriction. Energy and Resource Eﬃcient innovations are here
conﬁrmed to lead to potential "win win" situations, in which reducing
the environmental impact of production is contextually improving ﬁrms'
economic performances.
25These results are not reported here but are available upon request.
26We also recognise that some of the control variables we included (HHI, RD,
SIZE, PC, EAST and LPAT ) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the two samples. Al-
though this might change the coeﬃcients of those variables in our regression results,
we do not consider it a limitation to our analysis as they were just included as control
variables and we have not even commented their potentially biased coeﬃcients.
117
The same conclusion does not hold for externality reducing innova-
tions, for which the cost burden of the adoption of the innovation seems to
overcome the potential gains. A threshold of green innovativeness seems
to be at stake and this discriminates between proﬁtable innovations and
not proﬁtable one. Only highly (green) innovative ﬁrms are indeed found
to beneﬁt from the adoption of EREI. When looking at the drivers that
work behind the adoption of each typology of EI considered, we con-
ﬁrm that the motivation inducing their adoption signiﬁcantly impacts
the proﬁtability eﬀects of the innovations. Again, this conﬁrms our main
hypothesis of the need to better articulate the question to allow identi-
fying speciﬁc heterogeneous patterns that we found in our data. Lastly,
a Porter- like mechanism emerges as far as regulation induced EREI
are concerned, conﬁrming previous results in the ﬁeld (Rexhäuser and
Rammer, 2013).
The current work suﬀers however of a set of limitations we could
not solve. One of the main limitations of this analysis lies in the cross-
sectional nature of the data. Although the merge of two subsequent waves
of the Mannheim Innovation Panel allows to include an appropriate time
lag between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, so
as to overcome endogeneity issues, it is still reasonable to assume that
proﬁtability is also depending on ﬁrms' unobserved heterogeneity, for in-
stance, on technology level or managerial quality, that a panel analysis
setting would have allowed to control for. Unfortunately, the key envi-
ronmental variables were only available for the 2009 wave, thus limiting
a panel exploitation of the data. The best eﬀort was made in trying to
capture the majority of elements driving to observed heterogeneity by
adding a set of lagged comprehensive controls, but the room for unob-
served heterogeneity is still open and it is not possible to model for it
accurately in a cross section setting.
On the other side, the great advantage of this analysis lies in the
use of speciﬁc survey data on the adoption of environmental innovation,
which allows overcoming the limits of previous studies deriving from the
need to ﬁnd adequate proxies for EI.
Another (smaller) limitation lies in the speciﬁc time frame we consid-
ered. Although Germany is one of the European countries who recovered
faster from the economic downturn and that it is consequently acceptable
to assume that values of competitiveness in 2010 have not been under-
pinned by the crisis, it would have been preferred to account for that in
the empirical strategy. Unfortunately, for such a structural break test to
be implemented, a time-series data dimension would have been required,
and, once again, this dataset does not allow covering such an issue.
Future research might be also directed to further investigate the com-
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petitiveness eﬀects of diﬀerent typologies of EI by focusing on speciﬁc
technology ﬁelds through a patent-based analysis instead of a survey one.
That would allow to look more deeply into the technology of each inno-
vation generated and to diﬀerentiate between the competitiveness eﬀects
engendered by ER technologies and EREI technologies.
Another interesting future line of research, if these data will be avail-
able, would be to apply panel data methodologies on a panel dataset
which collects information on EI for more than one subsequent wave.
That would also allow controlling for those unobserved ﬁrms' hetero-
geneities that might impact on ﬁrms' proﬁtability that we could not
completely take into consideration in the current work.
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Appendix
Table 3.8: Sector variables and distribution
Description Sector NACE Rev 2.0 Frequency Percentage
Agriculture, mining, quarrying A and B 23 2.16
Food, Beverages, Tobacco C10-C12 38 3.57
Textile, Leather and wearing app C13-C15 30 2.82
Wood, paper and printing C16-C18 (Bench) 51 4.8
Chemicals, Coke and petroleum products C19-C20 30 2.82
Pharmaceutical industry C21 7 0.66
Rubber, plastic and o.n.m.p. C21-C23 67 6.3
Basic and fabricated metals C24-C25 84 7.9
Computer, Electronic and optical products C26 72 6.77
Electrical equipment C27 28 2.63
Machinery and equipment and o.m. C28, C32, C33 128 12.04
Motor Vehicles and other transport eq. C29-C30 34 3.2
Furniture C31 17 1.6
Electricity and Water supply D-E 93 8.75
Construction F 13 1.22
Wholesale and retail G 62 5.83
Transport and communication H-J 110 10.35
Banking, assurances, renting services K-L, N 98 9.22
R&D, consulting, education and other se M, O-T 78 7.34
Total 1063 100
Table 3.9: Diﬀerences in the variables' means between operative and full
sample
N Mean N Mean
variable Operative sample Operative sample Full sample Full sample
OM 1063 5.614299 2274 5.611258
EREI 1063 0.1063029 6369 0.103941
ER 1063 0.1044214 6313 0.0947252
EI 1063 0.1702728 6400 0.1639063
EAST * 1063 0.332079 7061 0.3084549
SIZE * 1063 4.0275 6319 3.646109
RD * 1063 0.4854186 7061 0.4112732
PC * 1063 0.3941675 7061 0.3444271
HHI * 1063 46.94077 7045 44.67348
LPAT * 1063 -7.488904 7061 -7.834
MS 1063 0.2750892 3391 0.2680772
Variables with * are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the samples with a conﬁdence level of 95%
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Conclusions: summary of
results and policy implications
The achievement of the European 2020 policy goals is strictly interrelated
with the development, adoption and exploitation of more sustainable
production methods and products by ﬁrms.
Environmental innovations (EI) are seen in the current work as an
instrument that allow to meet the policy target of reducing air emissions,
without giving up to economic competitiveness. In other words, EI seems
to be central elements for pursuing the greener economy that is placed
at the center of the current international agenda.
At the same time, through the adoption of EI by ﬁrms, a decou-
pling between environmental pressure and economic growth may occur,
pointing to an economic growth that is more and more independent from
environmental damages, as the theory of the environmental Kutznets
curve (EKC) sets forth.
The current thesis has the general objective to shed more light on
such innovations, given on the one side the central role they have been
attributed and, on the other one, the special elements that characterize
them (Rennings, 1998; 2000). More speciﬁcally, each Chapter identiﬁes
the gaps in the previous literature in the ﬁeld and tries to ﬁll them.
At the centre of the analysis in the whole thesis is the investigation
of the drivers and the implications of EI. With the term drivers I refer
to all those elements that push or pull ﬁrms' decisions to engage in an
environmental-innovative activity, meant as the adoption of EI or the
generation of environmental technologies as well. With the word impli-
cations I mainly refer to the economic consequences in terms of gains or
losses that the adoption of EI engender for the ﬁrms.
Grounding on previous literature in the ﬁelds of the environmental
economics and of the economics of innovation, each of the three essays has
investigated EI under multiple perspectives. Moreover, the exploitation
of heterogeneous data-sources has made the analysis richer.
In developing this work, a big eﬀort has been made in order to prop-
erly balance the need of a structural coherence along the Chapters with
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the need of being original and to add my contribution to the existing
literature. Coherence mainly comes from a neo-schumpeterian approach
adopted throughout the thesis, which sees (green) innovation and tech-
nological advances as creative reactions that are key driving forces for
economic change. EI are thus placed at the centre of each of the three
empirical analysis, and their determinants, drivers and implications have
been analyzed.
Originality comes from the choice to focus in each an every essay on
very speciﬁc and not investigated (yet) research questions, so that each
essay can constitute an autonomous and separately exploitable contribu-
tion to the literature in the ﬁeld.
Each of the three Chapters, through the exploitation of diﬀerent
methodologies and data sources, autonomously contributed to answer
original research questions and helps in ﬁlling the gaps that have been
discovered in previous existing literature.
In the ﬁrst Chapter it emerged that EI share some similarities with
technological and non-technological innovations but they do also diﬀer
substantially in the drivers that foster their adoption. In particular their
more systemic nature than standard technological innovations has been
stressed, as information from partners that are external to the supply
chain (e.g. KIBS, research institutions, universities and competitors)
has appeared more important (De Marchi and Grandinetti, 2013) and
innovation cooperation (e.g. in R&D) has been shown to work more ef-
fectively for EI (De Marchi, 2012). Two main implications follow. A
general implication is that these diﬀerences make the analysis of the de-
terminants of EI appropriate, as the previous literature on the drivers of
standard technological and non technological innovations may not per-
fectly ﬁt the case of EI. Furthermore, the Chapter highlights that some of
the building-blocks of the open innovation mode are at stake also in the
case of EI. Consequently, not only internal but also external information
sources spur the adoption of EI. It derives that, in terms of policy impli-
cation, to foster the adoption of EI by ﬁrms the policy-maker should also
take into consideration the role that networking and external sourcing
strategies play.
A policy designed at favoring the search for and exploitation of infor-
mation coming from the external boundaries of the ﬁrm (e.g. business
partners, suppliers or universities or research organization) can actu-
ally help ﬁrms in improving their environmental-innovativeness. Helping
knowledge exchanges and networking among ﬁrms and other organisa-
tions could thus contribute to a sustainable growth in Europe. Removing
the barriers that hamper the development of a "green" open innovation
mode, such as ﬁrms' lack of a network capacity that favors the interac-
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tion with external partners, is thus a key policy intervention that would
allow the diﬀusion of EI (Montresor et al., 2013). Policy support to in-
novation cooperation such as R&D partnership or technology transfer
should however not be too wide, as it should also take into account the
non-linearities that emerged in the empirical investigation presented in
the Chapter, according to which the exploitation of external knowledge
sources may be detrimental after a certain threshold.
In Chapter 2 it has been outlined that regulation induces innovations
directed towards sustainability but it has been also stressed that countries
diverge in the magnitude of their regulatory pressure. The main goal of
the Chapter was thus to understand whether inducement mechanisms are
at stake also in a context characterized by weak environmental regulatory
pressure, such as the Italian one (Ha²£i£ et al., 2009).
Exploiting patent data in green technologies of Italian Regions, the
empirical analysis performed pointed to the conclusion that regional-
sectoral environmental performances positively inﬂuence the generation
of green knowledge. The main implication of this ﬁnding is that an
inducement mechanism is at stake also in the Italian context, that is
characterized, as anticipated, by weak regulatory pressure. In qualifying
these mechanisms of inducement, it has been found that the vertical
linkages along the value chain, i.e. those user-producer dynamics that
occur along the value chain, do play a central role. The main conclusion
is that not only some inducement is at stake also in the presence of
weak regulatory pressure, but also that this inducement works through
corporate socially responsible behaviors. Those are indeed translated
into an increase in the derived demand for cleaner technologies. In other
words, the generation of green knowledge, measured by green patents, is
stimulated by corporate socially responsible behaviors that are expressed
by the derived demand for cleaner technologies.
The main policy implication is that the development of green tech-
nologies can be stimulated by raising entrepreneur's awareness of both
environmental and also economic relevance of their environmental perfor-
mances. In order to do that, policies aimed at creating an entrepreneurial
culture that attributes a high weight to the environmental performances
can stimulate the development of green technologies (e.g. Audretsch,
2007), with the important caveat that a properly designed policy should
account for sectoral and regional heterogeneities.
Chapter 3 concludes the analysis on EI by providing an investigation
on the economic implications that derive for the ﬁrms from their adop-
tion. Measures of ﬁrm's proﬁtability have been adopted to analyze the
economic implications of EI. Following a ﬁrm-level analysis, the main
research question was to understand whether it pays or not to be green.
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As previous literature focusing on the same research question found
very heterogeneous results, the Chapter proposed an original focus to
properly deal with this topic.
This original approach consisted in diﬀerentiating between typologies
of EI, on the one side energy and material saving innovations and on the
other one externality reducing innovations. Secondly, the diﬀerentiation
was made starting from the motivations that drove ﬁrms' decision to
adopt EI.
The empirical results conﬁrmed the appropriateness of the strategy
adopted, as diﬀerent proﬁtability gains stem from diﬀerent typologies of
innovations and from diﬀerent motivations behind their adoption. The
main general implication is that the category of EI is broad and includes
innovations that are intrinsically diﬀerent. Consequently, a proper diﬀer-
entiation is required to establish the competitiveness eﬀects associated
with their adoption.
But what is really relevant from this Chapter are its policy implica-
tions.
The most important one is that it pays to be green: green strategies
can pay in terms of economic returns, conﬁrming the premises that, in a
ﬁrm level setting, it is possible to improve ﬁrms' environmental perfor-
mances without giving up to their economic growth.
However, this sentence needs to be better qualiﬁed, as it holds for a
particular typology of innovation, i.e. those aimed at reducing the en-
ergy or material used per unit of output and only when the environmental
impact associated is high. When looking at innovations that reduce the
negative externalities of production, ﬁrms' proﬁtability is instead dam-
aged.
Fostering the adoption of EI by ﬁrms might be a good policy target,
as it might help both the environment and ﬁrms' proﬁtability. Policy
makers should however be carefully looking at which typologies of EI
they are willing to stimulate, as they engender heterogeneous proﬁtabil-
ity gains. Moreover, the possibility for a policy intervention as an incen-
tive for ﬁrms' innovative activities has been supported by the empirical
analysis looking at the role for regulation, ﬁnding a conﬁrmation of the
widely discussed Porter hypothesis. At the same time, results that have
been found for the role of ﬁnancial grants or subsidies are less promis-
ing. This points to the conclusion that also diﬀerent policies engender
heterogeneous innovative responses that are translated into very diﬀerent
proﬁtability outcomes. It is not enough to place an environmental regu-
lation, but this has to be properly targeted and designed to be eﬀective
and reach its goals.
Future extension of the research lines that emerged in this thesis can
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be drawn.
The analysis performed in Chapter 1 can be extended to include those
element that favor the absorption of external knowledge by ﬁrms, such
as R&D and its so-called "second face", that on the one side (ﬁrst face)
is a direct input to innovations and, on the other side (second face),
helps reducing the cognitive distance between the ﬁrm and its external
knowledge sources (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).A panel analysis on ﬁrm
level data will then be really helpful in overcoming some reverse causality
issues that can arise from the empirical applications proposed. Unfortu-
nately ﬁrm level data on the adoption of environmental innovations are
not available yet for more than one year (wave), thus making it impossible
to perform such an analysis.
Possible future extension of Chapter 2 is to invert the link of causality
between environmental performances and green technologies that has
been identiﬁed in the Chapter. Furthermore, it would have been useful
to analyze the longitudinal development of regional air emissions, but at
time being, only data for Italian Regions in 2005 are available.
A patent analysis to disentangle the proﬁtability eﬀect of diﬀerent
environmental innovations, identiﬁed by their IPC codes, instead of be-
ing self-reported (as in Chapter 3) might also be an interesting further
extension. It would have also been useful to exploit balance sheet data
on proﬁtability instead of self-reported ones (as in the last Chapter), but
this was not possible given the anonymization procedures of ﬁrm micro
data set forth by the statistical oﬃces. Lastly, a relevant extension of the
last Chapter would be to look at the economic eﬀects of EI not only for
ﬁrms but for the whole society, by looking at measures of productivity
or employment growth instead of proﬁtability ones.
These developments are already in my research agenda for the very
next future.
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